# Fullerton

# Rd 2 Neg v Southwestern

## 1NC

### Off

#### Transitioning to socialism is not a financial incentive

Czinkota 2009 **-** Associate Professor at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University (Michael, Fundamentals of International Business, p. 69)

Financial incentives offer special funding for the investor by providing, for example, land or buildings, loans, and loan guarantees. Non financial incentives include guaranteed government purchases, special protection from competition through tariffs, import quotas, and local content requirements, and investments in infrastructure facilities.

#### The aff also increases restrictions- nationalizing energy would require new restrictions on quotas and how much to produce

#### They are extra topical- the aff nationalizes energy types that are not listed in the topic- they nationalize all of them

#### Vote Negative

#### Limits—resolutional limits encourage AFF innovation, predictive research on a designated topic, and clash—a precursor to productive education. Also, the inherent value of arguments within limits is greater, which link turns education arguments.

#### Bidirectionality- allowing the aff to increase restrictions allows them to do the literal opposite of the topic- that prevents negative preparation

### Off

#### Nationalizing the oil market causes Saudi prolif, and China rise

Chris Black Major, US Army April 2009 “Post Oil America and a renewable energy policy leads to the abrogation of the Middle East to China” http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a530125.pdf

In the quest to reduce the consumption of oil, the US is failing to see the larger impact of a renewable energy policy. Reverse engineering over 60 years of policy, strategy, diplomacy, and military efforts to ensure the free flow and access to oil will inevitably cause a “vacuum” of American access, presence, and influence in a highly volatile region; raise the specter of larger militaries; cause an increasing need for nuclear weapons; shift security and cooperation guarantees; and disrupt the US economy and foreign policy. The implementation of a renewable energy policy begins to shift US prominence in the Persian Gulf to one dominated by China, resulting in US loss of strategic access and influence in an already volatile region. China presently practices a pure form of realpolitik in the region as they do not demand much of their energy suppliers nor care about the attendant politics of the region so long as they have a reliable oil stream. Saudi Arabia, as the largest producer of oil and keeper of the Islamic faith, will look to maintain their hold on power and will recognize the shift from the US to China and with it their security umbrella that has been provided by the US. Saudi Arabia will be happy to increase their relationship with China as that not only brings them large revenues for their national budget, it also brings a “no questions asked” policy of arms purchases and a lack of concern over Saudi’s domestic policies, their quest for nuclear weapons, or their stance towards Israel. As the US weans itself from oil it will accelerate the already occurring geopolitical shift in the Middle East from a region dominated by the United States to one that will be dominated by China. As a result of this shift, the US will lose access and influence in the region and realignments will occur among nation states leading the Saudis to grow their military and accelerate their quest for nuclear weapons. Unencumbered by the US, Saudi Arabian domestic policies will shift towards the more extreme versions of Wahhabism, leading towards an even harder stance towards Israel.

#### Saudi prolif causes extinction

Eric Edelman et al (Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Former Undersecretary for Defense) and Andrew Krepinevich (President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment) and Evan Montgomery (Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) February 2011 “The dangers of a nuclear Iran” http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/2010.12.27-The-Dangers-of-a-Nuclear-Iran.pdf

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also ordered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several diªerent ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer.Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the npt since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of di⁄cult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the npt. n-player competition Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other.Multipolar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarinebased nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly,would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war. Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft.

#### China rise causes escalation

Zbigniew K. Brzezinski (CSIS counselor and trustee and cochairs the CSIS Advisory Board. He is also the Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, in Washington, D.C. He is cochair of the American Committee for Peace in the Caucasus and a member of the International Advisory Board of the Atlantic Council. He is a former chairman of the American-Ukrainian Advisory Committee. He was a member of the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State from 1966 to 1968; chairman of the Humphrey Foreign Policy Task Force in the 1968 presidential campaign; director of the Trilateral Commission from 1973 to 1976; and principal foreign policy adviser to Jimmy Carter in the 1976 presidential campaign. From 1977 to 1981, Dr. Brzezinski was national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter. In 1981, he was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom for his role in the normalization of U.S.-China relations and for his contributions to the human rights and national security policies of the United States. He was also a member of the President’s Chemical Warfare Commission (1985), the National Security Council–Defense Department Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy (1987–1988), and the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (1987–1989). In 1988, he was cochairman of the Bush National Security Advisory Task Force, and in 2004, he was cochairman of a Council on Foreign Relations task force that issued the report Iran: Time for a New Approach. Dr. Brzezinski received a B.A. and M.A. from McGill University (1949, 1950) and Ph.D. from Harvard University (1953). He was a member of the faculties of Columbia University (1960–1989) and Harvard University (1953–1960). Dr. Brzezinski holds honorary degrees from Georgetown University, Williams College, Fordham University, College of the Holy Cross, Alliance College, the Catholic University of Lublin, Warsaw University, and Vilnius University. He is the recipient of numerous honors and awards) February 2012 “After America” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/after\_america?page=0,0

China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership.¶ At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty.

### Off

#### The affs use of the political as the background for their ethical action is the ultimate unethical act

Adam Thurschwell (Asst. Prof. of Law, Cleveland State University) 2003 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 1193

Thus, as Derrida puts it, "ethics enjoins a politics and a law ... . but the political or juridical content that is thus assigned remains undetermined, still to be determined beyond knowledge, beyond all presentation, all concepts ... ." n26 No determinate content issues from the ethical demand because ethics, in Derrida's (and Levinas's) sense, is non-normative. To derive a legal or political rule of decision from one's ethical responsibility would be, paradoxically, to displace that responsibility onto a "calculation," and thus would itself be unethical precisely to the extent that it relieves one of further responsibility for the decision in any given case. Ethics therefore demands a legal/political decision that can only rest on something like a "mystical foundation," n27 since such a decision cannot be founded on any determinable rules, reasons or values without abandoning its claim to ethical status. Accordingly, the legal/political decision can only be "determined beyond knowledge, beyond all presentation, all concepts" n28 - which is to say, determined on the basis of something that resembles pure faith.

#### Government extension robs individuals of agency

Machan, Auburn University Philosophy professor, 3

(Tibor R, Research Fellow at Hoover Institution Stanford University, Passion for Liberty, pg. 19-20)

Those who wanted to retain some elements of the political outlook that Locke's position displaced, namely, the view that people belonged to the country—were, in fact, subjects of the country's head, the king or government—found a way to use the concept of human rights to advocate their essentially reactionary position. (Yes, Virginia, Karl Marx was a reactionary!) They appropriated the concept of human individual rights to mean not liberties from others but services from them. It is not that one has the right to seek happiness, for example, but that one has a right to be made happy! Positive rights are, in fact, The main reason why the founders established a government that secures our rights is that they agreed with Locke and a few others throughout human history who held that justice requires that communities fit human beings as moral agents with personal responsibility to govern their own lives. It is to protect their moral agency that warrants the establishment of governments via the consent of the governed. With the introduction of the conceptual perversion known as positive rights, it has become impossible for government to govern by a set of consistent standards that had been provided by the theory of individual rights. Positive rights, as already noted, must be in inherent conflict—when someone is conscripted to serve another, he or she no longer can serve some of his or her own purposes or, indeed, even the purposes of many others, given the scarcity of time and skills to which others are supposedly naturally entitled. Most certainly, positive rights conflict with our basic negative rights to life, liberty, and property, In the last analysis, the doctrine of positive rights leaves government free to impose its arbitrary standards—one day it is to help AIDS research, the next to foster the arts by supporting public broadcasting, and the following day it is to solve the problem of immoderate smoking habits among the citizenry. No standards of restraint apply—indeed, as in a fascistic system, anything goes that the leaders think is important. The only difference is that the leaders, say in the United States, still abide some modicum of democracy.

Voting issue!

Sylvester Petro, professor of law at Wake Forest, Spring 1974, Toledo Law Review, p480

However, one may still insist on echoing Ernest Hemingway – “I believe in only one thing: liberty.” And it is always well to bear in mind David Hume’s observation: “It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once.” Thus, it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no import because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism, and the end of all human aspiration. Ask Solzhenstyn, Ask Milovan Djilas. In sum, if one believes in freedom as a supreme value and proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit.

#### Alternative –Reject the affirmatives displacement of their ethical commitment on outside institutions but embrace the individual ethical responsibility embodied within the 1AC

#### Their focus on the atrocities that the government creates and trades off with recognizing our own personal complicity with violence. Only by refusing to make statements like “the United States Federal Government should” allows us to transform our own personal will to violence that is the root of their impacts

Susanne Kappeler (Associate Professor at Al-Akhawayn University) 1995 The Will to Violence: The Politics of Personal Behaviour, pg. 75-76

War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation, the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence, of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all. 'We are the war', writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell [my friend], but I see it everywhere. It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you, in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war . . . And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible, we permit it to happen.5 'We are the war' - and we also 'are' the sexual violence, the racist violence, the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime', for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. 'We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal.6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility — leading to the -well-known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens — even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia - since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers. For we tend to think that we cannot 'do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN — finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like 'I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution.'7 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non-comprehension': our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

### Case

#### No try or die – squo may not be perfect but we’re shifting towards full political inclusion now incrementally – any war is a net-bigger turn to the aff

http://www.commondreams.org/views04/1230-05.htm Gwynne **Dyer** December 30, 200**4** is a Canadian journalist based in London whose articles are published in 45 papers worldwide. This is an abridged version of the last chapter in his updated book, War, first published in 1985. His latest book is Future: Tense. The Coming Global Order, published by McClelland and Stewart. by the Toronto Star The End of War Our Task Over the Next Few Years is to Transform the World of Independent States into a Genuine Global Village by Gwynne Dyer

War is deeply embedded in our history and our culture, probably since before we were even fully human, but weaning ourselves away from it should not be a bigger mountain to climb than some of the other changes we have already made in the way we live, given the right incentives. And we have certainly been given the right incentives: The holiday from history that we have enjoyed since the early '90s may be drawing to an end, and another great-power war, fought next time with nuclear weapons, may be lurking in our future. The "firebreak" against nuclear weapons use that we began building after Hiroshima and Nagasaki has held for well over half a century now. But the proliferation of nuclear weapons to new powers is a major challenge to the stability of the system. So are the coming crises, mostly environmental in origin, which will hit some countries much harder than others, and may drive some to desperation. Add in the huge impending shifts in the great-power system as China and India grow to rival the United States in GDP over the next 30 or 40 years and it will be hard to keep things from spinning out of control. With good luck and good management, we may be able to ride out the next half-century without the first-magnitude catastrophe of a global nuclear war, but the potential certainly exists for a major die-back of human population. We cannot command the good luck, but good management is something we can choose to provide. It depends, above all, on preserving and extending the multilateral system that we have been building since the end of World War II. The rising powers must be absorbed into a system that emphasizes co-operation and makes room for them, rather than one that deals in confrontation and raw military power. If they are obliged to play the traditional great-power game of winners and losers, then history will repeat itself and everybody loses. Our hopes for mitigating the severity of the coming environmental crises also depend on early and concerted global action of a sort that can only happen in a basically co-operative international system. When the great powers are locked into a military confrontation, there is simply not enough spare attention, let alone enough trust, to make deals on those issues, so the highest priority at the moment is to keep the multilateral approach alive and avoid a drift back into alliance systems and arms races. And there is no point in dreaming that we can leap straight into some never-land of universal brotherhood; we will have to confront these challenges and solve the problem of war within the context of the existing state system. The solution to the state of international anarchy that compels every state to arm itself for war was so obvious that it arose almost spontaneously in 1918. The wars by which independent states had always settled their quarrels in the past had grown so monstrously destructive that some alternative system had to be devised, and that could only be a pooling of sovereignty, at least in matters concerning war and peace, by all the states of the world. So the victors of World War I promptly created the League of Nations. But the solution was as difficult in practice as it was simple in concept. Every member of the League of Nations understood that if the organization somehow acquired the ability to act in a concerted and effective fashion, it could end up being used against them, so no major government was willing to give the League of Nations any real power. Instead, they got World War II, and that war was so bad — by the end the first nuclear weapons had been used on cities — that the victors made a second attempt in 1945 to create an international organization that really could prevent war. They literally changed international law and made war illegal, but they were well aware that all of that history and all those reflexes were not going to vanish overnight. It would be depressing to catalogue the many failures of the United Nations, but it would also be misleading. The implication would be that this was an enterprise that should have succeeded from the start, and has failed irrevocably. On the contrary; it was bound to be a relative failure at the outset. It was always going to be very hard to persuade sovereign governments to surrender power to an untried world authority which might then make decisions that went against their particular interests. In the words of the traditional Irish directions to a lost traveler: "If that's where you want to get to, sir, I wouldn't start from here." But here is where we must start from, for it is states that run the world. The present international system, based on heavily armed and jealously independent states, often exaggerates the conflicts between the multitude of human communities in the world, but it does reflect an underlying reality: We cannot all get all we want, and some method must exist to decide who gets what. That is why neighboring states have lived in a perpetual state of potential war, just as neighboring hunter-gatherer bands did 20,000 years ago. If we now must abandon war as a method of settling our disputes and devise an alternative, it only can be done with the full co-operation of the world's governments. That means it certainly will be a monumentally difficult and lengthy task: Mistrust reigns everywhere and no nation will allow even the least of its interests to be decided upon by a collection of foreigners. Even the majority of states that are more or less satisfied with their borders and their status in the world would face huge internal opposition from nationalist elements to any transfer of sovereignty to the United Nations. The good news for humans is that it looks like peaceful conditions, once established, can be maintained. And if baboons can do it, why not us? The U.N. as presently constituted is certainly no place for idealists, but they would feel even more uncomfortable in a United Nations that actually worked as was originally intended. It is an association of poachers turned game-keepers, not an assembly of saints, and it would not make its decisions according to some impartial standard of justice. There is no impartial concept of justice to which all of mankind would subscribe and, in any case, it is not "mankind" that makes decisions at the United Nations, but governments with their own national interests to protect. To envision how a functioning world authority might reach its decisions, at least in its first century or so, begin with the arrogant promotion of self-interest by the great powers that would continue to dominate U.N. decision-making and add in the crass expediency masquerading as principle that characterizes the shifting coalitions among the lesser powers in the present General Assembly: It would be an intensely political process. The decisions it produced would be kept within reasonable bounds only by the need never to act in a way so damaging to the interest of any major member or group of members that it forced them into total defiance, and so destroyed the fundamental consensus that keeps war at bay. There is nothing shocking about this. National politics in every country operates with the same combination: a little bit of principle, a lot of power, and a final constraint on the ruthless exercise of that power based mainly on the need to preserve the essential consensus on which the nation is founded and to avoid civil war. In an international organization whose members represent such radically different traditions, interests, and levels of development, the proportion of principle to power is bound to be even lower. It's a pity that there is no practical alternative to the United Nations, but there isn't. If the abolition of great-power war and the establishment of international law is truly a hundred-year project, then we are running a bit behind schedule but we have made substantial progress. We have not had World War III, and that is thanks at least in part to the United Nations, which gave the great powers an excuse to back off from several of their most dangerous confrontations without losing face. No great power has fought another since 1945, and the wars that have broken out between middle-sized powers from time to time — Arab-Israeli wars and Indo-Pakistani wars, mostly — seldom lasted more than a month, because the U.N.'s offers of ceasefires and peacekeeping troops offered a quick way out for the losing side. If you assessed the progress that has been made since 1945 from the perspective of that terrifying time, the glass would look at least half-full. The enormous growth of international organizations since 1945, and especially the survival of the United Nations as a permanent forum where the states of the world are committed to avoiding war (and often succeed), has already created a context new to history. The present political fragmentation of the world into more than 150 stubbornly independent territorial units will doubtless persist for a good while to come. But it is already becoming an anachronism, for, in every other context, from commerce, technology, and the mass media to fashions in ideology, music, and marriage, the outlines of a single global culture (with wide local variations) are visibly taking shape. It is very likely that we began our career as a rising young species by exterminating our nearest relatives, the Neanderthals, and it is entirely possible we will end it by exterminating ourselves, but the fact that we have always had war as part of our culture does not mean that we are doomed always to fight wars. Other aspects of our behavioral repertoire are a good deal more encouraging. There is, for example, a slow but quite perceptible revolution in human consciousness taking place: the last of the great redefinitions of humanity. At all times in our history, we have run our affairs on the assumption that there is a special category of people (our lot) whom we regard as full human beings, having rights and duties approximately equal to our own, and whom we ought not to kill even when we quarrel. Over the past 15,000 or 20,000 years we have successively widened this category from the original hunting-and-gathering band to encompass larger and larger groups. First it was the tribe of some thousands of people bound together by kinship and ritual ties; then the state, where we recognize our shared interests with millions of people whom we don't know and will never meet; and now, finally, the entire human race. There was nothing in the least idealistic or sentimental in any of the previous redefinitions. They occurred because they were useful in advancing people's material interests and ensuring their survival. The same is true for this final act of redefinition: We have reached a point where our moral imagination must expand again to embrace the whole of mankind. It's no coincidence that the period in which the concept of the national state is finally coming under challenge by a wider definition of humanity is also the period that has seen history's most catastrophic wars, for they provide the practical incentive for change. But the transition to a different system is a risky business: The danger of another world war which would cut the whole process short is tiny in any given year, but cumulatively, given how long the process of change will take, it is extreme. That is no reason not to keep trying. Our task over the next few generations is to transform the world of independent states in which we live into some sort of genuine international community. If we succeed in creating that community, however quarrelsome, discontented, and full of injustice it will probably be, then we shall effectively have abolished the ancient institution of warfare. Good riddance.

#### Cap key to heg

Peter Gowan. "US Hegemony Today." Monthly Review. 2003. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m1132/is\_3\_55/ai\_105368629/pg\_1

American hegemony since 1945 has been structurally different in its degree and type of dominance from that of any other power in the history of capitalism. Instead of simply being the biggest power with the biggest capitalism among a number of great powers, the United States was able to exercise political dominance over the entire capitalist core. Before 1945 different capitalist centers had geographically different zones of political and economic dominance. The United States ended that arrangement, making the whole capitalist world its geographical sphere of political dominance. On this basis it shaped and reshaped the conditions and forms of international capital accumulation throughout the capitalist world.

#### US engagement as a superpower creates the preconditions for peace- statistical data proves wars have been in decline since American became the superpower

Owen 11 John M. Owen Professor of Politics at University of Virginia PhD from Harvard "DON’T DISCOUNT HEGEMONY" Feb 11 www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the downward trend in international war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war); the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically American hegemony. A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon. The same case can be made, with somewhat more difficulty, concerning the spread of democracy. Washington has supported democracy only under certain conditions—the chief one being the absence of a popular anti-American movement in the target state—but those conditions have become much more widespread following the collapse of communism. Thus in the 1980s the Reagan administration—the most anti-communist government America ever had—began to dump America’s old dictator friends, starting in the Philippines. Today Islamists tend to be anti-American, and so the Obama administration is skittish about democracy in Egypt and other authoritarian Muslim countries. But general U.S. material and moral support for liberal democracy remains strong.

#### Stats prove that heg and interdependence are the reason that conflict is decreasing

Steven Pinker (Professor of Psychology at Harvard University) September 24, 2011 “Violence Vanquished” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html

On the day this article appears, you will read about a shocking act of violence. Somewhere in the world there will be a terrorist bombing, a senseless murder, a bloody insurrection. It's impossible to learn about these catastrophes without thinking, "What is the world coming to?" But a better question may be, "How bad was the world in the past?" Believe it or not, the world of the past was much worse. Violence has been in decline for thousands of years, and today we may be living in the most peaceable era in the existence of our species. The decline, to be sure, has not been smooth. It has not brought violence down to zero, and it is not guaranteed to continue. But it is a persistent historical development, visible on scales from millennia to years, from the waging of wars to the spanking of children. This claim, I know, invites skepticism, incredulity, and sometimes anger. We tend to estimate the probability of an event from the ease with which we can recall examples, and scenes of carnage are more likely to be beamed into our homes and burned into our memories than footage of people dying of old age. There will always be enough violent deaths to fill the evening news, so people's impressions of violence will be disconnected from its actual likelihood. Evidence of our bloody history is not hard to find. Consider the genocides in the Old Testament and the crucifixions in the New, the gory mutilations in Shakespeare's tragedies and Grimm's fairy tales, the British monarchs who beheaded their relatives and the American founders who dueled with their rivals. Today the decline in these brutal practices can be quantified. A look at the numbers shows that over the course of our history, humankind has been blessed with six major declines of violence. The first was a process of pacification: the transition from the anarchy of the hunting, gathering and horticultural societies in which our species spent most of its evolutionary history to the first agricultural civilizations, with cities and governments, starting about 5,000 years ago. For centuries, social theorists like Hobbes and Rousseau speculated from their armchairs about what life was like in a "state of nature." Nowadays we can do better. Forensic archeology—a kind of "CSI: Paleolithic"—can estimate rates of violence from the proportion of skeletons in ancient sites with bashed-in skulls, decapitations or arrowheads embedded in bones. And ethnographers can tally the causes of death in tribal peoples that have recently lived outside of state control. These investigations show that, on average, about 15% of people in prestate eras died violently, compared to about 3% of the citizens of the earliest states. Tribal violence commonly subsides when a state or empire imposes control over a territory, leading to the various "paxes" (Romana, Islamica, Brittanica and so on) that are familiar to readers of history. It's not that the first kings had a benevolent interest in the welfare of their citizens. Just as a farmer tries to prevent his livestock from killing one another, so a ruler will try to keep his subjects from cycles of raiding and feuding. From his point of view, such squabbling is a dead loss—forgone opportunities to extract taxes, tributes, soldiers and slaves. The second decline of violence was a civilizing process that is best documented in Europe. Historical records show that between the late Middle Ages and the 20th century, European countries saw a 10- to 50-fold decline in their rates of homicide. The numbers are consistent with narrative histories of the brutality of life in the Middle Ages, when highwaymen made travel a risk to life and limb and dinners were commonly enlivened by dagger attacks. So many people had their noses cut off that medieval medical textbooks speculated about techniques for growing them back. Historians attribute this decline to the consolidation of a patchwork of feudal territories into large kingdoms with centralized authority and an infrastructure of commerce. Criminal justice was nationalized, and zero-sum plunder gave way to positive-sum trade. People increasingly controlled their impulses and sought to cooperate with their neighbors. The third transition, sometimes called the Humanitarian Revolution, took off with the Enlightenment. Governments and churches had long maintained order by punishing nonconformists with mutilation, torture and gruesome forms of execution, such as burning, breaking, disembowelment, impalement and sawing in half. The 18th century saw the widespread abolition of judicial torture, including the famous prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" in the eighth amendment of the U.S. Constitution. At the same time, many nations began to whittle down their list of capital crimes from the hundreds (including poaching, sodomy, witchcraft and counterfeiting) to just murder and treason. And a growing wave of countries abolished blood sports, dueling, witchhunts, religious persecution, absolute despotism and slavery. The fourth major transition is the respite from major interstate war that we have seen since the end of World War II. Historians sometimes refer to it as the Long Peace. Today we take it for granted that Italy and Austria will not come to blows, nor will Britain and Russia. But centuries ago, the great powers were almost always at war, and until quite recently, Western European countries tended to initiate two or three new wars every year. The cliché that the 20th century was "the most violent in history" ignores the second half of the century (and may not even be true of the first half, if one calculates violent deaths as a proportion of the world's population). Though it's tempting to attribute the Long Peace to nuclear deterrence, non-nuclear developed states have stopped fighting each other as well. Political scientists point instead to the growth of democracy, trade and international organizations—all of which, the statistical evidence shows, reduce the likelihood of conflict. They also credit the rising valuation of human life over national grandeur—a hard-won lesson of two world wars. The fifth trend, which I call the New Peace, involves war in the world as a whole, including developing nations. Since 1946, several organizations have tracked the number of armed conflicts and their human toll world-wide. The bad news is that for several decades, the decline of interstate wars was accompanied by a bulge of civil wars, as newly independent countries were led by inept governments, challenged by insurgencies and armed by the cold war superpowers. The less bad news is that civil wars tend to kill far fewer people than wars between states. And the best news is that, since the peak of the cold war in the 1970s and '80s, organized conflicts of all kinds—civil wars, genocides, repression by autocratic governments, terrorist attacks—have declined throughout the world, and their death tolls have declined even more precipitously. The rate of documented direct deaths from political violence (war, terrorism, genocide and warlord militias) in the past decade is an unprecedented few hundredths of a percentage point. Even if we multiplied that rate to account for unrecorded deaths and the victims of war-caused disease and famine, it would not exceed 1%. The most immediate cause of this New Peace was the demise of communism, which ended the proxy wars in the developing world stoked by the superpowers and also discredited genocidal ideologies that had justified the sacrifice of vast numbers of eggs to make a utopian omelet. Another contributor was the expansion of international peacekeeping forces, which really do keep the peace—not always, but far more often than when adversaries are left to fight to the bitter end. Finally, the postwar era has seen a cascade of "rights revolutions"—a growing revulsion against aggression on smaller scales. In the developed world, the civil rights movement obliterated lynchings and lethal pogroms, and the women's-rights movement has helped to shrink the incidence of rape and the beating and killing of wives and girlfriends. In recent decades, the movement for children's rights has significantly reduced rates of spanking, bullying, paddling in schools, and physical and sexual abuse. And the campaign for gay rights has forced governments in the developed world to repeal laws criminalizing homosexuality and has had some success in reducing hate crimes against gay people. \* \* \* \* Why has violence declined so dramatically for so long? Is it because violence has literally been bred out of us, leaving us more peaceful by nature? This seems unlikely. Evolution has a speed limit measured in generations, and many of these declines have unfolded over decades or even years. Toddlers continue to kick, bite and hit; little boys continue to play-fight; people of all ages continue to snipe and bicker, and most of them continue to harbor violent fantasies and to enjoy violent entertainment. It's more likely that human nature has always comprised inclinations toward violence and inclinations that counteract them—such as self-control, empathy, fairness and reason—what Abraham Lincoln called "the better angels of our nature." Violence has declined because historical circumstances have increasingly favored our better angels. The most obvious of these pacifying forces has been the state, with its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. A disinterested judiciary and police can defuse the temptation of exploitative attack, inhibit the impulse for revenge and circumvent the self-serving biases that make all parties to a dispute believe that they are on the side of the angels. We see evidence of the pacifying effects of government in the way that rates of killing declined following the expansion and consolidation of states in tribal societies and in medieval Europe. And we can watch the movie in reverse when violence erupts in zones of anarchy, such as the Wild West, failed states and neighborhoods controlled by mafias and street gangs, who can't call 911 or file a lawsuit to resolve their disputes but have to administer their own rough justice. Another pacifying force has been commerce, a game in which everybody can win. As technological progress allows the exchange of goods and ideas over longer distances and among larger groups of trading partners, other people become more valuable alive than dead. They switch from being targets of demonization and dehumanization to potential partners in reciprocal altruism. For example, though the relationship today between America and China is far from warm, we are unlikely to declare war on them or vice versa. Morality aside, they make too much of our stuff, and we owe them too much money. A third peacemaker has been cosmopolitanism—the expansion of people's parochial little worlds through literacy, mobility, education, science, history, journalism and mass media. These forms of virtual reality can prompt people to take the perspective of people unlike themselves and to expand their circle of sympathy to embrace them. These technologies have also powered an expansion of rationality and objectivity in human affairs. People are now less likely to privilege their own interests over those of others. They reflect more on the way they live and consider how they could be better off. Violence is often reframed as a problem to be solved rather than as a contest to be won. We devote ever more of our brainpower to guiding our better angels. It is probably no coincidence that the Humanitarian Revolution came on the heels of the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment, that the Long Peace and rights revolutions coincided with the electronic global village. Whatever its causes, the implications of the historical decline of violence are profound. So much depends on whether we see our era as a nightmare of crime, terrorism, genocide and war or as a period that, in the light of the historical and statistical facts, is blessed by unprecedented levels of peaceful coexistence. Bearers of good news are often advised to keep their mouths shut, lest they lull people into complacency. But this prescription may be backward. The discovery that fewer people are victims of violence can thwart cynicism among compassion-fatigued news readers who might otherwise think that the dangerous parts of the world are irredeemable hell holes. And a better understanding of what drove the numbers down can steer us toward doing things that make people better off rather than congratulating ourselves on how moral we are. As one becomes aware of the historical decline of violence, the world begins to look different. The past seems less innocent, the present less sinister. One starts to appreciate the small gifts of coexistence that would have seemed utopian to our ancestors: the interracial family playing in the park, the comedian who lands a zinger on the commander in chief, the countries that quietly back away from a crisis instead of escalating to war. For all the tribulations in our lives, for all the troubles that remain in the world, the decline of violence is an accomplishment that we can savor—and an impetus to cherish the forces of civilization and enlightenment that made it possible.

#### Capitalism is human nature – cap will reconstitute itself

Paul Bowles. (London School of Economics). Capitalism. 2007. p. 29-31.

A third implication of Smith's analysis is that the motive for entering into exchange is self-interest. I enter into exchange because I value more highly that which I can obtain from you than that which I currently possess, and vice versa. Exchange is therefore based upon self-interest. This is summed up in Smith's (1976: 26-27) famous statement that "it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest". That is, the baker does not sell me bread because s/he wants to remove my hunger but because s/he wishes to make a profit. Market interactions, which have increasingly dominated human interactions, are based on self-interest. A society which functions on the basis of self-interest might be regarded as anything from slightly unseemly to downright immoral and inhuman. For Smith, and subsequent supporters of capitalism, however, it is no such thing; it arises from human propensities and many benefits spring from it. The profit motive is "natural". For Smith, the propensity to exchange (based on self-interest) permitted the division of labour - because I am willing to enter into exchange, I do not need to produce all that I need but can specialize and exchange my surplus production for yours. And it was this specialization and division of labour which allowed countries to greatly increase their productivity and to raise general living standards. Furthermore, the self-interested actions of individuals produced the growth that benefited all: the "Invisible Hand" at work. The "Invisible Hand" metaphor used by Smith is a very powerful one; it is based on the argument that the self-interested actions of individuals lead, not to chaos, but to order and to socially desirable outcomes. Prosperity and social progress is brought about, not by the deliberate interventions of policy-makers seeking to promote social welfare, but as the unintended outcome of decentralized decisions driven by self-interest. This analysis leads to a simple but powerful conclusion: capitalism is a system capable of maximizing social welfare while minimizing government intervention. If the market is left to operate freely then this will lead to better, albeit unintended, social outcomes than even the best-intentioned interventions of governments seeking to impose their preferred outcomes. And government interventions are often very far from best-intentioned. This conclusion, of the social welfare maximizing properties of markets, relies on these markets being competitive markets. It is not surprising that writers such as the Friedmann (1962) attribute monopolies to restrictions placed upon the market by governments rather than by the workings of the market itself. In the absence of government ownership and government restrictions, capitalist markets are presumed to be overwhelmingly competitive. Smith, Friedman and their followers believe that markets and profit-making are "natural". Furthermore, the operation of markets constitutes an important component of human freedom. 'But is self-interest enough to keep society together? Where do "values" come from? For some of capitalism's supporters, self-interest is sufficient and individual preferences and values are seen as innate. For others, "values" need to be reinforced by non-market moral compasses provided by religious and/or "family" values, for example. Politically, these differences are expressed in contemporary societies in the tensions between the libertarian and the socially conservative Right. Both are pro-capitalist, but they differ on the need for extra-market social institutions to guide human behaviour. In the market sphere, however, both sides agree that self-interest is natural and desirable.

#### Cap transition wars = extinction

Rajini Kothari, Prof of PLS – U Delhi, TOWARD A JUST SOCIAL ORDER 1982 p571

Attempts at global economic reform could also lead to a world racked by increasing turbulence, a greater sense of insecurity among the major centres of power – and hence to a further tightening of the structures of domination and domestic repression – producing in their wake an intensification of the old arms race and militarization of regimes, encouraging regional conflagrations and setting the stage for eventual global holocaust.

#### “Structural violence” is reductive and inevitable

Boulding 1977 (Kenneth E. Boulding, economist, educator, peace activist, poet, religious mystic, devoted Quaker, systems scientist, and interdisciplinary philosopher, “Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 14, No. 1, JSTOR)

Finally, we come to the great Galtung metaphors of 'structural violence' 'and 'positive peace'. They are metaphors rather than models, and for that very reason are suspect. Metaphors always imply models and meta- phors have much more persuasive power than models do, for models tend to be the preserve of the specialist. But when a metaphor implies a bad model it can be very dangerous, for it is both persuasive and wrong. The metaphor of structural violence I would argue falls right into this category. The metaphor is that poverty, deprivation, ill health, low expectations of life, a condition in which more than half the human race lives, is 'like' a thug beating up the victim and 'taking his money away from him in the street, or it is 'like' a conqueror stealing the land of the people and reducing them to slavery. The implication is that poverty and its associated ills are the fault of the thug or the conqueror and the solution is to do away with thugs and conquerors. While there is some truth in the metaphor, in the modern world at least there is not very much. Violence, whether of the streets and the home, or of the guerilla, of the police, or of the armed forces, is a very different phenomenon from poverty. The processes which create and sustain poverty are not at all like the processes which create and sustain violence, although like everything else in 'the world, everything is somewhat related to every- thing else.¶ There is a very real problem of the struc- tures which lead to violence, but unfortunately Galitung's metaphor of structural violence as he has used it has diverted atten- tion from this problem. Violence in the behavioral sense, that is, somebody actually doing damage to somebody else and trying to make them worse off, is a 'threshold' phenomenon, rather like the boiling over of a pot. The temperature under a pot can rise for a long time without its boiling over, but at some 'threshold boiling over will take place. The study of the structures which underlie violence are a very important and much neglected part of peace research and indeed of social science in general. Thresh- old phenomena like violence are difficult to study because they represent 'breaks' in the system rather than uniformities. Violence, whether between persons or organizations, occurs when the 'strain' on a system is too great for its 'strength'. The metaphor here is that violence is like what happens when we break a piece of chalk. Strength and strain, however, especially in social systems, are so interwoven historically that it is very difficult to separate them.¶ The diminution of violence involves two¶ possible strategies, or a mixture of the two;¶ one is the increase in the strength of the sys-¶ tem, 'the other is the diminution of the strain.¶ The strength of systems involves habit, culture, taboos, and sanctions, all these 'things which enable a system to stand increasing¶ strain without breaking down into violence. The strains on the system 'are largely dy- namic in character, such as arms races, mu- tually stimulated hostility, changes in rela- tive economic position or political power, which are often hard to identify. Conflicts of interest 'are only part 'of the strain on a sys-¶ tem, and not always the most important part. It is very hard for people ito know their interests, and misperceptions of 'interest take place mainly through the dynamic processes, not through the structural ones. It is only perceptions of interest which affect people's behavior, not the 'real' interests, whatever these may be, and the gap between perception and reality can be very large and re- sistant to change.¶ However, what Galitung calls structural violence (which has been defined 'byone un- kind commenltatoras anything that Galitung doesn't like) was originally defined as any unnecessarily low expectation of life, on that assumption that anybody who dies before the allotted span has been killed, however unintentionally and unknowingly, by some- body else. The concept has been expanded to include all 'theproblems of poverty, desti- tution, deprivation, and misery. These are enormouslyreal and are a very high priority for research and action, but they belong to systems which are only peripherally related to 'the structures whi'ch produce violence. This is not rto say that the cultures of vio- lence and the cultures of poverty are not sometimes related, though not all poverty cultures are cultures of violence, and cer- tainly not all cultures of violence are pover- ty cultures. But the dynamicslof poverty and the success or failure to rise out of it are of a complexity far beyond anything which the metaphor of structural violence can offer. While the metaphor of structural violence performed a service in calling attention to a problem, it may have done a disservice in preventing us from finding the answer.

#### Not the root cause of conflict – other factors overwhelm

Volf 2002 Miroslav Volf (Henry B. Wright Professor of Theology at Yale Divinity School since 1998) Journal of Ecumenical Studies 1-1-02

Though “otherness”–cultural, ethnic, religious, racial difference–is an important factor in our relations with others, we should not overestimate it as a cause of conflict. During the war in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990′s, I was often asked, “What is this war about? Is it about religious and cultural differences? Is it about economic advantage? Is it about political power? Is it about land?” The correct response was, of course, that the war was about all of these things. Monocausal explanations of major eruptions of violence are rarely right. Moreover, various causes are intimately intertwined, and each contributes to others. That holds true also for otherness, which I am highlighting here. However, neither should we underestimate otherness as a factor. The contest for political power, for economic advantage, and for a share of the land took place between people who belonged to discrete cultural and ethnic groups. Part of the goal of the war in the former Yugoslavia was the creation of ethnically clean territories with economic and political autonomy. The importance of “otherness” is only slightly diminished if we grant that the sense of ethnic and religious belonging was manipulated by unscrupulous, corrupt, and greedy politicians for their own political and economic gain. The fact that conjured fears for one’s identity could serve to legitimize a war whose major driving force lay elsewhere is itself a testimony to how much “otherness” matters.

#### Human life is inherently valuable

Penner 2005 Melinda Penner (Director of Operations – STR, Stand To Reason) 2005 “End of Life Ethics: A Primer”, Stand to Reason, http://www.str.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5223

Intrinsic value is very different. Things with intrinsic value are valued for their own sake. They don’t have to achieve any other goal to be valuable. They are goods in themselves. Beauty, pleasure, and virtue are likely examples. Family and friendship are examples. Something that’s intrinsically valuable might also be instrumentally valuable, but even if it loses its instrumental value, its intrinsic value remains. Intrinsic value is what people mean when they use the phrase "the sanctity of life." Now when someone argues that someone doesn’t have "quality of life" they are arguing that life is only valuable as long as it obtains something else with quality, and when it can’t accomplish this, it’s not worth anything anymore. It's only instrumentally valuable. The problem with this view is that it is entirely subjective and changeable with regards to what might give value to life. Value becomes a completely personal matter, and, as we all know, our personal interests change over time. There is no grounding for objective human value and human rights if it’s not intrinsic value. Our legal system is built on the notion that humans have intrinsic value. The Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that each person is endowed by his Creator with certain unalienable rights...." If human beings only have instrumental value, then slavery can be justified because there is nothing objectively valuable that requires our respect. There is nothing other than intrinsic value that can ground the unalienable equal rights we recognize because there is nothing about all human beings that is universal and equal. Intrinsic human value is what binds our social contract of rights. So if human life is intrinsically valuable, then it remains valuable even when our capacities are limited. Human life is valuable even with tremendous limitations. Human life remains valuable because its value is not derived from being able to talk, or walk, or feed yourself, or even reason at a certain level. Human beings don’t have value only in virtue of states of being (e.g., happiness) they can experience. The "quality of life" view is a poison pill because once we swallow it, we’re led down a logical slippery slope. The exact same principle can be used to take the life of human beings in all kinds of limited conditions because I wouldn't want to live that way. Would you want to live the life of a baby with Down’s Syndrome? No? Then kill her. Would you want to live the life of an infant with cerebral palsy? No? Then kill him. Would you want to live the life of a baby born with a cleft lip? No? Then kill her. (In fact, they did.) Once we accept this principle, it justifies killing every infant born with a condition that we deem a life we don’t want to live. There’s no reason not to kill every handicapped person who can’t speak for himself — because I wouldn’t want to live that way. This, in fact, is what has happened in Holland with the Groningen Protocol. Dutch doctors euthanize severely ill newborns and their society has accepted it.

#### Calculation good doesn’t devalue life

Revesz 2008 Richard L. Revesz (Dean and Lawrence King Professor of Law at New York University School of Law, JD Yale Law School) and Michael A Livermore. (JD NYU School of Law, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Integrity, and Managing director of the NYU Law Review). Retaking Rationality How Cots-Benefit Analysis Can Better protect the Environment and Our Health. 2008. P. 1-4.

Governmental decisions are also fundamentally different from personal decisions in that they often affect people in the aggregate. In our individual lives, we come into contact with at least some of the consequences of our decisions. If we fail to consult a map, we pay the price: losing valuable time driving around in circles and listening to the complaints of our passengers. We are constantly confronted with the consequences of the choices that we have made. Not so for governments, however, which exercise authority by making decisions at a distance. Perhaps one of the most challenging aspects of governmental decisions is that they require a special kind of compassion—one that can seem, at first glance, cold and calculating, the antithesis of empathy. The aggregate and complex nature of governmental decisions does not address people as human beings, with concerns and interests, families and emotional relationships, secrets and sorrows. Rather, people are numbers stacked in a column or points on a graph, described not through their individual stories of triumph and despair, but by equations, functions, and dose-response curves. The language of governmental decisionmaking can seem to—and to a certain extent does—ignore what makes individuals unique and morally important. But, although the language of bureaucratic decisionmaking can be dehumanizing, it is also a prerequisite for the kind of compassion that is needed in contemporary society. Elaine Scarry has developed a comparison between individual compassion and statistical compassion.' Individual compassion is familiar—when we see a person suffering, or hear the story of some terrible tragedy, we are moved to take action. Statistical compassion seems foreign—we hear only a string of numbers but must comprehend "the concrete realities embedded there."' Individual compassion derives from our social nature, and may be hardwired directly into the human brain.' Statistical compassion calls on us to use our higher reasoning power to extend our natural compassion to the task of solving more abstract—but no less real—problems. Because compassion is not just about making us feel better—which we could do as easily by forgetting about a problem as by addressing it—we have a responsibility to make the best decisions that we can. This book argues that cost-benefit analysis, properly conducted, can improve environmental and public health policy. Cost-benefit analysis—the translation of human lives and acres of forest into the language of dollars and cents—can seem harsh and impersonal. But such an approach is also necessary to improve the quality of decisions that regulators make. Saving the most lives, and best protecting the quality of our environment and our health—in short, exercising our compassion most effectively—requires us to step back and use our best analytic tools. Sometimes, in order to save a life, we need to treat a person like a number. This is the challenge of statistical compassion. This book is about making good decisions. It focuses on the area of environmental, health and safety regulation. These regulations have been the source of numerous and hard-fought controversies over the past several decades, particularly at the federal level. Reaching the right decisions in the areas of environmental protection, increasing safety, and improving public health is clearly of high importance. Although it is admirable (and fashionable) for people to buy green or avoid products made in sweatshops, efforts taken at the individual level are not enough to address the pressing problems we face—there is a vital role for government in tackling these issues, and sound collective decisions concerning regulation are needed. There is a temptation to rely on gut-level decisionmaking in order to avoid economic analysis, which, to many, is a foreign language on top of seeming cold and unsympathetic. For government to make good decisions, however, it cannot abandon reasoned analysis. Because of the complex nature of governmental decisions, we have no choice but to deploy complex analytic tools in order to make the best choices possible. Failing to use these tools, which amounts to abandoning our duties to one another, is not a legitimate response. Rather, we must exercise statistical compassion by recognizing what numbers of lives saved represent: living and breathing human beings, unique, with rich inner lives and an interlocking web of emotional relationships. The acres of a forest can be tallied up in a chart, but that should not blind us to the beauty of a single stand of trees. We need to use complex tools to make good decisions while simultaneously remembering that we are not engaging in abstract exercises, but that we are having real effects on people and the environment. In our personal lives, it would be unwise not to shop around for the best price when making a major purchase, or to fail to think through our options when making a major life decision. It is equally foolish for government to fail to fully examine alternative policies when making regulatory decisions with life-or-death consequences. This reality has been recognized by four successive presidential administrations. Since 1981, the cost-benefit analysis of major regulations has been required by presidential order. Over the past twenty-five years, however, environmental and other progressive groups have declined to participate in the key governmental proceedings concerning the cost-benefit analysis of federal regulations, instead preferring to criticize the technique from the outside. The resulting asymmetry in political participation has had profound negative consequences, both for the state of federal regulation and for the technique of cost-benefit analysis itself. Ironically, this state of affairs has left progressives open to the charge of rejecting reason, when in fact strong environmental and public health pro-grams are often justified by cost-benefit analysis. It is time for progressive groups, as well as ordinary citizens, to retake the high ground by embracing and reforming cost-benefit analysis. The difference between being unthinking—failing to use the best tools to analyze policy—and unfeeling—making decisions without compassion—is unimportant: Both lead to bad policy. Calamities can result from the failure to use either emotion or reason. Our emotions provide us with the grounding for our principles, our innate interconnectedness, and our sense of obligation to others. We use our powers of reason to build on that emotional foundation, and act effectively to bring about a better world.

#### Sustainable capitalism now

Economist 2012 (The Economist, February 16, 2012, “Blood, Gore and capitalism,” http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2012/02/sustainable-capitalism)

THESE are busy days for Al Gore. In late January, the former vice-president turned climate-change warrior took to the high seas, leading a luxury cruise-cum-fact-finding mission to Antarctica for a bunch of billionaires and policy wonks. They were to see for themselves the melting ice shelf and enjoy what remains of the spectacular views. Then, on February 15th, he was in New York to launch a manifesto (pdf) for what he calls “sustainable capitalism”. The manifesto is published by the non-profit arm of Generation Investment Management, a fund-management company Mr Gore launched in 2004 with David Blood, an ex-partner at Goldman Sachs. The company focuses on firms with what it calls sustainable business models. Unlike Mr Gore's seafaring adventures, which generated a lively blogging war between Mr Gore, shipmates such as Richard Branson, and their right-wing critics, the manifesto is unlikely to set anyone's pulse racing. Yet its very dullness is a virtue, for it reflects the practical lessons learnt from several years of trying to make a success of the investment business, where the devil lies very much in the boring detail. The big picture outlined by Messrs Blood and Gore is hardly novel. An obsession with short-term profits rather than sustainable long-term profits led to the apotheosis of unsustainable capitalism—the crash of September 2008—and the subsequent bail-out of the financial system (though in this case, a lack of environmental concern was the least of the unsustainability problems). Like many people, they had expected this crash to be a turning point, after which capitalism would be reorientated towards the long term. In the event, this did not happen. Indeed, says Mr Gore, the “conversation about sustainability has if anything gone backwards”. To help remedy this, the manifesto suggests several changes to the way the capitalist system works. (It does not go into detail about other farther-reaching reforms for which Mr Gore has long advocated, such as putting a price on carbon.) The sexiest of these, assuming securities law turns you on, is a proposal—already made elsewhere by organisations such as the Aspen Institute—for “loyalty shares” that pay out more to investors that have owned them continuously for at least three years. The average holding period for a share is now seven months, down from several years in the 1990s. Rewarding longer ownership would require a lot of new legislation, particularly to apply it to existing firms. Even among those who favour long-termism there is debate about whether longer ownership is necessarily the same as more effective ownership. Still, it is worth discussing. Lovers of accountancy may be taken more by two other proposals. One, which would probably need legislation though could conceivably be introduced without it by regulators such as America’s Securities and Exchange Commission, is to require all companies to publish “integrated reports” that would include details of their environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance alongside their financial returns. Making such reporting mandatory would be a big step, especially given opposition from the significant number of firms that say that the science of ESG reporting is too immature to be integrated with financial reports. A better approach, cited in the manifesto, may be South Africa's new requirement that firms either publish an integrated report or explain why not. That should stimulate lively debate in either case. The Blood and Gore manifesto also wants firms to have to account for assets that might become "stranded" —worth much less—in the event of policy changes such as the imposition of a price on carbon emissions or higher charges for the use of water. This, the pair contend, would reveal many companies to be in much worse shape than they now appear, given plausible scenarios for how policy in these areas might one day develop. This scenario-planning might seem like a lot of extra work about stuff that is only hypothetical, and thus a burdensome extra cost. But Mr Blood points out that many firms already apply a price of carbon internally,¶ for example when evaluating significant investments, as they increasingly think it likely that governments will impose one. So perhaps it isn't that much more work. A key issue is whether all this extra information and rewards for loyalty will result in demands for more sustainable performance from those who own companies. As well as calling for company bosses to be paid in ways that incentivise sustainable long-term performance, the manifesto rightly shines a critical light on the pay of fund managers employed by institutional shareholders such as pension funds. Often, these managers are paid for short-term financial results, even though the liabilities of those investors—all of our pensions, for instance—are mostly very long-term. This prompts the thought that institutional investors that incentivise short-term performance when their liabilities are long-term may be in breach of their fiduciary duty as managers of other people's money. Indeed, maybe this incentive mismatch could provide the basis for a lawsuit. Messrs Blood and Gore say they are intrigued by the possibilities for such litigation to drive change, though they are not inclined to bring it themselves. But they do want to see the definition of what it means to be a fiduciary expanded to include an emphasis on sustainable investing. To their critics, Messrs Blood and Gore simply want to weigh capitalism down with political correctness. Yet they insist that a focus on firms that deliver sustainable results is actually the best long-term investment strategy. That, after all, is why they created Generation. Unlike earlier "green" and "ethical" investment funds, which screened out "bad" companies, effectively sacrificing financial return for purity, Generation set out to outperform the market by finding firms that it expected to do better than average over the long term.

#### The alternative is not non- capitalism but distorted versions like China’s- the financial crisis doesn’t doom it

Rogoff 2011 (Kenneth Rogoff, Professor of Economics at Harvard University and recipient of the 2011 Deutsche Bank Prize in Financial Economics, was the chief economist at the International Monetary Fund from 2001 Dec. 2, 2011 Is Modern Capitalism Sustainable? http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/is-modern-capitalism-sustainable-)

CAMBRIDGE – I am often asked if the recent global financial crisis marks the beginning of the end of modern capitalism. It is a curious question, because it seems to presume that there is a viable replacement waiting in the wings. The truth of the matter is that, for now at least, the only serious alternatives to today’s dominant Anglo-American paradigm are other forms of capitalism. European capitalism, which combines generous health and social benefits with reasonable working hours, long vacation periods, early retirement, and relatively equal income distributions, would seem to have everything to recommend it – except sustainability. China’s Darwinian capitalism, with its fierce competition among export firms, a weak social-safety net, and widespread government intervention, is widely touted as the inevitable heir to Western capitalism, if only because of China’s huge size and consistent outsize growth rate. Yet China’s economic system is continually evolving. Indeed, it is far from clear how far China’s political, economic, and financial structures will continue to transform themselves, and whether China will eventually morph into capitalism’s new exemplar. In any case, China is still encumbered by the usual social, economic, and financial vulnerabilities of a rapidly growing lower-income country. Perhaps the real point is that, in the broad sweep of history, all current forms of capitalism are ultimately transitional. Modern-day capitalism has had an extraordinary run since the start of the Industrial Revolution two centuries ago, lifting billions of ordinary people out of abject poverty. Marxism and heavy-handed socialism have disastrous records by comparison. But, as industrialization and technological progress spread to Asia (and now to Africa), someday the struggle for subsistence will no longer be a primary imperative, and contemporary capitalism’s numerous flaws may loom larger. First, even the leading capitalist economies have failed to price public goods such as clean air and water effectively. The failure of efforts to conclude a new global climate-change agreement is symptomatic of the paralysis. Second, along with great wealth, capitalism has produced extraordinary levels of inequality. The growing gap is partly a simple byproduct of innovation and entrepreneurship. People do not complain about Steve Jobs’s success; his contributions are obvious. But this is not always the case: great wealth enables groups and individuals to buy political power and influence, which in turn helps to generate even more wealth. Only a few countries – Sweden, for example – have been able to curtail this vicious circle without causing growth to collapse. A third problem is the provision and distribution of medical care, a market that fails to satisfy several of the basic requirements necessary for the price mechanism to produce economic efficiency, beginning with the difficulty that consumers have in assessing the quality of their treatment. The problem will only get worse: health-care costs as a proportion of income are sure to rise as societies get richer and older, possibly exceeding 30% of GDP within a few decades. In health care, perhaps more than in any other market, many countries are struggling with the moral dilemma of how to maintain incentives to produce and consume efficiently without producing unacceptably large disparities in access to care. It is ironic that modern capitalist societies engage in public campaigns to urge individuals to be more attentive to their health, while fostering an economic ecosystem that seduces many consumers into an extremely unhealthy diet. According to the United States Centers for Disease Control, 34% of Americans are obese. Clearly, conventionally measured economic growth – which implies higher consumption – cannot be an end in itself. Fourth, today’s capitalist systems vastly undervalue the welfare of unborn generations. For most of the era since the Industrial Revolution, this has not mattered, as the continuing boon of technological advance has trumped short-sighted policies. By and large, each generation has found itself significantly better off than the last. But, with the world’s population surging above seven billion, and harbingers of resource constraints becoming ever more apparent, there is no guarantee that this trajectory can be maintained. Financial crises are of course a fifth problem, perhaps the one that has provoked the most soul-searching of late. In the world of finance, continual technological innovation has not conspicuously reduced risks, and might well have magnified them. In principle, none of capitalism’s problems is insurmountable, and economists have offered a variety of market-based solutions. A high global price for carbon would induce firms and individuals to internalize the cost of their polluting activities. Tax systems can be designed to provide a greater measure of redistribution of income without necessarily involving crippling distortions, by minimizing non-transparent tax expenditures and keeping marginal rates low. Effective pricing of health care, including the pricing of waiting times, could encourage a better balance between equality and efficiency. Financial systems could be better regulated, with stricter attention to excessive accumulations of debt. Will capitalism be a victim of its own success in producing massive wealth? For now, as fashionable as the topic of capitalism’s demise might be, the possibility seems remote. Nevertheless, as pollution, financial instability, health problems, and inequality continue to grow, and as political systems remain paralyzed, capitalism’s future might not seem so secure in a few decades as it seems now.

#### capitalism solves the environment

Zey 1997 (Michael Zey, Professor of Management at Montclair State University, 1997, The Futurist, “The Macroindustrial Era: A New Age of Abundance and Prosperity”, March/April, http://www.zey.com/Featured\_2.htm)

This brings me to one of my major points about the necessity of growth. A recurring criticism of growth - be it industrial, economic, or technological - centers around its negative consequences. A good example of this is the tendency of economic and industrial growth to generate pollution. However, I contend that growth invariably provides solutions to any problems it introduces. The following examples will illustrate my point. Although economic growth can initially lead to such problems as pollution and waste, studies show that, after a country achieves a certain level of prosperity, the pendulum begins to swing back toward cleaner air and water. In fact, once a nation's per capita income rises to about $4,000 (in 1993 dollars), it produces less of some pollutants per capita. The reason for this is quite simple: Such a nation can now afford technologies such as catalytic converters and sewage systems that treat and eliminate a variety of wastes. According to Norio Yamamoto, research director of the Mitsubishi Research Institute, "We consider any kind of environmental damage to result from mismanagement of the economy." He claims that the pollution problems of poorer regions such as eastern Europe can be traced largely to their economic woes. Hence he concludes that, in order to ensure environmental safety, "we need a sound economy on a global basis." Thus, the answer to pollution, the supposed outgrowth of progress, ought to be more economic growth. Such economic growth can be accelerated by any number of actions: the transfer of technology, the sharing of scientific know-how, and economic investment. The World Bank estimates that every dollar invested in developing countries will grow to $100 in 50 years. As their wealth increases, these countries can take all the necessary steps to invest in pollution-free cars, catalytic converters, and other pollution-free technologies, such as the cleanest of all current large-scale energy sources, nuclear power. They can also afford to invest in bioremediation - the utilization of viruses to literally eat such impurities as oil spills and toxic waste. Russia is actively growing and exporting microorganisms that eat radioactive and metallic wastes from such sources as uranium, plutonium, magnesium, and silver.

#### capitalism Solves War

Hillebrand 2010 Evan E. Hillebrand (Professor of Diplomacy at University of Kentucky and a Senior Economist for the Central Intelligence Agency) 2010 “Deglobalization Scenarios: Who Wins? Who Loses?” Global Economy Journal, Volume 10, Issue 2 2010

A long line of writers from Cruce (1623) to Kant (1797) to Angell (1907) to Gartzke (2003) have theorized that economic interdependence can lower the likelihood of war. Cruce thought that free trade enriched a society in general and so made people more peaceable; Kant thought that trade shifted political power away from the more warlike aristocracy, and Angell thought that economic interdependence shifted cost/benefit calculations in a peace-promoting direction. Gartzke contends that trade relations enhance transparency among nations and thus help avoid bargaining miscalculations. There has also been a tremendous amount of empirical research that mostly supports the idea of an inverse relationship between trade and war. Jack Levy said that, “While there are extensive debates over the proper research designs for investigating this question, and while some empirical studies find that trade is associated with international conflict, most studies conclude that trade is associated with peace, both at the dyadic and systemic levels” (Levy, 2003, p. 127). There is another important line of theoretical and empirical work called Power Transition Theory that focuses on the relative power of states and warns that when rising powers approach the power level of their regional or global leader the chances of war increase (Tammen, Lemke, et al, 2000). Jacek Kugler (2006) warns that the rising power of China relative to the United States greatly increases the chances of great power war some time in the next few decades. The IFs model combines the theoretical and empirical work of the peacethrough trade tradition with the work of the power transition scholars in an attempt to forecast the probability of interstate war. Hughes (2004) explains how he, after consulting with scholars in both camps, particularly Edward Mansfield and Douglas Lemke, estimated the starting probabilities for each dyad based on the historical record, and then forecast future probabilities for dyadic militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and wars based on the calibrated relationships he derived from the empirical literature. The probability of a MID, much less a war, between any random dyad in any given year is very low, if not zero. Paraguay and Tanzania, for example, have never fought and are very unlikely to do so. But there have been thousands of MIDs in the past and hundreds of wars and many of the 16,653 dyads have nonzero probabilities. In 2005 the mean probability of a country being involved in at least one war was estimated to be 0.8%, with 104 countries having a probability of at least 1 war approaching zero. A dozen countries12, however, have initial probabilities over 3%. model predicts four great power wars in the deglobalization scenario vs. 2 in the globalization scenario.16 The globalization scenario projects that the probability for war will gradually decrease through 2035 for every country—but not every dyad--that had a significant (greater than 0.5% chance of war) in 2005 (Table 6). The decline in prospects for war stems from the scenario’s projections of rising levels of democracy, rising incomes, and rising trade interdependence—all of these factors figure in the algorithm that calculates the probabilities. Not all dyadic war probabilities decrease, however, because of the power transition mechanism that is also included in the IFs model. The probability for war between China and the US, for example rises as China’s power13 rises gradually toward the US level but in these calculations the probability of a China/US war never gets very high.14 Deglobalization raises the risks of war substantially. In a world with much lower average incomes, less democracy, and less trade interdependence, the average probability of a country having at least one war in 2035 rises from 0.6% in the globalization scenario to 3.7% in the deglobalization scenario. Among the top-20 war-prone countries, the average probability rises from 3.9% in the globalization scenario to 7.1% in the deglobalization scenario. The model estimates that in the deglobalization scenario there will be about 10 wars in 2035, vs. only 2 in the globalization scenario15. Over the whole period, 2005-2035, the IV. Winners and Losers Deglobalization in the form of reduced trade interdependence, reduced capital flows, and reduced migration has few positive effects, based on this analysis with the International Futures Model. Economic growth is cut in all but a handful of countries, and is cut more in the non-OECD countries than in the OECD countries. Deglobalization has a mixed impact on equality. In many non-OECD countries, the cut in imports from the rest of the world increases the share of manufacturing and in 61 countries raises the share of income going to the poor. But since average productivity goes down in almost all countries, this gain in equality comes at the expense of reduced incomes and increased poverty in almost all countries. The only winners are a small number of countries that were small and poor and not well integrated in the global economy to begin with—and the gains from deglobalization even for them are very small. Politically, deglobalization makes for less stable domestic politics and a greater likelihood of war. The likelihood of state failure through internal war, projected to diminish through 2035 with increasing globalization, rises in the deglobalization scenario particularly among the non-OECD democracies. Similarly, deglobalization makes for more fractious relations among states and the probability for interstate war rises.

#### Best studies

Hegre et al 2009 (H’vard Hegre, Professor of Political Science @University of Oslo, , John R. Oneal, Professor of Political Science @ The University of Alabama, Bruce Russett, Professor of Political Science @ Yale University) August 25, 2009 “Trade Does Promote Peace: New Simultaneous Estimates of the Reciprocal Effects of Trade and Conflict” http://www.yale-university.com/leitner/resources/docs/HORJune09.pdf

Liberals expect economically important trade to reduce conflict because interstate violence adversely affects commerce, prospectively or contemporaneously. Keshk, Reuveny, & Pollins (2004) and Kim & Rousseau (2005) report on the basis of simultaneous analyses of these reciprocal relations that conflict impedes trade but trade does not deter conflict. Using refined measures of geographic proximity and size—the key elements in the gravity model of international interactions—reestablishes support for the liberal peace, however. Without careful specification, trade becomes a proxy for these fundamental exogenous factors, which are also important influences on dyadic conflict. KPR‘s and KR‘s results are spurious. Large, proximate states fight more and trade more. Our re-analyses show that, as liberals would expect, commerce reduces the risk of interstate conflict when proximity and size are properly modeled in both the conflict and trade equations. We provided new simultaneous estimates of liberal theory using Oneal & Russett‘s (2005) data and conflict equation and a trade model derived from Long (2008). These tests confirm the pacific benefit of trade. Trade reduces the likelihood of a fatal militarized dispute, 1950–2000 in our most comprehensive analysis, as it does in the years 1984-97 when additional measures of traders‘ expectations of domestic and interstate conflict are incorporated (Long, 2008) and in the period 1885-2000. This strong support for liberal theory is consistent with Kim‘s (1998) early simultaneous estimates, Oneal, Russett & Berbaum‘s (2003) Granger-style causality tests, and recent research by Robst, Polachek & Chang (2007). Reuveny & Kang (1998) and Reuveny (2001) report mixed results. It is particularly encouraging that, when simultaneously estimated, the coefficient of trade in the conflict equation is larger in absolute value than the corresponding value in a simple probit analysis. Thus, the dozens of published articles that have addressed the endogeneity of trade by controlling for the years of peace—as virtually all have done since 1999—have not overstated the benefit of interdependence. Admittedly, our instrumental variables are not optimal. In some cases, for example, in violation of the identification rule, the creation or end of a PTA may be a casus belli. More importantly, neither of our instruments explains a large amount of variance. Thus, future research should be directed to identifying better instruments. Our confidence in the commercial peace does not depend entirely on the empirical evidence, however; it also rests on the logic of liberal theory. Our new simultaneous estimates—as well as our re-analyses of KPR and KR—indicate that fatal disputes reduce trade. Even with extensive controls for on-going domestic conflict, militarized disputes with third parties, and expert estimates of the risks of such violence, interstate conflict has an adverse contemporaneous effect on bilateral trade. This is hardly surprising (Anderton & Carter, 2001; Reuveny, 2001; Li & Sacko, 2002; Oneal, Russett & Berbaum, 2003; Glick & Taylor, 2005; Kastner, 2007; Long, 2008; Findlay & O‘Rourke, 2007; cf. Barbieri & Levy, 1999; Blomberg & Hess, 2006; and Ward & Hoff, 2007). If conflict did not impede trade, economic agents would be indifferent to risk and the maximization of profit. Because conflict is costly, trade should reduce interstate violence. Otherwise, national leaders would be insensitive to economic loss and the preferences of powerful domestic actors. Whether paid prospectively or contemporaneously, the economic cost of conflict should reduce the likelihood of military conflict, ceteris paribus, if national leaders are rational

#### Economic rationality produces a productive ontology

Boetke 03(Peter, professor of economics at George Mason ,Review of “Economics as Ideology”, published in Revue de Philosophie economique, http://www.gmu.edu/departments/economics/pboettke/pubs/recenstion\_douvrage.pdf)

It is my belief that Hoover is led to this, and other positions in his book that I find objectionable, because he fails to see economics as a discipline which can provide us with knowledge equivalent in ontological stature to the law of gravity and that democratic deliberations often produce economic policies that are the equivalent of engineering proposals for human beings to float rather than walk or drive to their next destination. If my characterization is correct, then as we saw in the quote from Mises, the economists will find themselves in opposition to proposed policy solutions to right this or that perceived social wrong. The economist is put in the unenviable position of reminding fellow citizens that wishing it so doesn't necessarily make it so. The science of economics puts parameters on our utopias, and those who advocate utopian solutions cannot stand any suggestion that their plan for the future is unworkable. The discipline of economics in addition to providing a critique, also suggests that any alternative arrangement being proposed must specify the institutional mechanisms by which incentives between actors will become aligned and the correct information will flow to right actors in time for them to make appropriate decisions or learn from their previous decisions that mistakes were made so the appropriate adjustments will be made. If no mechanism is in place, then incentive incompatibilities and coordination failures will result so that no matter how beautiful the proposed policy might appear on paper the solution will be one of economic waste and political opportunism. Because Hoover's book doesn't deal with economic science in such a sustained way, it cannot at the end of the day explain the evolution of modern economic thought and without that there is no way to understand the creation of contemporary politics in the wake of the breakdown of the Keynesian consensus in the 1970s, the collapse of communism in the 1980s and the realization of the tragic failure of development planning in the third world in the 1990s. Economic reality, it turns out more than psycho-history is the best way to understand the way the world work. The distinction between ontology and epistemology are often forgotten in discussions of the methodology and philosophy of the social sciences. We come to know the laws of gravity in a manner different than we come to know the law of demand (question of epistemology), but the forces at work that are described by the law of gravity and the law of demand are nevertheless real in the same way (question of ontology). The argument for methodological dualism between the natural and social sciences that was made by Mises and then Hayek crucially relies on this distinction between ontology and epistemology. In other words, economics is capable of establishing laws that have the same ontological claim as those derived in physics, but they are arrived at through procedures of inquiry entirely different from those employed in the natural sciences.

#### Economic rationality key to survival

Rockwell 08(Rockwell Jr., president of the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 5/19/2008, Llewellyn, “Everything You Love You Owe to Capitalism,” <http://mises.org/story/2982>)

For a person who has read in economics, and absorbed its essential lessons, the world around us becomes vivid and clear, and certain moral imperatives strike us. We know now that commerce deserves defense. We see entrepreneurs as great heroes. We sympathize with the plight of producers. We see unions not as defenders of rights but as privileged cartels that exclude people who need work. We see regulations not as consumer protection but rather as cost-raising rackets lobbied for by some producers to hurt other producers. We see antitrust not as a safeguard against corporate excess but as a bludgeon used by big players against smarter competitors. In short, economics helps us see the world as it is. And its contribution lies not in the direction of the assembly of ever more facts, but in helping those facts fit a coherent theory of the world. And here we see the essence of our job at the Mises Institute. It is to educate and instill a systematic method for understanding the world as it is. Our battleground is not the courts, nor the election polls, nor the presidency, nor the legislature, and certainly not the wicked arena of lobbying and political payoffs. Our battleground concerns a domain of existence that is more powerful in the long run. It concerns the ideas that individuals hold about how the world works. As we get older and see ever more young generations coming up behind us, we are often struck by the great truth that knowledge in this world is not cumulative over time. What one generation has learned and absorbed is not somehow passed on to the next one through genetics or osmosis. Each generation must be taught anew. Economic theory, I'm sorry to report, is not written on our hearts. It was a long time in the process of being discovered. But now that we know, it must be passed on — and in this way, it is like the ability to read, or to understand great literature. It is the obligation of our generation to teach the next generation. "If the world had drawn the correct lessons from these events, there would be no more need for economic education and no more need even for the bulk of what the Mises Institute does." And we are not merely talking here of knowledge for knowledge's sake. What is at stake is our prosperity. It is our standard of living. It is the well-being of our children and all of society. It is freedom and the flourishing of civilization that stand in the balance. Whether we grow and thrive and create and flourish, or wither and die and lose all that we have inherited, ultimately depends on these abstract ideas we hold concerning cause and effect in society. These ideas do not usually come to us by pure observation. They must be taught and explained.

#### Perfect rationality may be impossible, but doesn’t mean our methods are flawed or useless. The fact that some level of rational behavior can be accounted for means economics is invaluable in studying discourse and human relations

McKenzie 09 [Richard B. McKenzie, Predictably Rational?: In Search of Defenses for Rational Behavior in Economics, p. 203, Springer Press, 2009]

The various historical and disciplinary analyses of rational behavior in this book lead inextricably to an overarching conclusion: Perfect rational behavior, the type widely presumed in neoclassical economics – a decision making process in which people flawlessly (with impeccable consistency and transitivity) make choices among known alternatives with known resources at their disposable – is not, and cannot be, descriptive of the full scope of the human predicament. Frank Knight’s observations regarding “scientific economics” is key to understanding the limits of rational behavior: “The first question in regard to scientific economics is the question of how far life is rational how far its problems reduce to the form of using given means to achieve given ends…[L]ife is at bottom an exploration in the field of values, an attempt to discover values, rather than on the knowledge of them to produce and enjoy them to the greatest possible extent” (1935, p. 105). Nevertheless, there can be a rationality of a sort – and an economics of a sort – so far as wants are determined and to the extent that people can and do contemplate the relative merits of alternative courses of production and consumption. Behavioral psychologists and economists have more recently documented many imperfections in human rationality, and its derivatives, decision making, and behaviors (see Chap. 6), but neoclassical economists should neither consider such findings unexpected or deny them. Oddly, as will be seen in Chaps. 10 and 11, the behaviorals’ findings should even be welcomed as a reason d’etre for the economics as a course of study and method for thinking and deducing insights about real-world human behavior. The standard defense of perfect rationality in economics is Milton Friedman’s statement: In order to make testable predictions, we must abstract from the real world the models of behavior. Assuming complex forms of rationality, or just less than perfect rationality, can complicate thinking with no necessary improvement in the “fruitfulness” of the theory. There are four other major lines of defense for continued use of rationality as a theoretical tool of analysis.

## 2NC

#### I read all the cap good cards that Jeff didn’t read in the 1NC and also extended Kappler because they mostly dropped it

## 1NR

### Interpretation/Violation—2NC

#### (3) the agent of the resolution is the USFG not the individual debaters

Webster’s Guide to Grammar and Writing, pub. date: 2000, <http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm>

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on… If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

#### “The USFG” is the government in Washington D.C.

Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia, pub. date: 2000, <http://encarta.msn.com>

“The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC.”

#### C. Studies prove—depth is better than breadth.

**Arrington 09** (Rebecca, UVA Today, “Study Finds That Students Benefit From Depth, Rather Than Breadth, in High School Science Courses” March 4)

A recent study reports that high school students who study fewer science topics, but study them in greater depth, have an advantage in college science classes over their peers who study more topics and spend less time on each. Robert Tai, associate professor at the University of Virginia's Curry School of Education, worked with Marc S. Schwartz of the University of Texas at Arlington and Philip M. Sadler and Gerhard Sonnert of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics to conduct the study and produce the report. "Depth Versus Breadth: How Content Coverage in High School Courses Relates to Later Success in College Science Coursework" relates the amount of content covered on a particular topic in high school classes with students' performance in college-level science classes. The study will appear in the July 2009 print edition of Science Education and is currently available as an online pre-print from the journal. "As a former high school teacher, I always worried about whether it was better to teach less in greater depth or more with no real depth. This study offers evidence that teaching fewer topics in greater depth is a better way to prepare students for success in college science," Tai said. "These results are based on the performance of thousands of college science students from across the United States." The 8,310 students in the study were enrolled in introductory biology, chemistry or physics in randomly selected four-year colleges and universities. Those who spent one month or more studying one major topic in-depth in high school earned higher grades in college science than their peers who studied more topics in the same period of time. The study revealed that students in courses that focused on mastering a particular topic were impacted twice as much as those in courses that touched on every major topic.

# Rd 3 Neg v Georgia LS

## 1NC

### Off

#### Natural gas production is defined as the process of getting natural gas out of existing wells

EIA Glossary No Date http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm?id=D#dry\_nat\_gas\_prod

Dry natural gas production: The process of producing consumer-grade natural gas. Natural gas withdrawn from reservoirs is reduced by volumes used at the production (lease) site and by processing losses. Volumes used at the production site include (1) the volume returned to reservoirs in cycling, repressuring of oil reservoirs, and conservation operations; and (2) gas vented and flared. Processing losses include (1) nonhydrocarbon gases (e.g., water vapor, carbon dioxide, helium, hydrogen sulfide, and nitrogen) removed from the gas stream; and (2) gas converted to liquid form, such as lease condensate and plant liquids. Volumes of dry gas withdrawn from gas storage reservoirs are not considered part of production. Dry natural gas production equals marketed production less extraction loss.

Vote negative- key to limits- infinite possible places where you can drill- the only predictable mechanism is how the drilling happens- that’s the only thing that all natural gas affs share- key to negative predictability

### Off

#### Debt ceiling will get raised now- Obama PC key

Easley 1-6 [Jason Easley 1-6-2013 PoliticusUSA “Obama is Already Two Steps Ahead of Republicans on the Debt Ceiling” http://www.politicususa.com/obama-steps-republicans-debt-ceiling.html]

By using the fiscal cliff as the first stage of his political strategy, President Obama is already two steps ahead of Republicans on the debt ceiling.¶ Moments after the House passed the fiscal cliff deal, President Obama had already started winning the battle over the debt ceiling.¶ Before the Republican congressional leadership had a chance to utter a word about the debt ceiling, the president said,¶ But we can’t simply cut our way to prosperity. Cutting spending has to go hand-in-hand with further reforms to our tax code so that the wealthiest corporations and individuals can’t take advantage of loopholes and deductions that aren’t available to most Americans. And we can’t keep cutting things like basic research and new technology and still expect to succeed in a 21st century economy. So we’re going to have to continue to move forward in deficit reduction, but we have to do it in a balanced way, making sure that we are growing even as we get a handle on our spending.¶ Now, one last point I want to make — while I will negotiate over many things, I will not have another debate with this Congress over whether or not they should pay the bills that they’ve already racked up through the laws that they passed. Let me repeat: We can’t not pay bills that we’ve already incurred. If Congress refuses to give the United States government the ability to pay these bills on time, the consequences for the entire global economy would be catastrophic — far worse than the impact of a fiscal cliff.¶ Unlike what happened during the healthcare debate and the first debt ceiling crisis, President Obama was not about to give Republicans a moment to breathe and formulate their strategy on the debt ceiling. While Republicans were still fighting among themselves over the fiscal cliff deal, the president was already taking his case about the debt ceiling to the American people.¶ ¶ Obama’s seizing of the issue has established the media narrative, and left Republicans playing catch up. During his Sunday show interviews today, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell was asked repeatedly about raising more revenue as part of a debt ceiling deal. McConnell was left playing defense, and forced to repeat the same just say no obstruction/blame Obama talking points that he has been using for years.¶ It is becoming obvious that while congressional Republicans are bumbling from one self created crisis to the next, the White House is using a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the fiscal cliff, the debt ceiling, and the sequester.¶ As Republicans continued to point fingers and blame for the fiscal cliff deal, President Obama had already moved on to the debt ceiling. The president is two steps ahead of his adversaries, and it looks like the debt ceiling is going to turn into a game of political chicken. Obama is going to sound reasonable in tone, but dare congressional Republicans to default. Republicans have now caved on the payroll tax extension in 2011 and the fiscal cliff in 2012, so the White House is betting, with good reason, that they will blink again on the debt ceiling.¶ The president has public support, the better message, organization, and plan. Obama is running circles around the Republicans while dysfunction, disagreement, and chaos have paralyzed their party. Republicans will bluster about letting the nation default, but no one believes for a second that the big money interests who really run the party will ever let that happen.

#### Removal of energy restrictions drains PC

Whatley 10/30 Michael is the executive VP of the Consumer Energy Alliance. “Energy in the Next Four (Political) Years,” 2012, http://rigzone.com/iphone/article.asp?a\_id=121729

Should Republicans hold the House, and Democrats hold the Senate, it will make it exceedingly difficult for any meaningful energy legislation to pass in the next two years, regardless of who wins the Presidency. Smaller legislative measures, including requisite funding for federal agencies, are likely, but a bipartisan movement to pass a comprehensive energy package is unlikely.¶ For the Obama administration, partisan gridlock in Congress would require the President to push his energy agenda through regulation. Potential items of his docket include efforts to expand federal regulation over hydraulic fracturing and to create new incentives or mandates for alternative fuel consumption, such as a low carbon fuel standard.¶ For a Romney administration, any substantive changes to our current regulatory structure, especially as it relates to public lands, would require Congressional approval, something that a bitterly divided Congress will be loath to provide. Similarly, incentives for renewable energy programs and tax credits would be up to the discretion of the Congress and its budgeting process. However, a Romney administration would likely expand leasing opportunities in the federal offshore and public lands for oil and natural gas development.

#### Debt ceiling failure collapses the economy

Kling 1-2 [Michael Kling 1-2-2013 Money News “Washington Post: Fiscal Cliff Deal Does Not Resolve Debt Limit, Other Problems” http://www.moneynews.com/Economy/debt-limit-problems/2013/01/02/id/469758]

The government faces the catastrophic prospect of default if Congress doesn't raise the debt limit within the next two months. The federal government has already reached its debt limit, and the Treasury Department is taking "extraordinary measures" to meet debt payments. ¶ A recession is likely if Congress doesn't raise the debt ceiling and the country defaults, The Post reports. Even if it does raise the ceiling, continued wrangling could roil financial markets and slow the recovery. ¶ The compromise doesn't remove the uncertainty that's been plaguing American businesses. With the debt ceiling issue unresolved, American businesses may be reluctant to hire more employees and consumer spending may be more constrained.

#### Economic decline causes nuclear conflict

Mathew J. Burrows (counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC), PhD in European History from Cambridge University) and Jennifer Harris (a member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit) April 2009 “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr\_Burrows.pdf

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groupsinheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacksand newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

### Off

#### Natural gas production is intimately tied to notions of American Exceptionalism- rhetoric of it being a “patriotic choice” because of its domestic production as well as declarations of the US being the “Saudi Arabia of natural gas”

Clothier 2012 ¶ [Mark Clothier July 16, 2012 Bloomberg News “Colorado, Oklahoma Pitch Natural-Gas Cars In Michigan” http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-17/colorado-oklahoma-pitch-natural-gas-cars-in-michigan.html]

The governors of Oklahoma and Colorado met with executives from General Motors Co. (GM), Ford Motor Co. (F) and Fiat SpA (F)’s Chrysler Group LLC, to ask for more cars and trucks with engines that run on compressed natural gas.¶ They’ve joined with 11 other states, most rich with natural-gas stockpiles, to commit to buy thousands of those vehicles a year for their fleets. As marketable reserves of natural gas in the U.S. have grown and the per-gallon price has declined compared with gasoline or diesel, the fuel choice is a patriotic and non-partisan one, the governors said.¶ Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin, a Republican, and Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper, a Democrat, met with groups led by Steve Carlisle, a GM vice president; Ford’s Mark Fields, president of the Americas; and Peter Grady, Chrysler’s head of dealer networks. The states will issue a joint request for proposals on July 24, they said.¶ “What we want to do is be a partner to Detroit and make it so it works for them as a business proposition,” Hickenlooper said in an interview yesterday in Dearborn, Michigan.¶ A massive supply of natural gas from North America’s shale rocks has made the U.S. the world’s largest producer of natural gas and forced prices to record discounts versus crude oil.¶ President Barack Obama, in a speech in January in Las Vegas, called the U.S. the “Saudi Arabia of natural gas.” He’s pushed companies and the federal government to buy more vehicles that run on compressed natural gas, or CNG, for their fleets.

#### Exceptionalism leads to extinction- produces a denial of death that demands constant causalities

Peterson ‘7 (Christopher, Lecturer @ University of Western Sidney, Kindred Specters: Death, Mourning, and American Affinity, pgs. 3-8)

While this study accords with the claim that American culture disavows mortality, 1 do not argue for any simple reversal of this interdiction with an aim toward affirming finitude per se. If death is beyond our experience (as Heidegger among others has observed), if I am ultimately absent from "my" own death, then strictly speaking there is nothing for me to recognize or avow. Yet dying is something that I do every day. Indeed, it might be more accurate to say that American culture disavows dying, understood as a process that extends from our birth to our biological demise." Even with such an amended formulation, however, it is not entirely clear whether dying can ever be fully affirmed or avowed. That "we live as if we were not going to die," as Zygmunt Bauman observes, "is a remarkable achievement," especially given the ease with which we disavow dying on a daily basis." Some degree of disavowal would seem both unavoidable and necessary for our survival. Any effort to prolong one's life, from simply eating well and exercising to taking medications to prevent or treat illness, evidences this disavowal. For Bauman, however, the disavowal of dying often has violent political and social consequences. Noting the wartime imperative "to limit our casualties" for instance, Bauman remarks that "the price of that limiting is multiplying the dead on the other side of the battleline" (34). Drawing from Freud's claim that, "at bottom no one believes in his own death," Bauman argues that death is "socially managed" by securing the "immortality" of the few through the mortalization of others (35, his emphasis).8 The belief in my self-presence, which is also always a belief in my immortality, is thus dialectically conditioned by the nonpresence of others. Scholars in race and sexuality studies have done much to bring our attention to the ways in which American culture represents racial and sexual minorities as dead - both figuratively and literally. Indeed, this gesture both accompanies and reinforces the larger cultural dissimulation of mortality by making racial and sexual others stand in for the death that haunts every life. The history of American slavery tells a familiar story of how American consciousness disavows and projects mortality onto its "others." Orlando Patterson has described the institution of slavery in terms of a process of kinship delegitimation that constructs slaves as "socially dead."? For Patterson, slavery - across its various historical forms - emerges as a substitute for death a forced bargain by which the slave retains his/her life only to enter into the liminal existence of the socially dead. As a substitution for death slavery does not "absolve or erase the prospect of death," for the specter of material death looms over the slave's existence as an irreducible remainder (5). This primary stage in the construction of the socially dead person is followed by what Patterson refers to as the slave's "natal alienation," his/her alienation from all rights or claims of birth: in short, a severing of all genealogical ties and claims both to the slave's living blood relatives, and to his/her remote ancestors and future descendants. Although Patterson does not approach the problem of social death through a psychoanalytic vocabulary of disavowal and projection, one might say that the presumptive ontology of slave-owning, legally recognized kinship, was dependent on a deontologization of slave kinship that worked to deny the death that each life bears within itself. Building on Patterson's argument, Toni Morrison observes in Playing in the Dark that, "for a people who made much of their 'newness' - their potential, freedom, and innocence - it is striking how dour, how troubled, how frightened and haunted our early and founding literature truly is." For Morrison, African-American slaves came to shoulder the burden of the darkness (both moral and racial) against which America defined itself. The shadow of a racialized blackness did not so much threaten the ostensible "newness" of American life as it conditioned the latter's appearance as new and free. Hence "freedom," she writes, "has no meaning ... without the specter of enslavement" (56). Echoing Morrison, Russ Castronovo asserts in Necro Citizenship that nineteenth-century American politics constructed the citizen in relation to a morbid fascination with ghosts, seances, spirit rappings, and mesmerism. Taking his point of departure from Patrick Henry's in-famous assertion, "give me liberty or give me death," Castronovo explores how admission into the domain of citizenship required a certain depoliticization and pacification of the subject: "The afterlife emancipates souls from passionate debates, everyday engagements, and earthly affairs that animate the political field."!' From Lincoln's rumored dabbling in spiritualism, to attempts by mediums to contact the departed souls of famous Americans, to a senator's introduction of a petition in 1854 asking Congress to investigate communications with the "other side" so numerous are Castronovo's examples of what he calls" spectral politics" that we would have a difficult time contesting his diagnosis that nineteenth-century American political discourse worked to produce politically and historically dead citizens. That these citizens were constructed in tandem with the production of large slave populations- noncitizens who were urged by slavery proponents and abolitionists alike to believe that emancipation existed in a promised afterlife - would lend still more credence to the argument that nineteenth-century America propagated a dematerialized politics. One wonders, however, how Castronovo's argument sits in relation to Aries's contention that American life tends toward an interdiction of death, and if Castronovo's rejection of necropolitics, moreover, is not finally symptomatic of this very disavowal. Castronovo maintains that, "for cultures that fear death ... necrophilia promotes fascination with and helps tame an unknowable terror:' (5). American necrophilia, according to Castronovo, responds to an overwhelming fear and denial of death. Castronovo thus aims 'to turn us away from such preoccupation with ghosts, spirits, and the afterlife toward "specific forms of corporeality," such as the laboring body, the slave body, and the mesmerized body, in order to avoid "reinscrib[ing] patterns of abstraction" (17). Yet, this move away from general to specific forms of embodiment still retains the notion of "the body," and therefore of a self-contained, sell-present entity. If nineteenth-century politics required that the citizen be disembodied and dematerialized, it does not follow that a move toward embodiment remedies such a spiritualized politics. Although Castronovo cautions that recourse to the body" does not automatically guarantee resistance," the overall tenor of his project pathologizes the spectral (18). Indeed, one has the sense that Castronovo would like to untether politics from death altogether - as if political life is not always haunted by finitude. Reversing the terms of political necrophilia, he offers something like a political necrophobia that sees every intrusion of the spectral as synonymous with depoliticization. If nineteenth-century spiritualism infused American political life with a familiar set of distinctions between spirit/matter, soul/body, that says nothing about how these binaries might be displaced rather than merely reversed. A binaristic approach to the subject of mortality is also legible in Sharon Holland's Raising the Dead, which asserts that "bringing back the dead (or saving the living from the shadow of death) is the ultimate queer act."11Drawing from the activist slogan "silence = death" from the early years of the AIDS epidemic, and extending this activist imperative to address the social death of sexual and racial minorities more generally, Holland observes that the deaths of queer and racial subjects serve "to ward off a nation's collective dread of the inevitable" (38). Yet, as in Castronovo's critique of necropolitics, this imperative to "raise the dead" reverses rather than displaces the logic through which dominant, white, heterosexual culture disavows and projects mortality onto racial and sexual minorities. While we must address the particular effects that social death has on racial and sexual minorities, this social reality must also be thought in relation to a more generalizable principle of mourning. For the "shadow of death" haunts all lives, not just queer ones. The "ultimate queer act," pace Holland, would be to deconstruct rather than reinscribe the binary between life and death, to resist the racist and heterosexist disavowal of finitude. That Americanist literary criticism on the subject of mortality remains implicated in the larger cultural disavowal of dying suggests that we ought to reassess our critical energies, particularly as these powers are enlisted to address how American political ideology produces the "death" of racial and sexual others. Indeed, I would argue that such criticism remains invested - despite all claims to the contrary - in an American exceptionalist project. American exceptionalism names, in part, a fetishization of novelty and futurity that initially defined America against an ostensibly decaying and moribund Europe. As David Noble has argued, the doctrine of exceptionalism excluded America from "the human experience of birth, death, and rebirth" by figuring Europe in terms of time and America in terms of timeless space." If, as George Berkeley put it, America is "time's noblest offspring," history gives birth to its final progeny in order that the latter might escape time altogether. America thus becomes eternally present while "Europe breeds in her decay." If the "new world" qua new must deny mortality, then reanimating the excluded from within the terms of a dialectical reversal renews rather than dismantles the American exceptionalist project. Challenging the ideology of American exceptionalism is particularly crucial for a post-9/11 politics that aims to resist the transformation of American exposure to injury and death into a newly reconsolidated sense of innocence and immortality. As Donald Pease has argued, 9/11 transformed "virgin land" into "ground zero," effecting an ideological shift from a "secured innocent nation to a wounded, insecure emergency state."16 Drawing from the work of Giorgio Agamben. Pease describes the emergency state as a nation that - by exempting itself from its own democratic rules of free speech, due process, and above all, the rules of war - marks a division between those whom the state protects from injury and those whom the state is free to injure and kill with impunity (13). The reduction of the Arab other to that which cannot be killed because it is already dead works to cover over the wound that ground zero opens up under the surface of virgin land. The emergency state (or what Agamben calls the "state of exception") thus also names a nation that attempts to except itself from the universal condition of mortality. As Bauman notes, "if mortality and transience are the norm among humans, durability may be attained only as an exception" (67, his emphasis).

#### The alternative is to reject the Affirmative-Questioning American exceptionalism is key to understanding our place in the world- rejection is key to more productive politics

Walt 2011[Stephen M. Walt, an FP contributing editor, is Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international affairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government NOVEMBER 2011, Foreign Policy, “The Myth of American Exceptionalism” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/the\_myth\_of\_american\_exceptionalism]

Most statements of "American exceptionalism" presume that America's values, political system, and history are unique and worthy of universal admiration. They also imply that the United States is both destined and entitled to play a distinct and positive role on the world stage.¶ The only thing wrong with this self-congratulatory portrait of America's global role is that it is mostly a myth. Although the United States possesses certain unique qualities -- from high levels of religiosity to a political culture that privileges individual freedom -- the conduct of U.S. foreign policy has been determined primarily by its relative power and by the inherently competitive nature of international politics. By focusing on their supposedly exceptional qualities, Americans blind themselves to the ways that they are a lot like everyone else.¶ This unchallenged faith in American exceptionalism makes it harder for Americans to understand why others are less enthusiastic about U.S. dominance, often alarmed by U.S. policies, and frequently irritated by what they see as U.S. hypocrisy, whether the subject is possession of nuclear weapons, conformity with international law, or America's tendency to condemn the conduct of others while ignoring its own failings. Ironically, U.S. foreign policy would probably be more effective if Americans were less convinced of their own unique virtues and less eager to proclaim them.¶ What we need, in short, is a more realistic and critical assessment of America's true character and contributions. In that spirit, I offer here the Top 5 Myths about American Exceptionalism.

### Off

#### Text: The U.S. Supreme Court should rule that production restrictions on federal lands in the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf for conventional gas are unconstitutional on the basis of international law.

#### Supreme court can rule against restrictions on energy production

Craig 2010 (Robin Kundis Craig, Attorneys' Title Professor and Associate Dean for Environmental Programs at Florida State University College of Law, Summer 2010, “MULTISTATE DECISION MAKING FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY AND TRANSMISSION: SPOTLIGHT ON COLORADO, NEW MEXICO, UTAH, AND WYOMING: Constitutional Contours for the Design and Implementation of Multistate Renewable Energy Programs and Projects,” University of Colorado Law Review, Lexis)

A number of dormant Commerce Clause cases have involved energy production, and they systematically conclude that states cannot create legal requirements or preferences based on the source of the fuel or energy. In Wyoming v. Oklahoma, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an Oklahoma statute that required Oklahoma coal-fired electric power plants producing power for sale in Oklahoma to burn a mixture of coal containing at least ten percent Oklahoma-mined coal. 121 Moreover, the "savings clause" of the Federal Power Act did not prevent the conclusion that the Oklahoma statute was unconstitutional. 122 Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois concluded that a Clean Air Act compliance plan that favored Illinois coalviolated the dormant Commerce Clause. 123¶ Nor can states "hoard" state-created energy within their borders. Thus, in 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that New Hampshire could not constitutionally restrict interstate transportation of hydroelectric power generated in New Hampshire. 124

#### The counterplan is not a *reduction*—it requires executive/congressional acquiescence.

Spiro, 2001 (Peter J. Spiro, Professor, Hofstra University School of Law; Visiting Professor, University of Texas School of Law, Texas Law Review, April, lexis)

The increments approach answers these objections, at the same time that it affirms the value of constitutionalism. It presents, first of all, a determinate method of constitutional location. Unlike translation exercises, the increments model substantially confines the possible discretion of individual constitutional actors, including the judiciary. Working from a premise of historical situatedness, the theory denies the possibility of independent constitutional determination. That is not to deny the inevitability of constitutional change. But all constitutional actors work from a baseline, departures from which can be challenged and rejected by other constitutional actors. Constitutional norms are resolved only by the interplay of those actors. The content of constitutional norms will usually be reflected in institutional action, but one cannot necessarily find the law by reference to the action of any single institution alone. Even if the Supreme Court attempted to exploit the discretion afforded it by a translation model, its pronouncements amount to mere artifacts in the absence of acceptance by other actors. The increments model thus answers the primary volley of the originalists against countermajoritarian judicial adaptation of the constitutional text. Such adaptation will not prevail where it is rejected by other actors.

#### CP solves, doesn’t link to legitimacy, and provides a workable framework to incorporate international law.

Greffenius, 2007 (Robert Greffenius, J.D. Candidate, American University, Washington College of Law, American University International Law Review, May)

Scholars have written about Erie almost ad nauseam, to the point where it seems difficult to add anything new. 146 However, no one has yet connected the framework used in Erie, binding federal courts to state common law, to establish a similar framework for international law. 147 This Comment has, in essence, already argued for an International Erie doctrine to govern analysis of ICJ decisions, and possibly future international adjudicatory bodies' decisions that have presumptively binding authority. Though characterizing the relational authority of the ICJ vis-a-vis the United States in terms of an "International Erie" theory may seem radical, in truth, it offers a method to harmonize current case law in the Supreme Court with the understanding of international legal scholars. 148 This section explores the Supreme Court's option of providing a workable framework for courts to consider future international bodies' dispositions of cases by asserting an International Erie doctrine. [\*973] Even post-Medellin, the Supreme Court faces a conflict between its current holdings and ICJ decisions which will at some point likely have binding effect on the Supreme Court. The primary holding of Sanchez-Llamas is that U.S. courts do not need to adapt their procedure to comply with ICJ decisions. 149 Expounding a theory of International Erie would retain the essential holding of Sanchez-Llamas while still maintaining room to give effect to what the Supreme Court can characterize as the essential holding of Avena. Though the Mexican nationals themselves would likely argue that the primary holding of the ICJ in Avena was that the United States may not apply rules of procedural default, the Supreme Court may instead describe the essential holding as concerning solely an individual's right of action under the VCCR and the meaning of "without delay." 150 Looking at the ICJ decision after announcing the concept of an International Erie, its application would have been, and still may one day be, easy. The Supreme Court could simply say that the ICJ exercises a valid power when it interprets the substantive international law provisions of a treaty. However, just as in Erie, federal courts retain the power to employ their own federal rules of procedure, so both state and federal courts retain the power to employ local rules of procedure, even in the international context. 151 Thus, the Supreme Court may ignore the ICJ's interpretation of [\*974] proper "review and reconsideration" because that aspect of the holding infringes on domestic procedural law. 152 CONCLUSION While Medellin threw the role of the treaty in domestic law into upheaval, even members of the majority recognized the continuing importance of U.S. international commitments in domestic law. 153 Undeniably, the progression of ICJ cases from Breard through LaGrand and finally to Avena increased the tension between domestic courts' interpretation and the ICJ's interpretation of the VCCR, and thus the tension between the United States' international commitments and domestic enforcement. The International Erie doctrine explored in this Comment would provide the Court with workable approach to maintain domestic authority over issues of international law while still incorporating the binding and valid interpretation of that law by international tribunals. While, the Supreme Court avoided resolving this tension in Medellin, thus leaving the difficult issue for a future Court, the recurring nature of this issue makes it unlikely that Medellin permanently put the matter to rest. The Court should consider the International Erie doctrine as a theory that could finally allow for the settlement of this issue conclusively.

#### International law inevitable—incorporation, like the CP, prevents collapse of rule of law and economic collapse.

Martinez, 2003 (Assistant Professor, Stanford Law School, November, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 429)

The fact is that judicial bodies around the world are interacting with each other every day. These interactions take many forms - a Canadian court reviews a NAFTA arbitration panel award obtained by a U.S. investor against the government of Mexico;n60 a court in Florida hearing a civil suit against a former Latin American military officer now living in the United States must consider whether to follow decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia on the scope of military commanders' liability for torture committed by their subordinates; n61 a court in Texas hearing a bankruptcy case must decide how to react to parallel suits pending in England and the Cayman Islands. n62 Courts cannot avoid these interactions. A court may decide to ignore the existence of a foreign or international court, but that in itself is a choice, and one which shapes the contours of the emerging international system. Over time, a habitual practice of parochially disregarding the existence of other courts will lead to chaos and dysfunction. It is not too far-fetched to say that property interests will be compromised and business relations impaired, human rights will be violated and legal obligations will be thrown into doubt. We will have an international judicial system, but it will be a severely dysfunctional one. Such an anarchic outcome seems undesirable, but how can it be avoided? Is this system doomed to settle into chaotic behavior, or can self-organization by courts make it work?

#### Rule of law extinction.

Rhyne, 1958 (Charles S. Rhyne, Law Day Speech for Voice of America delivered on the first Law Day, May 1 abanet.org/publiced/lawday/rhyne58.html)

The tremendous yearning of all peoples for peace can only be answered by the use of law to replace weapons in resolving international disputes. We in our country sincerely believe that mankind’s best hope for preventing the tragic consequences of nuclear-satellite-missile warfare is to persuade the nations of the entire world to submit all disputes to tribunals of justice for all adjudication under the rule of law. We lawyers of America would like to join lawyers from every nation in the world in fashioning an international code of law so appealing that sentiment will compel its general acceptance. Man’s relation to man is the most neglected field of study, exploration and development in the world community. It is also the most critical. The most important basic fact of our generation is that the rapid advance of knowledge in science and technology has forced increased international relationships in a shrunken and indivisible world. Men must either live together in peace or in modern war we will surely die together. History teaches that the rule of law has enabled mankind to live together peacefully within nations and it is clear that this same rule of law offers our best hope as a mechanism to achieve and maintain peace between nations. The lawyer is the technician in man’s relationship to man. There exists a worldwide challenge to our profession to develop law to replace weapons before the dreadful holocaust of nuclear war overtake our people. It is said that an idea can be more powerful than an atom because strength today resides in man’s mind—not his muscle. We lawyers of the world must take the idea of peace under the rule of law and make it a force superior to weapons and thus outlaw wars of weapons. Law offers the best hope for order in a disordered world. The law of force or the force of law will rule the world. In the field of human conduct the law has never confessed failure. The struggle for a world ruled by law must go on with increased intensity. We must prove that the genius of man in the field of science and technology has not so far outstripped his inventiveness in the sphere of human relations as to make catastrophe inevitable. If man can conquer space he can also solve the need for legal machinery to insure universal and lasting peace. In our country ignorance of the value of law in international relations and what it could do for the people of the world is appalling. A major purpose of “Law Day-U.S.A.” is therefore to demonstrate to our people that the need for law in the world community is the greatest gap in the growing structure of civilization. And we lawyers of America are anxious to work with lawyers and men of good of all nations in filling this gap in that structure. We believe that no greater challenge exists for any profession and that no greater service to mankind can be performed.

\*This evidence uses gender-biased language which we do not endorse

### Exports

#### No cartel now- plan causes shift in Russian strategy- ensures a cartel that can actually mess up European markets

Orttung and Overland 2011 [Robert W. Orttung is the assistant director of the Institute for european, Russian, and eurasian Studies at george Washington university’s elliott School for International Affairs, president of the Resource Security Institute, and a visiting fellow at the Center for Security Studies of the Swiss Federal Institute of technology Zurich. Indra Overland is the head of the energy program at the norwegian Institute of International Affairs and associate professor at the university of tromsø. this article is a product of the RussCasp project on petroleum issues in Russia and the Caspian funded by the Petrosam Program of the Research Council of norway. “Russia and the Formation of a Gas Cartel” Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 58, no. 3, May/June 2011, pp. 53–66. http://bsu.ase.ro/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Orttung-Overland-Gas-Cartel.pdf]

Nu m e r o u s authors have raised concerns over Europe’s ¶ vulnerability to Russia’s use of the so-called gas ¶ weapon.¶ 1¶ Fears of unilateral action by Russia are partly ¶ overblown—at least as far as the consequences for West ¶ european importers are concerned—but the long-term ¶ implications of multilateral attempts to manipulate gas ¶ markets need to be investigated more thoroughly.¶ Russia has taken the lead in developing the Gas Exporting Countries’ Forum (geCF) as an organization ¶ that enables gas exporters to exchange information and ¶ policy advice. At present a Russian citizen is the secretary ¶ general of the geCF. Since its founding in 2001, there ¶ has been extensive discussion of the organization and its ¶ future. Most analysts have expressed skepticism over the ¶ idea that it would evolve into a cartel with the ability to ¶ affect gas supplies and prices along the lines of the betterknown organization of Petroleum exporting Countries ¶ (oPeC).¶ 2¶ However, the rapidly changing nature of international gas markets and the gradual institutionalization ¶ of the geCF call these earlier assumptions into question. ¶ Models assessing the impact of a possible gas cartel show ¶ that it could reduce total supplied gas quantities and raise ¶ prices for gas importers by as much as 22 percent.¶ 3¶ nevertheless, to pursue a cartel, Russia would have to ¶ give up the three pillars of its gas policy: the linkage of ¶ oil and gas prices, the emphasis on long-term contracts, ¶ and the preference for pipelines. Moscow is firmly committed to all three, so the prospects are dim that a cartel ¶ will play an important role in its strategy. nevertheless, ¶ the possibility of a cartel serves as a convenient backup ¶ in case conditions change, as well as a means to dissuade ¶ consumers from pushing for changes, particularly price ¶ delinkage.¶ the european union (eu) would be especially vulnerable to the establishment of a cartel because it relies ¶ heavily on gas imports from geCF members in the former ¶ Soviet union, north Africa, and the Middle east. the ¶ eu currently imports gas from Russia, Algeria, libya, ¶ norway, and Qatar, with possible sources of further ¶ diversification in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the ¶ Middle east. While the eu’s own natural gas production is ¶ shrinking, the energy Information Agency (eIA) expects ¶ consumption to increase 0.5 percent a year on average, ¶ from the current 550 bcm (billion cubic meters) to 620 ¶ bcm by 2035, requiring more imports.¶ 4¶ the International ¶ energy Agency (IeA) expects similar increases, although ¶ european leaders hope to cut consumption as part of their ¶ overall effort to address climate change.

#### Exports drive Russia into a gas cartel- the US cannot defeat them

Korin 2012 [Anne Korin, an adviser to the U.S. Energy Security Council and co-director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, an energy-security think tank. September 13 2012 Wall Street Journal “Should the U.S. Export Natural Gas?” Interview by Benjamin Lefebvre http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444226904577561300198957854.html]

MS. KORIN: But as LNG plays a larger part in international natural-gas trading and the commodity becomes fungible, the other gas giants—Russia, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—will have every incentive to concretize their discussions on forming an OPEC-like natural-gas cartel. They'll be able to restrict supply to the market and counterbalance the U.S.¶ That will drive the newly global natural-gas price—and thus prices in the U.S.—higher than it would have gone otherwise. That will certainly benefit those who own and sell the gas, but through higher electricity and chemical prices, it would overall be a drain on the economy.

#### Strong EU prevents extinction

Bruton 2 - John Bruton T.D, The Irish Times, Thursday, January 31, 2002, A Report For The Joint Oireachtas Committee On European Affairs

As the Laeken Declaration put it, "Europe needs to shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalisation" adding that Europe must exercise its power in order "to set globalisation within a moral framework, in other words to anchor it in solidarity and sustainable development". Only a strong European Union is big enough to create a space, and a stable set of rules, within which all Europeans can live securely, move freely, and provide for themselves, for their families and for their old age. Individual states are too small to do that on their own. Only a strong European Union is big enough to deal with the globalised human diseases, such as AIDS and tuberculosis. Only a strong European Union is big enough to deal with globalised criminal conspiracies, like the Mafia, that threaten the security of all Europeans. Only a strong European Union is big enough to deal with globalised environmental threats, such as global warming, which threaten our continent and generations of its future inhabitants. Only a strong European Union is big enough to deal with globalised economic forces, which could spread recession from one country to another and destroy millions of jobs. Only a strong European Union is big enough to regulate, in the interests of society as a whole, the activities of profit seeking private corporations, some of which now have more spending power than many individual states. These tasks are too large for individual states. Only by coming together in the European Union can we ensure that humanity, and the values which make us, as individuals, truly human, prevail over blind global forces that will otherwise overwhelm us.

No war over senkaku islands

Muthiah Alagappa. Asian Security Order. 2003 Pg 444 Google Books.

Alagappa (Introduction), Mastanduno (Chap. 4 In this volume), and Danzig (1997: 6-8) observe that U.S. hegemony has contributed to the maritime security order in Asia. They argue that it has contained the Sino-Japanese rivalry, ensured the security of the region’s smaller states, and facilitated the management of crises (between China and Taiwan, for instance) that could spill over into Asia’s maritime scene. They also assert that American hegemony has helped to maintain order in the region by reducing the incentives to build powerful navies that could secure SLOCs and counter the modernization activities of other states. Furthermore, they allege that American hegemony has deterred states from aggression since aggression is likely to be counterproductive if challenged by the United States. In the near term it is reasonable to expect American hegemony to continue to dampen problems created or fueled by the region’s adolescent states. Certainly the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s unmatched arsenal of nuclear and conventional carriers, guided missile destroyers and frigates, nuclear attack submarines, and fighter bombers (Weeks and Meconis 1999: 134-56) is a powerful guarantee that SLOCs will stay open. Even though the United States is officially neutral on disputes like the Sino-Japanese quarrel over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and the multinational disagreement over the South China Sea, American hegemonic position helps to ensure that these disputes take place within certain confines. After all, any aggressor has to take into account the fact that American defense treaties with the Philippines and Japan my obligate the United States to assist these countries in the even they are attacked in the disputed islands (IBC 1998). Furthermore, through its unmatched influence in international and regional economic organizations and regimes, the United States has the ability to further, if only indirectly, the resource acquisition and economic development activities of Asian states. Finally, the American power ensures that piracy will never become anything more than a minor nuisance in the region.

#### No nuclear terrorism –statistically insignificant cumulative probability

John Mueller (Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center, and is professor of Political Science, at Ohio State University) 2010 “Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda” p, 187-190

Assigning a probability that terrorists will be able to overcome each barrier is, of course, a tricky business, and any such exercise should be regarded as rather tentative and exploratory, or perhaps simply as illustrative-though it is done all the time in cost-benefit analysis. One might begin a quantitative approach by adopting probability estimates that purposely, and heavily, bias the case in the terrorists' favor. In my view, this would take place if it is assumed that the terrorists have a fighting chance of 50 percent of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles displayed in Table 13-1, though for many barriers, probably almost all, the odds against them are surely much worse than that. Even with that generous bias, the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million, specifically 1,048,576. Indeed, the odds of surmounting even seven of the 20 hurdles at that unrealistically, even absurdly, high presumptive success rate is considerably less than one in a hundred. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion specifically 3.486,784,401. What they would be at the (still entirely realistic) level of one in ten boggles the mind. One could also make specific estimates for each of the hurdles, but the cumulative probability statistics are likely to come out pretty much the same-or even smaller. There may be a few barriers, such as numbers 13 or absolute loyalty trump the one oftechnical competence. This would increase the chances that the bomb-making enterprise would go undetected, while at the same time decreasing the likelihood that it would be successful. However, given the monumentality of the odds confronting the would-be atomic terrorist, adjustments for such issues are scarcely likely to alter the basic conclusion.

That is, if one drastically slashed the one in 3.5 billion estimate a thousandfold, the odds of success would still be one in 3.5 million. Moreover, all this focuses on the effort to deliver a single bomb. If the requirement were to deliver several, the odds become, of course, even more prohibitive. Getting away from astronomical numbers for a minute, Levi points out that even if there are only ten barriers and even if there were a wildly favorable 80 percent chance of overcoming each hurdle, the chance of final success, following the approach used here, would only be 10 percent. Faced even with such highly favorable odds at each step, notes Levi, the wouldbe atomic terrorist might well decide "that a nuclear plot is too much of a stretch to seriously try." Similarly, Jenkins calculates that even if there are only three barriers and each carried a 50/50 chance of success, the likelihood of accomplishing the full mission would only be 12.5 percent.14 Odds like that are not necessarily prohibitive, of course, but they are likely to be mind-arrestingly small if one is betting just about everything on a successful outcome. Multiple Attempts The odds considered so far are for a single attempt by a single group, and there could be multiple attempts by multiple groups, of course. Although Allison considers al-Qaeda to be "the most probable perpetrator" on the nuclear front, he is also concerned about the potential atomic exploits of other organizations such as Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah, Chechen gangsters, Lebanon's Hezbollah, and various doomsday cults. IS However, few, if any, groups appear to have any interest whatever in striking the United States except for al-Qaeda, an issue to be discussed more fully in the next chapter. But even setting that consideration aside, the odds would remain long even with multiple concerted attempts.16 If there were a hundred such efforts over a period of time, the chance at least one of these would be successful comes in at less than one in over 10,000 at the one chance in two level. At the far more realistic level of one chance in three, it would be about one in nearly 35 million. If there were 1,000 dedicated attempts, presumably over several decades, the chance of success would be worse than one in a thousand at the SO/50 level and one in nearly 3.5 million at the one in three level.I7 Of course, attempts in the hundreds are scarcely realistic, though one might be able to envision a dozen or so. Additionally, if there were a large number of concerted efforts, policing and protecting would presumably become easier because the aspirants would be exposing themselves repeatedly and would likely be stepping all over each other in their quest to access the right stuff. Furthermore, each foiled attempt would likely expose flaws in the defense system, holes the ...,. defenders would then plug, making subsequent efforts that much more dif• ficult. For example, when the would-be peddler of a tiny amount of pur loined highly enriched uranium was apprehended in 2006, efforts were made to trace its place of origin using nuclear forensics. IS ." Also, the difficulties for the atomic terrorists are likely to increase over time because of much enhanced protective and policing efforts by ... self-interested governments. Already, for example, by all accounts Russian nuclear materials are much more adequately secured than they were 10 or ~, .-s 15 years ago.19

#### Any move for retaliation is posturing – Obama wont follow through

Michael Crowley (Senior Editor the New Republic) January 2010 “Obama and Nuclear Deterrence”, http://www.tnr.com/node/72263

The Los Angeles Times ran an important story yesterday about the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review, which evaluates U.S. policy towards the use of nuclear weapons. Apparently there's a debate inside the administration--one that is splitting the civilians from the generals--not just about the size of our nuclear stockpile but also how we conceive of possible first-strike and retaliatory policies. A core issue under debate, officials said, is whether the United States should shed its long-standing ambiguity about whether it would use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, in hopes that greater specificity would give foreign governments more confidence to make their own decisions on nuclear arms. Some in the U.S. argue that the administration should assure foreign governments that it won't use nuclear weapons in reaction to a biological, chemical or conventional attack, but only in a nuclear exchange. Others argue that the United States should promise that it would never use nuclear weapons first, but only in response to a nuclear attack. As the story notes, some experts don't place much weight on how our publicly-stated doctrine emerges because they don't expect foreign nations to take it literally. And the reality is that any decisions about using nukes will certainly be case-by-case. But I'd still like to see some wider discussion of the underlying questions, which are among the most consequential that policymakers can consider. The questions are particularly vexing when it comes to terrorist groups and rogue states. Would we, for instance, actually nuke Pyongyang if it sold a weapon to terrorists who used it in America? That implied threat seems to exist, but I actually doubt that a President Obama--or any president, for that matter--would go through with it.

#### No Russia war

Brzezinski 2005 (Zbigniew Brzezinski. (National Security Adviser Under the Carter Administration). "US Russia: Zbigniew Brzezinski Assesses US Russia Relations." Radio Free America. 11 May 2005. http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/05/b62307e1-832c-4fbc-ab91-ba8fa7a0eb24.html)

There can be no cold war because Russia is in no position to wage either a hot or a cold war. It's a brutal effort to wage war in Chechnya which verges on genocide; it's at the same time a testimony to the incompetence of the Russian military. Russia's in no position to wage a cold war with America, either. Because Russia is essentially right now in a very serious social and demographic crisis. So a real cold war is not possible. Some issues are likely to continue being conflictual. In a broader sense, the American-Russian relationship is probably going to be described in less euphoric terms than has recently been the case, but the basic reality of a mixed relationship -- partially antagonistic, partially cooperative -- I think is going to endure. Former 'Sphere Of Influence' RFE/RL: Unlike in the rest of the world, where as you noted the United States is increasingly isolated and politically unpopular, the former Soviet sphere of influence embraces the United States. Seventy-two percent of Georgians approve of President Bush's visit on [9 April] there.... Under the circumstances that you outline, and given that this policy is bound to exacerbate tensions with Moscow, what do you think is the U.S. plan in that region, and what do you think it should be? Brzezinski: The United States is supporting and de facto promoting geopolitical pluralism in the space of the [former] Soviet Union. That is to say, it is supporting the independence of the post-Soviet states without seeking to turn them into American satellites -- but with the objective of making them viable as independent states. Part of the dilemma that Russia faces is that its nostalgia for an imperial status creates sustained and extensive hostility with all of its neighbors. It is impossible to mention a single neighbor of Russia with whom Russia has genuinely good relations. It is impossible to mention a single neighbor of Russia that likes Russia. And that is a problem which only the Russians can correct; it cannot be corrected for them by the Americans

#### Shared interests keep relations stable, overwhelm all other issues.

Winny Chen, 2010 (Testing Time for U.S.-China Relations, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/02/china\_relations.html)

Unfortunately, President Obama’s conciliatory approach just postponed the already existing friction in U.S.-China relations. But like the times before, this rough patch will pass, too. The tone may have changed, but the challenges and shared interests ultimately remain the same. The United States and China need each other now more than ever. China needs America’s innovation and purchasing power just as much as the United States needs China’s economic growth to boost its exports and key cooperation on important global issues. China needs American-provided stability in the Asia Pacific in order to sustain its own development, and the United States needs China’s help on pressing regional and international security issues such as North Korea, piracy, and Iran. Continuing to focus on these areas of shared interests, aligning policies where we share objectives, and working through current disagreements, no matter how long it takes is the only way forward. Global problem solving on the hardest issues is made exponentially harder without China. Our national interests require a continued partnership. So even as the two countries brace for a bumpy ride through the next few months, it is important not to lose sight of the shared interests we have across a panoply of issues economic rebalancing, nonproliferation, climate change, and regional security. The key is not to overreact to the mercurial tone, but to stay focused on our shared interests and to keep working toward a mature relationship.

#### No US/China war—It’s in neither country’s best interest

Ackerman 2011 (Robert Ackerman, May 10, 2011, “War Between China, U.S. Not Likely,” http://www.afcea.org/signal/signalscape/index.php/2011/05/10/11510/)

The United States and China are not likely to go to war with each other because neither country wants it and it would run counter to both nations’ best interests. That was the conclusion of a plenary panel session hosted by former Good Morning America host David Hartman at the 2011 Joint Warfighting Conference in Virginia Beach. Adm. Timothy J. Keating, USN (Ret.), former head of the U.S. Pacific Command, noted that China actually wants the United States to remain active in the Asia-Pacific region as a hedge against any other country’s adventurism. And, most of the other countries in that region want the United States to remain active as a hedge against China. Among areas of concern for China is North Korea. Wallace “Chip” Gregson, former assistant secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, said that above all China fears instability, and a North Korean collapse or war could send millions of refugees streaming into Manchuria, which has economic problems of its own.

#### US won’t go to war in the SCS

Emmers 2007 (Ralf Emmers, February 28, 2007, “The spratly dispute in China-Southeast Asian relations: a case of desecuritization” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Online)

Fourth, the lower degree of securitization of the dispute derives from the limited proven oil reserves of the South China Sea. As exploration techniques have improved, oil reserves lying under the seabed in the deep water have become more viable. Yet the oil reserves of the South China Sea are still uncertain and initial estimations have been adjusted lower. As oil prices have risen substantially over recent years, the situation in the South China Sea could change for the worst however if proof was found of sufficient oil reserves for commercial use. Finally, the restrained involvement of the United States has been another source of stability in the South China Sea. Washington does not consider the Spratly dispute as a vital security concern. It does not want to further complicate its relations with China by getting involved in the question of sovereign jurisdiction. Though following closely the developments in the South China Sea, the U.S. has consistently limited its interest to the preservation of the freedom of navigation and the mobility of its Seventh Fleet. Due to its own economic interests, China is not expected to interrupt the shipping lanes that cross the South China Sea.

#### China is working on cooperative resolution to South China Seas conflicts now

Wu Shicun Who are the real troublemakers in the South China Sea? Globaltimes.cn | 2012-11-6 21:17:06 http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/742715.shtml

China is playing a constructive role in safeguarding peace and stability in the South China Sea. Peace and stability in the South China Sea are closely related to the vital interests of China, who benefits from the safe and unimpeded navigation as well as the regional trade links and economic prosperity. China cherishes and is committed to safeguarding this hard-won situation. However, recently some foreign political figures, policy analysts and scholars condemn China's practices as "the big bullying the small, the strong domineering over the weak.”¶ They even speculate that China is taking the delaying or dodging tactics so as to dominate the resolution of the disputes when a favorable time comes. Such accusations are totally groundless. China insists on solving international disputes through peaceful negotiations.¶ China is ready to negotiate with the countries concerned to handle the South China Sea disputes in a proper manner in accordance with the universally recognized international laws including the principles and legal regime established under UNCLOS. Early in the 1980s, China proposed "shelving the disputes and seeking for joint development,” which showed its sincerity and willingness to a proper settlement of the SCS disputes.

### 2 adv

#### No arctic war- No opportunity and coop solves – prefer experts

Young, Professor – Institutional and International Governance, Environmental Institutions @ UCSB, Arctic expert, PhD – Yale, 2011

(Oran R, “The future of the Arctic: cauldron of conflict or zone of peace?” *International Affairs* 87:1, p. 185-193)

Popular accounts of the Arctic’s jurisdictional issues are regularly couched in terms of provocative phrases like the afore-mentioned ‘who owns the Arctic’ or ‘use it or lose it’. **But these** phrases **turn out to be highly misleading** in this context. **There are virtually no disputes in the Arctic regarding sovereignty** over northern lands; no one has expressed a desire to redraw the map of the Arctic with regard to the terrestrial boundaries of the Arctic states. Most of the disagreements are to do with jurisdiction over marine areas where the idea of ownership in the ordinary sense is irrelevant. While some of these disagreements are of long standing and feature relatively entrenched positions, they are not about establishing ownership, and they do not indicate that some level of ‘use’ is required to avoid the erosion of sovereignty. **There is little prospect that these disputes will spawn armed clashes.** As both Michael Byers and Shelagh Grant make clear in their excellent analyses of Arctic sovereignty, recent efforts to address matters involving sovereignty in the Arctic are marked by a spirit of rule-based problem-solving, rather than an escalating spiral of politically charged claims and counterclaims. The process of delineating jurisdictional boundaries regarding the seabed beyond the limits of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) is taking place in conformity with the rules and procedures set forth in Article 76 of UNCLOS. Norway and Russia have signed an international treaty resolving their differences regarding jurisdictional boundaries in the Barents Sea. There are signs that Canada and the United States are interested in a similar approach with regard to the Beaufort Sea. The Russians, whose much ballyhooed 2007 initiative to plant the Russian flag on the seabed at the North Pole is widely discussed in the books under review, have acted in conformity with the relevant rules of international law in addressing jurisdictional matters and repeatedly expressed their readiness to move forward in a cooperative manner in this realm. There are, of course, significant sensitivities regarding the legal status of the Northern Sea Route and especially the Northwest Passage. But given that commercial traffic on these routes is likely to be limited during the near future, and that the use of these routes will require the active cooperation of the coastal states, regardless of their formal legal status, **opportunities arise for** devising **pragmatic arrangements** governing the use of these waterways. The progress now being made regarding the development of a mandatory Polar Code covering Arctic shipping is good news. The fact that ‘hot spots’ in the search for oil and gas in the Arctic are located, for the most part, in areas that are not subject to jurisdictional disputes is also helpful. Overall, it seems fair to conclude that the **Arctic states are living** up to their promises to deal **with jurisdictional issues in** the region in **a peaceful manner.**

#### No arctic conflict

Dyer 12 (Gwynne Dyer, OC is a London-based independent Canadian journalist, syndicated columnist and military historian., His articles are published in 45 countries, 8/4/2012, "Race for Arctic Mostly Rhetoric", www.winnipegfreepress.com/opinion/columnists/race-for-arctic-mostly-rhetoric-164986566.html)

Russian television contacted me last night asking me to go on a program about the race for Arctic resources. The ice is melting fast, and it was all the usual stuff about how there will be big strategic conflicts over the seabed resources -- especially oil and gas -- that become accessible when it's gone. **The media always love conflict, and now that the Cold War is long gone, there's no other potential military confrontation between the great powers to worry about**. Governments around the Arctic Ocean are beefing up their armed forces for the coming struggle, so where are the flashpoints and what are the strategies? It's great fun to speculate about possible wars. In the end I didn't do the interview because the Skype didn't work, so I didn't get the chance to rain on their parade. But here's what I would said to the Russians if my server hadn't gone down at the wrong time. First, you should never ask the barber if you need a haircut. **The armed forces in every country are always looking for reasons to worry about impending conflict,** because that's the only reason their governments will spend money on them. Sometimes they will be right to worry, and sometimes they will be wrong, but right or wrong, they will predict conflict. Like the barbers, it's in their professional interest to say you need their services. So you'd be better off to ask somebody who doesn't have a stake in the game. As I don't own a single warship, I'm practically ideal for the job. And **I don't think there will be any significant role for the armed forces in the Arctic**, although there is certainly going to be a huge investment in exploiting the region's resources. There are three separate "resources" in the Arctic. On the surface, there are the sea lanes that are opening up to commercial traffic along the northern coasts of Russia and Canada. Under the seabed, there are potential oil and gas deposits that can be drilled once the ice retreats. And in the water in between, there is the planet's last unfished ocean. The sea lanes are mainly a Canadian obsession, because the government believes the Northwest Passage that weaves between Canada's Arctic islands will become a major commercial artery when the ice is gone. Practically every summer, Prime Minister Stephen Harper travels north to declare his determination to defend Canada's Arctic sovereignty from -- well, it's not clear from exactly whom, but it's a great photo op. Canada is getting new Arctic patrol vessels and building a deep-water naval port and Arctic warfare training centre in the region, but it's all much ado about nothing. The Arctic Ocean will increasingly be used as a shortcut between the North Atlantic and the North Pacific, but the shipping will not go through Canadian waters. Russia's "Northern Sea Route" will get the traffic, because it's already open and much safer to navigate. Then there's the hydrocarbon deposits under the Arctic seabed, which the U.S. Geological Survey has forecast may contain almost one-fourth of the world's remaining oil and gas resources. But from a military point of view, there's only a problem if there is some disagreement about the seabed boundaries. There are only four areas where the boundaries are disputed. Two are between Canada and its eastern and western neighbours in Alaska and Greenland, **but there is zero likelihood of a war between Canada and the United States or Denmark** (which is responsible for Greenland's defence). In the Bering Strait, there is a treaty defining the seabed boundary between the United States and Russia, signed in the dying days of the Soviet Union, but the Russian Duma has refused to ratify it. The legal uncertainty caused by the dispute, however, **is more likely to deter future investment in drilling there than lead to war.**

And then there was the seabed-boundary dispute between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea, which led Norway to double the size of its navy over the past decade. But last year, the two countries signed an agreement dividing the disputed area right down the middle and providing for joint exploitation of its resources. So no war between NATO (of which Norway is a member) and the Russian Federation. Which leaves the fish, and it's hard to have a war over fish. The danger is rather that the world's fishing fleets will crowd in and clean the fish out, as they are currently doing in the Southern Ocean around Antarctica. If the countries with Arctic coastlines want to preserve this resource, they can only do so by creating an international body to regulate the fishing. And they will have to let other countries fish there, too, with agreed catch limits, since they are mostly international waters. **They will be driven to co-operate, in their own interests. So no war over the Arctic**. All we have to worry about now is the fact the ice is melting, which will speed global warming (because open water absorbs far more heat from the sun than highly reflective ice), and ultimately melt the Greenland icecap and raise sea levels worldwide by seven metres. But that's a problem for another day.

#### Simple environmental factors ensure CBWs fail

Laqueur 1999 (Walter- Cochairman, International Research Council, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, The New Terrorism, pg. 244)

Ironically, the major factor retarding the use of gases and germs by states and terrorists is not revulsion or moral constraints but technical difficulties. "Ideal" conditions for an attack seldom if ever exist, and the possibility of things going wrong is almost unlimited: aerosols may not function, the wind may blow in the wrong direction, missiles carrying a deadly load may land in the wrong place or neutralize the germs on impact. In the course of time these technical difficulties may be overcome, but it is still very likely that roughly nine out of ten of the early attempts by terrorists to wage chemical or biological warfare will fail. But they will not pass unnoticed; the authorities and the public will be alerted, and the element of surprise lost. The search for the perpetrators may begin even before the first successful attack. And what has just been said with regard to terrorists may also be true with regard to state terrorism.

#### Too much CBW material needed – empirically no impact

Mueller & Mueller 1999 (John- Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester, Karl- Assistant Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Foreign Affairs, May/June 1999)

Chemical weapons, meanwhile, are virtually incapable of killing masses of people in open areas except when used in vast quantities, and so their inclusion in the WMD category is highly dubious unless the concept is so diluted that bullets or machetes could be included as well. As with terrorism, the problem here is primarily fear rather than actual consequences. Matthew Meselson, a biologist at Harvard University, calculates that it would take a ton of nerve gas or five tons of mustard gas to produce heavy casualties among unprotected people in an open area one kilometer square. Even for nerve gas this would require the concentrated delivery into a rather small area of about 300 heavy artillery shells or seven 500-pounds bombs. A 1993 analysis by Congress' Office of Technology Assessment concluded that a ton of sarin perfectly delivered under absolutely ideal conditions over a heavily populated area against unprotected people might cause between 3,000 and 8,000 deaths. Under slightly less ideal circumstances -- if there were a moderate wind or if the sun were out, for example -- the death rate would be a tenth as great. Discussions of chemical weapons often stress their ability to cause many casualties -- both dead and wounded -- glossing over the fact that historically most of those incapacitated by such weapons have not actually died.

#### Arctic drilling causes damage to the environment

Fiorucci 2012 [Dan Fiorucci 8-30-2012 “Shell Gets Go Ahead for Drilling in Chukchi -- With Restrictions” http://articles.ktuu.com/2012-08-30/arctic-challenger\_33506259]

Until the containment vessel can travel to the arctic, Salazar has placed restrictions on Shell's drilling. He's only given permission for the company to drill to a depth of 1300 feet. That's 4,000 feet short of the actual oil reservoir. ¶ In his opening statement today, Salazar assured the public, "Any exploratory activities will be conducted under the closest oversight -- and the most rigorous safety standards -- ever implemented in the history of the United States." ¶ Such was the diversity of opinions about what everyone agrees is an historic move in the long story of oil exploration in North America -- the move into Alaska's arctic waters. ¶ Shell predicts that if the Chukchi and Beaufort seas contain as much oil as the U.S. Geological Survey estimates they do -- 25 billion barrels -- then it will be possible to re-fill the Trans Alaska Pipeline with black gold. ¶ 25 years ago, TAPS was transporting 2 million barrels a day to the port of Valdez. These days it's transporting only about one quarter as much -- 560,000 barrels. ¶ But even if Alaska's arctic waters prove to be as rich as the U.S.G.S says, it will be a decade or more before TAPS gets re-filled. If large amounts of oil are found in the Chukchi Sea, a 400-mile-pipeline will have to be built --across the 23-million-acre National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska. And despite its industrial-sounding name, the NPR-A is, in fact, the biggest unprotected wilderness anywhere in the United States. ¶ So environmentalists worry about construction of the proposed pipeline -- which compounds their fears about drilling in arctic waters. They say that -- to this day -- there is no proven technology for containing an oil-spill in ice-choked waters. In fact, they point out, oil spill recovery -- even in waters that have no ice whatsoever -- leaves much to be desired. "The Center for Biological Diversity" contends that only 3 percent of the oil was recovered in the Gulf of Mexico oil spill of 2010 -- the largest spill in U.S. History.

#### Environment resilient

Easterbrook 1995, Distinguished Fellow, Fullbright Foundation (Gregg, A Moment on Earth pg 25) MI

IN THE AFTERMATH OF EVENTS SUCH AS LOVE CANAL OR THE Exxon Valdez oil spill, every reference to the environment is prefaced with the adjective "fragile." "Fragile environment" has become a welded phrase of the modern lexicon, like "aging hippie" or "fugitive financier." But the notion of a fragile environment is profoundly wrong. Individual animals, plants, and people are distressingly fragile. The environment that contains them is close to indestructible. The living environment of Earth has survived ice ages; bombardments of cosmic radiation more deadly than atomic fallout; solar radiation more powerful than the worst-case projection for ozone depletion; thousand-year periods of intense volcanism releasing global air pollution far worse than that made by any factory; reversals of the planet's magnetic poles; the rearrangement of continents; transformation of plains into mountain ranges and of seas into plains; fluctuations of ocean currents and the jet stream; 300-foot vacillations in sea levels; shortening and lengthening of the seasons caused by shifts in the planetary axis; collisions of asteroids and comets bearing far more force than man's nuclear arsenals; and the years without summer that followed these impacts. Yet hearts beat on, and petals unfold still. Were the environment fragile it would have expired many eons before the advent of the industrial affronts of the dreaming ape. Human assaults on the environment, though mischievous, are pinpricks compared to forces of the magnitude nature is accustomed to resisting.

## 2NC

## Courts

### Perm—A2 do both

#### Doesn’t solve politics; the Supreme Court must act first to provide political cover.

Garrett and Stutz, 2005 (Robert T. Garrett and Terrence Stutz, Dallas Morning News, “School finance now up to court Justices to decide if overhaul needed after bills fail in Legislature” lexis)

That could foreshadow the court's response to a chief argument by state attorneys – that the court should butt out and leave school finance to the Legislature. A court finding against the state would put the ball back in the hands of lawmakers, who have tended to put off dealing with problems in schools, prisons and mental health facilities until state or federal judges forced them to act. "It's the classic political response to problems they don't want to deal with," said Maurice Dyson, a school finance expert and assistant law professor at Southern Methodist University. "There is no better political cover than to have a court rule that something must be done, which allows politicians to say their hands are tied."

#### It’s mutually exclusive—the case would be moot.

Lee, 1992 (Evan Tsen Lee, Associate Professor, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, Harvard Law Review, January, lexis)

ONE of the major impediments to the judicial protection of collective rights 1 is the group of doctrines falling under the rubric [\*606] of "justiciability" -- standing, ripeness, and mootness. 2 These are the gatekeeper doctrines; each regulates a different dimension of entrance to the federal courts. The law of standing considers whether the plaintiff is the proper person to assert the claim, the law of ripeness ensures that the plaintiff has not asserted the claim too early, 3 and the law of mootness seeks to prevent the plaintiff from asserting the claim too late. 4 By keeping certain public-minded plaintiffs and public-law claims out of federal court, these doctrines have shifted much of the battle for collective rights to the more steeply pitched fields of state courts or the political process. 5 In particular, defendants in public law litigation have had considerable success keeping such cases out of the federal courts by invoking the "case or controversy" requirement [\*607] of Article III. 6 Under current Supreme Court precedent, if a plaintiff cannot demonstrate that she possesses an ongoing "personal stake" in the outcome of the litigation, a federal court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim on the merits. 7 No amount of judicial discretion can overcome this jurisdictional defect, because Article III demarcates the outer limit of federal court power. 8 As a result, many attempts to establish entitlements to important collective rights fail before courts can give them full consideration.

### Perm—A2 do cp

#### First, it severs the agent. “The” means whole [USFG].

Merriam-Websters, 2010 (Online dictionary)

used as a function word before a noun or a substantivized adjective to indicate reference to a group as a whole

#### Courts can’t reduce—they rely on acquiescence.

Hanson et al, 2006 (Jon D. Hanson, professor at Harvard Law School; and Adam Benforado, Frank Knox Fellow at Cambridge University, “The drifters: Why the supreme court makes justices more liberal” January/February, online)

It would be a mistake to believe that the only situation that influences justices comes from within the Supreme Court building or individual judges’ limited spheres of interaction. The mechanisms designed to keep the judiciary independent of the other branches of government are necessarily incomplete, and there is good evidence that judges frequently interpret laws in ways that align with the particular policy desires of sitting members of Congress and the current president. This is not surprising given the forces that Congress and the president can bring to bear on the judiciary—including limiting or even stripping jurisdiction in certain areas, altering the size of federal courts, and instituting impeachment hearings. Just as important is the fact that the court cannot implement its orders without the acquiescence and assistance of other government actors. In addition, lower-court judges may be constrained by pressures not to be overruled by higher courts or the need to stake out particular positions in order to improve their chances of promotion within the judiciary.

#### Resolved.

Random House Dictionary, 2010 (© Random House, Inc. 2010)

firm in purpose or intent; determined.

#### Should.

[Same Source] Random House Dictionary, 2010 (© Random House, Inc. 2010)

must; ought (used to indicate duty, propriety, or expediency

#### Our interpretation is the most predictable.

Random House Dictionary, 2010 (Random House, Inc., online)

Rules similar to those for choosing between shall and will have long been advanced for should and would, but again the rules have had little effect on usage. In most constructions, would is the auxiliary chosen regardless of the person of the subject: If our allies would support the move, we would abandon any claim to sovereignty. You would be surprised at the complexity of the directions. Because the main function of should in modern American English is to express duty, necessity, etc. (You should get your flu shot before winter comes), its use for other purposes, as to form a subjunctive, can produce ambiguity, at least initially: I should get my flu shot if I were you. Furthermore, should seems an affectation to many Americans when used in certain constructions quite common in British English: Had I been informed, I should (American would) have called immediately. I should (American would) really prefer a different arrangement. As with shall and will, most educated native speakers of American English do not follow the textbook rule in making a choice between should and would. See also shall.

### Solvency—2NC compliance mod

#### CP compliance is guaranteed-

#### Moderate Obamacare ruling ensures

Drehle 2012 (David Von Drehle, acclaimed journalist, June 29, 2012, “Roberts Rules: What the Health Care Decision Means for the Country,” TIME, http://swampland.time.com/2012/06/29/roberts-rules-what-the-health-care-decision-means-for-the-country/)

It’s hard to believe, but generations of Americans considered compromise an admirable quality. Schoolteachers taught their students about the Great Compromise that produced the Constitution and the Missouri Compromise that — for a time — held it together. Now the word connotes something bad. A leaky gasket has been “compromised,” and cheating spouses are caught in “compromising” positions. What Roberts managed to do with Obamacare vindicated the virtue of compromise in an era of Occupiers, Tea Partyers and litmus-testing special interests.¶ He didn’t seek some nonexistent middle ground halfway between irreconcilable poles. He didn’t listen to one side saying no and the other saying yes and write an opinion saying maybe, or blend black and white to make gray. He found a means of giving both sides just enough of what they wanted that he was able to avert a crisis. In the superheated conflict mill that is American politics these days, it’s good to have someone in a position of authority willing to try.¶ What’s more, Roberts found a way through that did not betray his own firmly held beliefs. He was conservative more than 30 years ago, when he clerked for the future Chief Justice William Rehnquist, and conservative when he served as a counsel in the Reagan White House. He was conservative when his name appeared in a leadership directory of the Federalist Society, and he is still conservative today. His cautious solution to the health care standoff, however, will make it much harder for his foes to paint his future decisions as the work of a lawless ideologue — no matter how conservative they are. He has managed to stand well above the viral, toxic cloud of partisan rancor that has settled over the capital, making him perhaps the healthiest figure, politically speaking, in government. After seven terms as Chief Justice, he finally put the Roberts in the Roberts court.

#### a. Prioritization of political resources.

Treanor and Sperling, 1993 (Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University; and Gene B. Sperling, J.D., Yale Law School, Columbia Law Review, December, lexis)

First, full examination of the revival issue demonstrates the interactive nature of the relationship between judicial invalidation of statutes and majoritarian decision-making. Judicial review is not purely external to the legislative process: the very act of judicial invalidation powerfully shapes subsequent legislative deliberations. Belief in the finality of judicial judgments is so pervasive that, when a statute is struck down or when a judicial decision establishes a rule of law under which a statute is unconstitutional, its opponents frequently act as if the statute were gone for all time. At the very least, even if political actors realize the potential for reversal, the finding of unconstitutionality alters the way in which they spend their political capital. As a result, rather than seek to repeal a statute that appears to be, for all practical purposes, a nullity, they devote their political resources to other - more clearly consequential - matters. Revival in such circumstances can produce a result contrary to what the political process would have produced in the absence of the initial judicial decision.

### Theory—Agent CP’s

Education—impact areas are debated every round. Implementation level analysis is the most beneficial—real world.

Branson, 2007 (Josh Branson, “Reflections about debate and policymaking” May 31, edeabte)

Well, that’s not the way it worked at all, at least for me. No doubt in a collegiate debate judged by one of ya’ll I could have killed them all on the Pan K, probably even if we talked slow, but in the real world, I was kind of surprised to find that the knowledge generated by debate proved to be fairly damn cursory and artificial. I could rattle off a list of most of the arguments for/against most of the general nonproliferation doctrines, but a lot of the empirical and factual basis for these arguments was completely missing in my brain. I could make the basic claim for almost anything in the field, but the technical issues that underlines a lot of them (the names and locations of the Russian CW destruction plants, an understanding of how the fine points of the budget process works, how a capital market sanction would actually be implemented, where did we get our intelligence that revealed Chinese serial proliferators selling bombs to AQ Khan, how does a centrifuge cascade work and why exactly would multilateral sanctions undermine Iran’s ability to get uranium gas piping technology, the names of the key players in the various foreign governments that make nonproliferation policy etc) was all missing. Maybe this stuff sounds pretty boring, and some of it is, but this is the type of stuff that really determines whether or not policies are successful and whether or not they are effectively promulgated. But the details pretty much get left out in debates, replaced by a simplistic and power-worded DA that culminates in ‘nuclear winter.’ To my surprise, when setting out in the nonproliferation world, you don’t get to make grand pronouncements about the impact of funding Nunn-Lugar on US soft power or whether funding it would cause a budget deficit which would collapse the global economy and cause multiple scenarios for nuclear war. Instead, most of the work that is done is deciding which and what type of Russian facilities to allocate the money to, knowing the specific people within the Russian government we can trust, which types of nuclear disposition is safest and what types of transportation we should use when moving spent fuel back to storage, etc. When dealing with these discussions repeatedly, I found that debate had provided me a very sound abstract conceptual frame through which to analyze the general issues being raised, but little in a way of meaningfully engaging the policy process.

### Court DA—A2 legitimacy

#### Justices will word the ruling to preserve legitimacy.

Dunn, 2003 (Pintip Hompluem Dunn, Yale Law Journal, November, lexis)

Whether or not Lawrence was rightly decided, the Court requires the flexibility of overruling. The Justices are not trying to trick us when they use these rhetorical devices. They are not trying to enact bad law through sleight-of-hand semantics. Rather, these devices allow the Justices to achieve the near impossible - the ability to overrule effectively when necessary, even as the very legitimacy on which they rely to give their rulings force is threatened. Judges may be liars, but in this paradoxical world of law in which we live, they have no other choice. They must lie, or the fiction of legitimacy that we have so carefully constructed will come crashing down, bringing with it the entire judicial system as we know it. We should thank our lucky stars, then, that they do their job so well.

#### More ev—decreases judicial activism.

Buys, 2007 (Cindy G. Buys, Assistant Professor at Southern Illinois University School of Law, BYU Journal of Public Law, lexis)

As a general proposition, however, international law does have more legitimacy in the U.S. legal system than foreign law because the U.S. has a greater role in shaping international law than foreign law. 263 As a result, there are different considerations at work with respect to the use of foreign law in constitutional interpretation. In the Knight v. Florida death penalty case, Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion in which he suggested some standards for the use of foreign law. 264 He suggests the use of foreign law is appropriate in two situations. First, it is appropriate when there exists a roughly comparable question and there is a transnational or global aspect to the case, there are shared standards, or world opinion is implicated. Second, the use of foreign law is appropriate when roughly comparable legal standards exist, i.e., when the external or foreign norms resonate internally. Justice Breyer suggests that this last situation is most likely to occur with respect to Europe and its former colonies because of our shared human rights heritage. 265 These suggestions are worthy of further exploration to determine whether "roughly comparable questions" or "roughly comparable legal standards" can be identified with some confidence. However, use of foreign law should be approached with particular caution. A specific nation's laws reflect that nation's history, culture, and legal system. 266 Thus, any one nation's legal rules are likely to be of limited value to another nation with a different history, culture and legal system. However, if a worldwide survey is conducted and many or most nations in the world have adopted a particular legal rule, that rule will reflect a consensus derived from many different cultures and legal systems and will likely be more useful and persuasive. Finally, persons on both sides of the debate agree that part of what is driving this debate regarding the use of international and foreign law is a concern that such law will be used by judges in an unprincipled manner to support the judges' personal viewpoints. 267 Justice Breyer responds to [\*47] this concern by arguing that a good way to counter the possibility of judges imposing their own moral values is for judges to look outside themselves and see how society is dealing with the issue - including looking to foreign societies and international law. 268 Moreover, it may be argued that international law is a more effective interpretive tool than many other external sources a judge may use because rules of international law are "a product of years of distillation of principles formed through international consensus," that are evidenced by state practice and agreements that articulate the relevant principles. 269 As a result, reliance on a rule of international law may actually reduce an individual judge's subjectivity when interpreting constitutional provisions. 270

## Exports Adv

### A2: Aggressive Russia

#### Russia is not aggressive- looking for cooperation

Itar-Tass 2012 [Itar-Tass 28/02/2012 “Experts see no aggressiveness in Putin’s foreign policy article” http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c39/354109.pdf]

Outright criticism of the United States and NATO in the international scene has prompted some analysts to speculate that¶ with Putin’s return to the Kremlin Russia’s foreign policy will get tougher. However, the key idea of most commentaries is¶ this: the national leader defends Russia’s interests in the world arena, and the article is not aggressive, it merely expresses¶ the expectation Russia will be respected. In his article titled Russia and the Changing World Putin says the country will not¶ be isolating itself and wishes to stay open and cooperate with al l other countries in various fields , including the¶ strengthening of universal security, but at the same time it believes it will be impermissible for individual countries and¶ blocks to encroach on state sovereignty.¶ Putin unequivocally accused the United States and NATO of “undermining confidence” and pointed out that “some aspects¶ of their behavior do not fit in with the logic of modern development and rely on the stereotypes of bloc mentality.” Russia, as¶ follows from the article, is most resentful over NATO’s expansion and plans for building a missile defense system in Europe.¶ The United States and NATO, Putin believes, on the pretext of human rights protection has abused the sovereignty of other¶ states in a series of armed conflicts. Moreover, it was protecting human rights “selectively,” while violating the right of¶ masses of other people to life. The events of the ”Arab spring,” and the outcome of the operation in Iraq have brought about¶ a situation where religious extremism is on the rise in the countries involved, and the situation is getting even worse than it¶ had been before external intervention, he said.¶ In his analysis of the West’s participation in the events of the “Arab spring” and its actions in the Middle East in general Putin¶ calls in question whether the aims of the United States and NATO are really ‘noble’. He speculates that the real aims are not¶ the establishment of democracy or the protection of human rights, but “interest in the re-division of markets.” Such foreign¶ interference, whatever noble goals may be used as a cover-up, is confined to actual support for one of the parties to a¶ conflict and to ousting the latter’s rival with the net effect “domination of one force is replaced by a still more aggressive¶ domination of the other,” Putin said.¶ Alongside his critical description of the United States’ foreign policy Putin believes that “in periods of international¶ turbulence close and trusting cooperation by Moscow and Washington is particularly in great demand.” In relations with the¶ United States Russia is prepared for a qualitative breakthrough on the condition “the Americans will be guided in reality by¶ the principles of equitable partnership and mutual respect.”¶ “Putin is contesting the Russian presidency and for that reason he was obliged to formulate Russia’s attitude to a number of¶ fundamental issues very harshly. This article was written not only for the people of Russia. With it the prime minster sends a¶ message to our neighbors, partners and competitors. If the article were written for the sole purpose of maneuvering, it would¶ remain unnoticed, the deputy chairman of the State Duma’s international affairs committee, is quoted by Life News as¶ saying.¶ At the same time Putin not only identified the problems of international community, but proposed ways of handling them,¶ the legislator said. For instance, he not only mentioned our differences over the missile defense issue, but also called for¶ enhancing cooperation, thereby easing the risk of a major international conflict.¶ “This article is a demand for respecting Russia,” the weekly Argumenty I Fakty quotes the general director of the Center forPolitical Information, Alexei Mukhin, as saying. “Putin has not proposed some new foreign policy strategy, he merely stated¶ that at a certain point Russia selected the correct path to follow, and if it continues along it, it will achieve respect. The most¶ important thing is the prime minister declared he is a serious person and does not change his views under the influence of¶ time-serving political considerations.”¶ “There are some nuances, but in general the point of view is clear and stable,” political scientist Fyodor Lukyanov said on¶ the Russian News Service radio station. “I believe that in this article there is nothing offensive or aggressive. It is rather¶ defensive. It describes the world in which Russia will have to exist during his hypothetical presidency as a very dangerous¶ place.”¶ “It is very important the article declares that despite the existing controversies and problems Russia sees the United States¶ as a partner,” the RBC Daily quotes political scientist Alexei Zudin as saying. “Certainly there will be attempts to interpret¶ the foreign policy approaches, declared in that article, as aggressive. I believe that this does not agree with the reality.

#### No aggressive Russia- personnel constraints

Stratfor 2012 [Stratfor August 31, 2012 “The Future of Russia's Military: Part 5” http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/future-russias-military-part-5]

One challenge facing the Kremlin is recruitment. Several factors, including negative demographic trends, have undermined the military's ability to recruit and retain a sufficient number of quality personnel.¶ According to official numbers from the Russian armed forces, the military can currently build an estimated maximum force of 800,000 personnel -- a smaller figure than the 1 million personnel target usually given. In April 2012, the military comprised 160,100 officers, 189,700 contract soldiers and 317,200 conscripts. Taking retention rates and general attrition levels into account, the Russian military needs to conscript around 300,000 people during each of its drafts to maintain target troop levels of 1 million.¶ However, the military has reportedly fallen short of its conscription goals in recent years, with 280,000 Russians inducted in the fall 2010 draft, 218,720 in spring 2011, 135,850 in fall 2011 and 132,000 in spring 2012. An increasing number of violations associated with the draft is thus unsurprising. During the fall 2011 draft, officials who were under pressure to meet even the lowered targets committed some 6,000 violations in the conscription of Russians considered unfit to serve.¶ The conscription problems have forced the military to attempt to recruit higher numbers of contract soldiers by raising salaries and improving living conditions. These efforts require considerable funding, but they will be central to the modernization of the Russian military moving forward.

### Dependence Low

#### Qatar is cutting into Russian markets- decreasing their leverage

Hulbert and Goldthau 2012 [Matthew Hulbert Lead Analyst at European Energy Review and consultant to a number of governments, most recently as Senior Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute for International Relations and Andreas Goldthau Head of the Department of Public Policy at the Central European University, an American graduate school based in Budapest, Hungary. Prior to joining CEU, he worked for Rand, SWP Germany and the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. He is also a Fellow with the Global Public Policy Institute’s Global Energy Governance program and an Adjunct Professor with Johns Hopkins University’s MSc in Energy Policy and Climate 8/05/2012 Forbes “Why America Can Make or Break A New Global Gas World” http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/08/05/why-america-can-make-or-break-a-new-global-gas-world/]

But what’s actually doing so much damage to Russia’s Eastern ‘strategy’ is the fact that China can point to independent gas benchmarks in Europe as a credible price points for ‘Sino-Soviet’ deals. That brings us directly back to Qatar’s door as the main primer of European liquidity. The tiny Middle Eastern state is trying to play a very clever game that’s not just about maximising receipts, but enhancing its global potential. If the former was the case, it would’ve already exited the European market when we consider netbacks on Qatari spot into Asian ports have been about $14/MMBtu, twice the figure achieved on UK / North West Europe deliveries. Rather Qatar’s medium term strategy is to keep feeding European spot markets as a transitional step towards an Asian future. Many think Doha would even need to see Asian spot prices hit $25/MMbtu before it comprehensively exited European markets.¶ Admittedly, it’s an ‘open secret’ that Qatar is trying to place up to 50 million tonnes of LNG into Asian markets over the next few years, ramping up the 34 million tonnes it already ships out East. India, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan are relatively easy recipients, but the market Doha really wants to nail down is China, where it has a very limited presence to date. Qatargas is yet to reach any conclusive agreements over contract duration and pricing formulas for full oil parity. The Gulf State has actually only sold around 2mt/y at significant discounts into Asia, making clear that its vast riches (both in geological and paper form) don’t need to instantly rake in the RMB to stay afloat. As long as it keeps feeding European markets, the underlying hedge is that China will have to pay a decent price on decent terms for Doha to turn most of its tankers East.¶ Maybe so, but this entails a very delicate balancing act for Doha to get right, and it’s one that ultimately points towards discounts on long term gas agreements with Beijing. As much as Qatar wants a good price for its gas, it still needs to head off a full scale Pacific Basin pricing war with over 50mt/y expected to come online in the region in the next few years. Leave things too late, and it risks dropping the Beijing ball altogether. Indeed, change seats for a moment and look at this from China’s perspective. Not only does Beijing have a raft of supply options to draw on in the next five years, they are more than happy not to take too much Qatari gas at premium prices. Allowing European spot prices to burgeon on the back of Qatari gas is coming in remarkably handy for China, specifically because it knows in the longer term it has to start sourcing large amounts of Russia gas. China would much rather forego relatively small quantities of Qatari supplies to maintain spot prices on European hubs now, in order to drive a harder bargain procuring far larger quantities of Russian gas in future. China is so ahead of the curve that it refuses to touch Russian West Siberian supplies, precisely because it’s worried Moscow could simultaneously supply Beijing and Brussels with the same fields. If Russia wants ‘in’ on Chinese markets, it has to develop fresh East Siberian fields.

#### Russia is losing their monopoly- Middle East producers

Hulbert and Goldthau 2012 [Matthew Hulbert Lead Analyst at European Energy Review and consultant to a number of governments, most recently as Senior Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute for International Relations and Andreas Goldthau Head of the Department of Public Policy at the Central European University, an American graduate school based in Budapest, Hungary. Prior to joining CEU, he worked for Rand, SWP Germany and the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. He is also a Fellow with the Global Public Policy Institute’s Global Energy Governance program and an Adjunct Professor with Johns Hopkins University’s MSc in Energy Policy and Climate 8/05/2012 Forbes “Why America Can Make or Break A New Global Gas World” http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/08/05/why-america-can-make-or-break-a-new-global-gas-world/]

With that in mind, we’ll start off by taking a brief look at the ‘climatic conditions’ that have made global gas convergence a serious debate, examining reduced OECD demand and meteoric unconventional gains in the US. That’s freed up vast swathes of LNG tankers from the Middle East that should have hit US ports to find their way to European hubs instead. European utilities contracted to expensive Russian pipeline gas have been bleeding customers and cash ever since, constantly being undercut by new market entrants using spot purchases to good effect over term prices. As a result, European wholesale hubs are seriously challenging Russo-German border prices, and as yet, no conclusive winner has emerged given conflicting ‘fundamentals’ in play. But this battle over pricing models isn’t just being waged in Europe; it increasingly divides Asia as well. To add the Pacific dimension, we then turn to China: Beijing has been notoriously stubborn signing oil-indexed contracts over the past two years, irrespective of the vendors involved. It’s put itself in a great pricing position as it has plenty of options to source its gas. Nobody is going to make a dud move signing up overpriced contracts with the prospect of new export giants emerging in the next five to ten years: Least of all, the Middle Kingdom.

### 2NC Cartel Link Wall

#### The aff forces spot pricing- ensures Russian control of natural gas markets- they still have the most of it

Hulbert and Goldthau 2012 [Matthew Hulbert Lead Analyst at European Energy Review and consultant to a number of governments, most recently as Senior Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute for International Relations and Andreas Goldthau Head of the Department of Public Policy at the Central European University, an American graduate school based in Budapest, Hungary. Prior to joining CEU, he worked for Rand, SWP Germany and the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. He is also a Fellow with the Global Public Policy Institute’s Global Energy Governance program and an Adjunct Professor with Johns Hopkins University’s MSc in Energy Policy and Climate 8/05/2012 Forbes “Why America Can Make or Break A New Global Gas World” http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/08/05/why-america-can-make-or-break-a-new-global-gas-world/]

But it’s not all bad news for Russia. The first point is that most consumers (especially continental Europeans) are labouring under the illusion that spot markets mean cheap prices. What they miss, is that setting gas prices based on gas fundamentals has got nothing to do with being cheap – it’s purely about achieving a cost reflective price for whatever the markets (and fundamentals) suggest gas should be. Gas on gas competition might well have positive medium term effects on price given marginal costs of production are generally cheaper than oil. But there are never any guarantees. If anything, prices could initially be far more volatile than those associated with piped gas given the cyclical nature of the beast, not to mention adapting to new upstream investment regimes unable to fall back on the oil ‘certainties’ of old. But assuming these initial hurdles are jumped and gas markets are politically allowed to bed in, that’s where the real fun and games start. As much as consumers think they’ve taken the political sting out of gas producers tails, spot markets could actually give producers far more leverage to manipulate prices, either on a collective or bilateral basis. When you take a quick look at the map, it’s clear to see supply side dynamics are essentially oligopolistic in Europe, a position that Russia might decide to capitalise on. The question is whether Russia would have the nerve to go for it, or be able to take the ideological leap of faith needed to explore and exploit a potentially lucrative new world of gas benchmarks?¶ Much would depend on pricing pressures involved and how far convergence has got, but the lower prices go, the more compelling prospect supply side collusion would become. Warning shots along such lines have been repeatedly fired by the GECF (even if often behind closed doors) with Russia, Algeria, Iran and Venezuela all wanting to recalibrate markets back towards producer interests. Obviously someone would have to shoulder initial opportunity costs and absorb likely free riding, enforce quotas and restrict new market entry at the fringe. They would also need to find a swing producer, that many have long thought would be Qatar, but actually, flags up a huge opportunity for Russia here.¶ Instead of issuing empty threats to flood markets or decimate upstream investments, independent gas benchmarks might just provide Moscow with sufficient incentive to do what it should always have done: get to grips with the fact that US shale has made Russia a price taker in Europe (and Asia), and start developing LNG prospects to reclaim control of global gas fundamentals. Despite sitting on over 30% of global gas supplies, Russian LNG production accounts for less than 5% of global share. Moscow has let itself become a fringe player in a global gas world. A ridiculous statement when you consider Russia is the gas equivalent to Saudi Arabia for oil. Developing Shtokman, Sakhalin and indeed Bazhenov and Achimov fields will undoubtedly put some people’s nose out of joint, but given Russia’s own unconventional reserves are estimated to be ten times larger than the whole of Europe, it still has the time (and potential) to break anybody in the field on volume to dictate long term prices. If global gas benchmarks are the way of the future, then we should at least be aware that Russia has the potential to play a pivotal role as the swing LNG producer of the world. The initial 62 million tonnes of LNG Shtokman and Sakhalin should hold, tells us as much.¶ Not only could Russia lean far heavier on Qatar, Australia, Algeria, West African and burgeoning Latin American LNG production to align short term prices, it would set the stage for a serious approach towards a gas cartel as the logical conclusion of independent global gas prices. Worst of all, Russia’s swing status would be built on the shoulders of a well-supplied, but largely isolated US market. If the US goes native, Europe fails to develop indigenous supplies, and Asia soaks up excess supplies, then Russia can have lots of fun applying its own logic of ‘gas on gas’ competition. That should certainly give Europe something to think about at the wrong end of the Eurasian pipeline. But you never know, if Brussels asks the Chinese politely, the clever chaps in Beijing might have a plan C. Beijing LNG ‘freedom carriers’ making their way to Europe by 2025 might just be a better bet than hoping the US delivers on its global gas potential. Ironic times indeed.

### China Stuff

#### No US/China war—It’s in neither country’s best interest

Ackerman 2011 (Robert Ackerman, May 10, 2011, “War Between China, U.S. Not Likely,” http://www.afcea.org/signal/signalscape/index.php/2011/05/10/11510/)

The United States and China are not likely to go to war with each other because neither country wants it and it would run counter to both nations’ best interests. That was the conclusion of a plenary panel session hosted by former Good Morning America host David Hartman at the 2011 Joint Warfighting Conference in Virginia Beach. Adm. Timothy J. Keating, USN (Ret.), former head of the U.S. Pacific Command, noted that China actually wants the United States to remain active in the Asia-Pacific region as a hedge against any other country’s adventurism. And, most of the other countries in that region want the United States to remain active as a hedge against China. Among areas of concern for China is North Korea. Wallace “Chip” Gregson, former assistant secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, said that above all China fears instability, and a North Korean collapse or war could send millions of refugees streaming into Manchuria, which has economic problems of its own.

## 1NR

### Faster

#### Fastest- Double-dip now causes depression - overwhelms their D

Isidore 11 (Financial Correspondent-CNN Money, 8/10, http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/10/news/economy/double\_dip\_recession\_economy/index.htm

Another recession could be even worse than the last one for a few reasons. For starters, the economy is more vulnerable than it was in 2007 when the Great Recession began. In fact, the economy would enter the new recession much weaker than the start of any other downturn since the end of World War II. Unemployment currently stands at 9.1%. In November 2007, the month before the start of the Great Recession, it was just 4.7%. And the large number of Americans who have stopped looking for work in the last few years has left the percentage of the population with a job at a 28-year low. Various parts of the economy also have yet to recover from the last recession and would be at serious risk of lasting damage in a new downturn. Home values continue to lose ground and are projected to continue their fall. While manufacturing has had a nice rebound in the last two years, industrial production is still 18% below pre-recession levels. There are nearly 900 banks on the FDIC's list of troubled institutions, the highest number since 1993. Only 76 banks were at risk as the Great Recession took hold. But what has economists particularly worried is that the tools generally used to try to jumpstart an economy teetering on the edge of recession aren't available this time around. "The reason we didn't go into a depression three years ago is the policy response by Congress and the Fed," said Dan Seiver, a finance professor at San Diego State University. "We won't see that this time." Three times between 2008 and 2010, Congress approved massive spending or temporary tax cuts to try to stimulate the economy. But fresh from the bruising debt ceiling battle and credit rating downgrade, and with elections looming, the federal government has shown little inclination to move in that direction. So this new recession would likely have virtually no policy effort to counteract it.

#### Economic bounceback now- failure to get a deal on debt ceiling and sequester causes collapse

Brown 1-2 [Abram Brown 1-2-2013 Forbes “Fiscal Cliff: Two Monster Problems Loom Ahead. Here's What Happens Next” http://www.forbes.com/sites/abrambrown/2013/01/02/u-s-faces-uphill-climb-after-fiscal-cliff-deal-heres-what-happes-next/]

To monitor how investors feel about the progress, look at key bellwether stocks, businesses like Apple and FedEx, that can report tremors in economic conditions throughout the globe. Also, track how risk-off stocks fare: These are large, cash-generative companies like Procter & Gamble and Coca-Cola that investors buy during tiring times.¶ Optimism is already apparent from gains in U.S. and overseas markets. The Dow Jones industrial average climbed 1.4% to 13,286.18—a triple-digit gain of 182 points. The Nasdaq composite rose 2.6% to 3,086.46, and the S&P 500 added 1.9% to 1,452.81.¶ Abroad, the Euro Stoxx 50 climbed by 2.6% to 2,704.61. The FTSE 100 added 2.3% to 6,035.90. Asian markets told a similar story. The Shanghai composite went up 1.3% to 2,269.13, and the Hang Sheng index increased 2.9% to 23,311.98.¶ The length of the rally should seem very much in doubt. “The bare bones agreement to limit the scope of tax increases in 2013 removes for now the threat of immediate, severe fiscal tightening,” says Citi economist Steven Wieting. “However, the incomplete agreement leaves both short-term and long-term spending decisions to the new Congress in just the next couple of months. A two-month delay in sequestration roughly coincides with needed action to raise the Federal debt ceiling.” Wieting adds: “Such further agreements may be reached with even more difficulty.”

### Theory

#### Best academic theory validates our impact

Royal 2010 (Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-214)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 10981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Seperately, Polllins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium, and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996,2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘future expectation of trade’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavior of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectation of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases , as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002, p.89). Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. ‘Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to create a ‘rally round the flag’ effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997) Miller (1999) and Kisanganie and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force.

### 2NC Uniqueness Update

#### It will get raised- Obama spending PC

Star Ledger 1-6 [The Star Ledger 1-6-2013 Editorial Board “Debt ceiling and hostage taking: Editorial” http://blog.nj.com/njv\_editorial\_page/2013/01/post\_75.html]

Republicans are threatening to pull this trigger unless President Obama agrees to deep spending cuts. That tactic is so reckless it should be criminal. But it worked in 2011 when Obama folded under the pressure and agreed to more than $1 trillion in discretionary spending cuts.¶ This time, Obama promises to fight. He vows he will not negotiate with a gun to his head and allow a minority party to dictate terms.¶ “I want to send a very clear message,” he said a few weeks ago. “We are not going to play that game next year ... because we’ve got to break that habit.”¶ This is a game of chicken. Republicans are threatening to shoot the hostage unless they get their way, and Obama is daring them to pull the trigger.¶ It’s scary to watch, but Obama has good reason to take this tough line. Republicans cannot be allowed to use their narrow control of the House as a lever to dictate terms to the Senate and the White House every year as the debt grows.¶ Would House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) really pull the trigger? Most Americans understand that the intransigence of House Republicans is the main impediment to a balanced debt deal. If they drive the economy into a ditch, they could lose their control of the chamber in 2014.¶ ¶ The obvious solution is to avoid this danger by striking a grand bargain that stabilizes the debt as a share of the economy. That was the goal of the bipartisan Simpson-Bowles plan, which was issued in December 2010 and put the cost at $4 trillion over a decade.¶ The surprise is that we are more than halfway there. The spending cuts Republicans forced in 2011 combined with the recent tax hikes are worth more than $2 trillion. The smaller debt will cuts interest payments by another $300 billion.¶ So let us pray that the art of the deal is not dead yet. We need more tax hikes, and we need more spending cuts, especially in entitlement programs. The heroes of this story are the members of both parties who agree to swallow those bitter pills.

#### They are split on debt ceiling

Sonmez 1-5 [Felicia Sonmez 1-5-2013 Washington Post “GOP dissension over debt-ceiling strategy” http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/gop-dissension-surfaces-over-debt-ceiling-strategy/2013/01/05/6dd24012-56ab-11e2-a613-ec8d394535c6\_story.html]

There are early signs of division within the Republican Party over how to approach the upcoming debate over raising the federal debt ceiling.¶ On Friday, a top Senate Republican signaled that members of his party should be prepared to play hardball and be willing to accept the kind of consequences in each previous fight they’ve threatened but managed to avoid.¶ House Speaker John A. Boehner (R-Ohio) likewise insisted that Republicans hold the line, telling his members they must demand that every dollar they raise the debt limit be paired with commensurate spending cuts.¶ But other Republicans counseled caution, warning that pressure from the business community and the public to raise the $16.4 trillion federal borrowing limit renders untenable any threats not to do so and will weaken the GOP’s hand if their stance is perceived to be a bluff.

### Hagel is not Thumper

#### Hagel will sail – this undermines opposition

by Jim Lobe, January 05, 2013 Major Test for Israel Lobby As Obama Leans to Hagel for Pentagon

http://original.antiwar.com/lobe/2013/01/04/major-test-for-israel-lobby-as-obama-leans-to-hagel-for-pentagon/

The sharpness of the neo-conservative campaign – particularly its allegations that Hagel is anti-Semitic and anti-Israel – has evoked charges of McCarthyism from his defenders, adding to the discomfort of the Israel lobby’s main organisations. Even CUFI, sometimes described as more Zionist than the Jewish organisations, disassociated itself from some of the charges. Thus far, only three Republican senators have said they will oppose Hagel if he is nominated, while several others who have traditionally been close to the lobby, including Sens. John McCain and Lindsay Graham, have voiced strong reservations but refrained from committing themselves. Some Democrats have also quietly expressed concern. But most observers believe that, if nominated, Hagel, who also heads the influential Atlantic Council think tank, will be confirmed by a solid – if not overwhelming – majority of senators. That makes the lobby’s position even more delicate. During his two terms as senator, Hagel, a consistent conservative on social and domestic issues, was personally popular with his colleagues on both sides of the aisle. “Americans are sick and tired of the smear tactics that Hagel’s main opponents have used, and going all-out against him would reveal that AIPAC cares more about Israel than it does about U.S. interests,” Walt told IPS. “Plus, why spend political capital on a former senator whose colleagues on the Hill are going to confirm him anyway?”

#### Any Hagel UQ problem would self-correct

Hope Hodge 1/3/2013 Could sequester punt push back a Hagel nomination? http://www.humanevents.com/2013/01/03/could-sequester-punt-push-back-a-hagel-nomination/

At minimum, the decision of Congress to delay a decision on sequestration will mean two more months of fiscal uncertainty for the Defense Department and the businesses that support it. But could the punt also affect how and when the transition to a new Defense Secretary takes place? Heritage Foundation research fellow Baker Spring told Human Events in November that he believed current defense secretary Leon Panetta, an outspoken critic of the sequestration mechanism, might be retained in his position if the more than $500 billion in cuts to planned spending did take effect, to oversee their implementation. President Barack Obama’s nomination of John Kerry for Secretary of State, in November, without an accompanying nomination for defense, fueled speculation that there would be a strategic delay in the transition of the Defense top spot. However, if consensus grows that a budget deal in March will need to realize cuts to Pentagon spending, former Republican Senator Chuck Hagel, Obama’s reported favorite to succeed Panetta at DoD, may be a preferred choice to oversee the implementation of such a deal. Hagel made news in 2011 when he told the Financial Times, shortly following a trim of $487 from the Pentagon budget, that he wanted to see the Department pared down even further. “I don’t think that our military has really looked at themselves strategically, critically, in a long, long time,” Hagel said. This contrasts sharply with Panetta’s message that while the 2011 cuts were bearable for the department, another cutback of that magnitude would be “devastating.”

### A2 Not Congress

#### Obama gets the blame – he is Velcro and highly visible

Nicholas and Hook 10 **Peter Nicholas and Janet Hook, “Obama the Velcro President,” LOS ANGELES TIMES, 7—30—10,** [**http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/30/nation/la-na-velcro-presidency-20100730/3**](http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/30/nation/la-na-velcro-presidency-20100730/3)**, accessed 8-22-11.**

If Ronald Reagan was the classic Teflon president, Barack Obama is made of Velcro. Through two terms, Reagan eluded much of the responsibility for recession and foreign policy scandal. In less than two years, Obama has become ensnared in blame. Hoping to better insulate Obama, White House aides have sought to give other Cabinet officials a higher profile and additional public exposure. They are also crafting new ways to explain the president's policies to a skeptical public. But Obama remains the colossus of his administration — to a point where trouble anywhere in the world is often his to solve. The president is on the hook to repair the Gulf Coast oil spill disaster, stabilize Afghanistan, help fix Greece's ailing economy and do right by Shirley Sherrod, the Agriculture Department official fired as a result of a misleading fragment of videotape. What's not sticking to Obama is a legislative track record that his recent predecessors might envy. Political dividends from passage of a healthcare overhaul or a financial regulatory bill have been fleeting. Instead, voters are measuring his presidency by a more immediate yardstick: Is he creating enough jobs? So far the verdict is no, and that has taken a toll on Obama's approval ratings. Only 46% approve of Obama's job performance, compared with 47% who disapprove, according to Gallup's daily tracking poll. "I think the accomplishments are very significant, but I think most people would look at this and say, 'What was the plan for jobs?' " said Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.). "The agenda he's pushed here has been a very important agenda, but it hasn't translated into dinner table conversations." Reagan was able to glide past controversies with his popularity largely intact. He maintained his affable persona as a small-government advocate while seeming above the fray in his own administration. Reagan was untarnished by such calamities as the 1983 terrorist bombing of the Marines stationed in Beirut and scandals involving members of his administration. In the 1986 Iran-Contra affair, most of the blame fell on lieutenants. Obama lately has tried to rip off the Velcro veneer. In a revealing moment during the oil spill crisis, he reminded Americans that his powers aren't "limitless." He told residents in Grand Isle, La., that he is a flesh-and-blood president, not a comic-book superhero able to dive to the bottom of the sea and plug the hole. "I can't suck it up with a straw," he said. But as a candidate in 2008, he set sky-high expectations about what he could achieve and what government could accomplish. Clinching the Democratic nomination two years ago, Obama described the moment as an epic breakthrough when "we began to provide care for the sick and good jobs to the jobless" and "when the rise of the oceans began to slow and our planet began to heal." Those towering goals remain a long way off. And most people would have preferred to see Obama focus more narrowly on the "good jobs" part of the promise. A recent Gallup poll showed that 53% of the population rated unemployment and the economy as the nation's most important problem. By contrast, only 7% cited healthcare — a single-minded focus of the White House for a full year. At every turn, Obama makes the argument that he has improved lives in concrete ways. Without the steps he took, he says, the economy would be in worse shape and more people would be out of work. There's evidence to support that. Two economists, Mark Zandi and Alan Blinder, reported recently that without the stimulus and other measures, gross domestic product would be about 6.5% lower. Yet, Americans aren't apt to cheer when something bad doesn't materialize. Unemployment has been rising — from 7.7% when Obama took office, to 9.5%. Last month, more than 2 million homes in the U.S. were in various stages of foreclosure — up from 1.7 million when Obama was sworn in. "Folks just aren't in a mood to hand out gold stars when unemployment is hovering around 10%," said Paul Begala, a Democratic pundit. Insulating the president from bad news has proved impossible. Other White Houses have tried doing so with more success. Reagan's Cabinet officials often took the blame, shielding the boss. But the Obama administration is about one man. Obama is the White House's chief spokesman, policy pitchman, fundraiser and negotiator. No Cabinet secretary has emerged as an adequate surrogate. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner is seen as a tepid public speaker; Energy Secretary Steven Chu is prone to long, wonky digressions and has rarely gone before the cameras during an oil spill crisis that he is working to end. So, more falls to Obama, reinforcing the Velcro effect: Everything sticks to him. He has opined on virtually everything in the hundreds of public statements he has made: nuclear arms treaties, basketball star LeBron James' career plans; Chelsea Clinton's wedding. Few audiences are off-limits. On Wednesday, he taped a spot on ABC's "The View," drawing a rebuke from Democratic Pennsylvania Gov. Edward G. Rendell, who deemed the appearance unworthy of the presidency during tough times. "Stylistically he creates some of those problems," Eddie Mahe, a Republican political strategist, said in an interview. "His favorite pronoun is 'I.' When you position yourself as being all things to all people, the ultimate controller and decision maker with the capacity to fix anything, you set yourself up to be blamed when it doesn't get fixed or things happen." A new White House strategy is to forgo talk of big policy changes that are easy to ridicule. Instead, aides want to market policies as more digestible pieces. So, rather than tout the healthcare package as a whole, advisors will talk about smaller parts that may be more appealing and understandable — such as barring insurers from denying coverage based on preexisting conditions. But at this stage, it may be late in the game to downsize either the president or his agenda. Sen. Richard J. Durbin (D-Ill.) said: "The man came in promising change. He has a higher profile than some presidents because of his youth, his race and the way he came to the White House with the message he brought in. It's naive to believe he can step back and have some Cabinet secretary be the face of the oil spill. The buck stops with his office."

### A2 Olive Branch

#### Plan unpopular – natural gas focus controversial

Lorris 11 Nicolas Lorris, Policy Analyst at The Heritage Foundation's Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, “Why Ethanol and Natural Gas Don’t Deserve Subsidies”, June 21st, 2011 <http://blog.heritage.org/2011/06/21/why-ethanol-and-natural-gas-don%E2%80%99t-deserve-subsidies/>

Two of the energy subsidy debates in Washington focus on tax credits for the ethanol and natural gas industries. The growing opposition to the $6 billion ethanol blender’s tax credit became quite clear when the Senate voted 73–27 to remove the subsidy—even though the credit is set to expire at the end of the year. When it comes to natural gas, bipartisan support has been cast to create, expand, or extend preferential tax treatment to subsidize the production, use, and purchase of natural gas vehicles (NGVs), although several Members of Congress have now withdrawn their names as co-sponsors of the bill. To see why neither ethanol nor natural gas deserves subsidies, look no further than Representative John Sullivan’s (R–OK) answer when asked to differentiate between the ethanol tax credit and the natural gas vehicle tax credits. He said, “The ethanol industry won’t survive without that. The natural gas industry will survive.” If that’s the case, then what’s the point of subsidizing ethanol or natural gas? If an energy source is not economically competitive, then the government should not artificially prop up these technologies and energy sources to create a market that wouldn’t exist without the subsidy. And if producers do have an economically viable idea, then they shouldn’t need the handouts from Washington in the first place. That is, if the natural gas industry will survive as Representative Sullivan says it will, then it shouldn’t need the tax credits.

The argument will then inevitably turn to helping producers push through the investment “valley of death.” Investment obstacles exist when introducing new technologies to the marketplace, so the natural gas industry could argue that it needs these tax credits to get off the ground and kick-start the transition from gas-powered vehicles to ones that run on natural gas. But if natural gas vehicles are truly a good economic idea, vehicle manufacturers will make them, and consumers will switch without market manipulation from Washington.

#### Republicans will pocket concessions – priority is opposing Obama

Burton, ’11 [Nsenga, “Dems to Obama: Stop Compromising with GOP,” http://www.theroot.com/buzz/dems-obama-stop-compromising-gop]

The Associated Press is reporting that Democrats are tiring of President Obama's concessions to the GOP on matters large (tax cut for the wealthy) and small (timing of jobs talk). President Obama has yielded to House Speaker John Boehner in a string of concessions that have unnerved Democrats and emboldened Republicans. A chorus of Democratic voices is now demanding that the president abandon his attempts at being a compromiser and instead lay out an ideological vision

that distinguishes him from Republicans and becomes a template for his re-election.

### A2 Revenue

#### GOP frames energy shifts as forcing additional spending cuts in other areas

Davenport, 12

(7/13, "Obama Faces Tough Challenge in Virginia Over Energy," National Journal, http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/obama-faces-tough-challenge-in-virginia-over-energy-20120713

But even here, Republicans – including the Romney campaign – have criticized Navy contracts to purchase biofuels that are more expensive than traditional fuels as the Pentagon prepares for spending cuts.

Speaking on Thursday to reporters on behalf of the Romney campaign, Former Navy Secretary John Lehman said, “If the president wants the taxpayer to subsidize alternative fuels, it shouldn’t be done on the Navy’s back.”

### A2: Winners Win

#### No turns---every energy policy is polarizing

Whitman 12 Christine Todd is a CASEnergy Co-Chair, Former EPA Administrator and New Jersey Governor, “Nuclear Power Garners Bipartisan Support,” August 13, http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/08/finding-the-sweet-spot-biparti.php?rss=1&utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+njgroup-energy+%28Energy+%26+Environment+Experts--Q+with+Answer+Previews%29#2237728

It’s clear from the debate around the merits and drawbacks of various electricity and fuel sources that energy policy can be a highly polarizing topic**.** In fact, it’s arguable that there is no energy option that holds a truly bipartisan appeal:

Every form of energy faces pockets of dissent. This makes crafting universally accepted energy policy particularly challenging**.**

## 2NR

#### The Harrison evidence is not qualified, not supported by evidence, and should not be evaluated; this is NOT an ethical challenge.

Harrison, 2007(Lindsay Harrison, edebate, “Please post this email to edebate on my behalf” March 3, online)

It has come to my attention that teams are reading "evidence" from a debate blog that I ran last year when the high school topic was a legal one. I started the blog because, in judging debates on the topic, I was frustrated by what I saw as misunderstandings of the legal system by many in the debate community. I also was frustrated by a lack of creativity in devising arguments as a result of a lack of broad legal knowledge. I intended the blog both to educate and to generate new ideas for argumentation. I did NOT intend the blog to be used as evidence, especially not in college debates where I figured the community would recognize that none of my posts were peer-reviewed (or reviewed by anyone at all), none of my posts were backed up by specific research, and none of my posts would ever qualify as "legal scholarship." In fact, I am merely giving people ideas for arguments and I do not necessarily advocate any of the ideas as my own - I consider evidence to be taken out of context if it says, "debaters should argue that bush would get credit" and folks read only the part suggesting "bush would get credit," thereby attributing that idea to me. When I found out that people were reading "Harrison 06" evidence from the blog as link cards on the court politics argument, I made an effort to end this. Whenever anyone read this evidence in front of me, I asked that they not do so in the future. I also posted something on the blog that I intended as a disclaimer for people not to read "evidence" from the blog. I have been traveling internationally for several months and, upon my return, I found out that people have continued to read this evidence in debate rounds. Accordingly, I am now sending this to edebate in the hope that the community will recognize definitively that I do not want blog posts from my debate education blog to be read as "evidence" in rounds. Please do not read evidence from my debate education blog in rounds. I consider it to be taken out of context. I hope that if people do read this evidence in rounds that judges will penalize those teams for reading evidence that the author considers out of context.

# Rd 5 Neg v ASU

## 1NC

### Off

#### The aff should advocate increasing energy production

#### The subject: central government- the USFG.

#### The verb: increase- to make greater. Or

#### “Resolved” expresses intent to implement the plan.

American Heritage Dictionary, pub. date: 2000, [www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved](http://www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved)

To find a solution to; solve … To bring to a usually successful conclusion

#### Reduce excludes removal

Words & Phrases: Perm Edition, 2002, vol 36A, p.80

Mass. 1905. Rev.Laws, c. 203, § 9, provides that, if two or more cases are tried together in the superior court, the presiding judge may "reduce" the witness fees and other costs, but "not less than the ordinary witness fees, and other costs recoverable in one of the cases" which are so tried together shall be allowed. Held that, in reducing the costs, the amount in all the cases together is to be considered and reduced, providing that there must be left in the aggregate an amount not less than the largest sum recoverable in any of the cases. The word "reduce," in its ordinary signification, does not mean to cancel, destroy, or bring to naught, but to diminish, lower, or bring to an inferior state.— Green v. Sklar, 74 N.E. 595, 188 Mass. 363.

#### The objects -Financial incentives means loans/grants

**UNCTAD, 4** - UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (“INCENTIVES”

http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20035\_en.pdf

There is no uniform definition of what constitutes an “investment incentive”. (Box I.1. contains a list of commonly used incentives.) The only major international instrument that contains a partial definition is the SCM Agreement (see below). Governments use three main categories of investment incentives to attract FDI and to benefit more from it:

· financial incentives, such as outright grants and loans at concessionary rates;

· fiscal incentives such as tax holidays and reduced tax rates;

· other incentives, including subsidized infrastructure or services, market preferences and regulatory concessions, including exemptions from labour or environmental standards.

#### Restrictions are regulatory prohibitions

Words & Phrases 2004 v37A p410

N.D.Okla. 1939. "Restriction," as used in the statutes concerning restriction on alienation of lands inherited from deceased Osage allottees, is synonymous with "prohibition." Act April J8, 1912. §§ 6, 7, 37 Stat. 87, 88.—U.S. v. Mullendore, 30 F.Supp. 13, appeal dismissed 111 F.2d 898.— Indians 15(1).

This is the regulatory part

Words & Phrases: Perm Edition, 2002, vol 36A, p414

N.II. 1938. As used in statute giving towns power to "regulate and restrict" buildings by zoning regulations, "regulation" is synonymous with "restrict" and "restrictions" are embraced in "regulations. Puh.Laws. 1926, c. 41. W A»-y\* r

#### The direct object is energy production

Is Cumulative Fossil Energy Demand a Useful Indicator for the Environmental Performance of Products? M A R K A . J . HUIJBREGTS , \* , † L I N D A J . A . R O M B O U T S , † S T E F A N I E H E L L W E G , ‡ R O L F F R I S C H K N E C H T , § A . J A N H E N D R I K S , † D I K V A N D E M E E N T , † , | A D M . J . R A G A S , † L U C A S R E I J N D E R S , ⊥ A N D J A A P S T R U I J S | Department of Environmental Science, Institute for Wetland and Water Research, Faculty of Science, Radboud University Nijmegen, P.O. Box 9010, NL-6500 GL Nijmegen, The Netherlands, Institute for Chemical- and Bioengineering, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zu¨rich, CH-8093 Zu¨rich, Switzerland, Ecoinvent Centre, Ueberlandstrasse 129, CH-8600 Duebendorf, Switzerland, Laboratory for Ecological Risk Assessment, National Institute of Public Health and the Environment, P.O. Box 1, NL-3720 BA, Bilthoven, The Netherlands, and Institute for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Dynamics, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 166, NL-1018 WV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands 2006 American Chemical Society VOL. 40, NO. 3, 2006 / ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 9 641 http://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/es051689g

The appropriateness of the fossil Cumulative Energy Demand (CED) as an indicator for the environmental performance of products and processes is explored with a regression analysis between the environmental life-cycle impacts and fossil CEDs of 1218 products, divided into the product categories “energy production”, “material production”, “transport”, and “waste treatment”. Our results show that, for all product groups but waste treatment, the fossil CED correlates well with most impact categories, such as global warming, resource depletion, acidification, eutrophication, tropospheric ozone formation, ozone depletion, and human toxicity (explained variance between 46% and 100%). We conclude that the use of fossil fuels is an important driver of several environmental impacts and thereby indicative for many environmental problems. It may therefore serve as a screening indicator for environmental performance. However, the usefulness of fossil CED as a stand-alone indicator for environmental impact is limited by the large uncertainty in the product-specific fossil CEDbased impact scores (larger than a factor of 10 for the majority of the impact categories; 95% confidence interval). A major reason for this high uncertainty is nonfossil energy related emissions and land use, such as landfill leachates, radionuclide emissions, and land use in agriculture and forestry.

#### Links

#### 1. The SUBJECT of the action is the AFF team, not the USFG.

#### 2. The OBJECT of the action is the judge, not energy.

#### 3. Their use of the double and/or makes the plan totally incoherent and proves it could mean any one of 12 things and negate any or all of the others.

#### Vote neg-

#### 1. Infinite regression—disregarding resolutional syntax produces an endless regression to small, trivial plans. For example, an aff only about the subject opens the door to ANY philosophy that speaks to ‘being.’

#### 2. Limits—resolutional limits encourage AFF innovation, predictive research on a designated topic, and clash—a precursor to productive education. Also, the inherent value of arguments within limits is greater, which link turns education arguments.

#### If our interpretation is net-beneficial it means there’s no reason to vote affirmative. If the case is true then it de-justifies the resolution. Teams are still signified by ‘AFF’ and ‘NEG’, so the resolution is a required measurement for ‘affirmation.’

### Off

#### The aff’s focus on the being mystifies the material roots of profit in the exploitation of labor rather than nature

DeFazio 12 (Kimberly, English Professor at University of Wisconsin Lacrosse, Winter/Spring 12, Machine-Thinking and the Romance of Posthumanism, http://redcritique.org/WinterSpring2012/machinethinkingandtheromanceofposthumanism.htm)

In the 21st century, global capitalism's commodification of all aspects of life has reached new heights, requiring new modes of explaining away the material roots. From cloning and bioengineered food, to ever-newer forms of human-technological hybrids, to overfishing and industrialization of slaughterhouses, to the privatization of public sources of water and the selling of "hot air" (which makes it possible for rich nations to avoid lowering emissions), to the "synthetic biology" by which biocapitalists like J. Craig Venter hope new living creatures will be produced to substitute fossil fuels—there is no aspect of social or natural life that is immune from the market. Capital's endless and inherently crisis-ridden drive to accumulate profit has, on the one hand, led to a new scramble among nations of the global North to privatize the world's dwindling natural resources regardless of the human and ecological consequences. What this competitive drive has lead to, among other things, is the scientific explorations of new bio-horizons: what Venter calls a "new industrial revolution" (Pollack). On the other hand, the most recent effects of capitalist crisis—beginning with the 2007 housing market crash—have been used to justify further privatization of social resources, leading to historically unprecedented cuts in wages, employment and social programs throughout the global North.¶ It is not surprising, then, that cultural theory has become more and more concerned with the relation between human and non-human life and with the instrumentalities used by the former to control the latter. Broadly characterized by a "posthuman" displacement of humanist priorities of reason, rationality and Cartesian dualism, at the center of which is a human subject constructed as fundamentally different from and superior to non-human animals and life and capable of developing reliable knowledge of and control over the objective world—a wide range of cultural writing today has become concerned with the increasing subjugation of nature to human calculation and control, and call for a new inquiry into the relation of the human and its other. Some, like Giorgio Agamben, address the increasing efforts of the state to control and manage all aspects of human and non-human life (Homo Sacer; The Open). Others, like Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, focus on the efforts by corporations to privatize the knowledges, affects and technologies that have been developed through the collective energies of what they call the multitude: the efforts to enclose the digital commons in the interests of a powerful few (Commonwealth). Graham Harman goes so far as to suggest that the "being" of tools is constitutive of all being in the contemporary moment (Tool-Being), while Peter Menzel and Faith D'Alusio celebrate the displacement of homo sapiens by the notion of robo sapiens (Robo Sapiens). Among one of the most popular developments in contemporary posthumanist theory, animal studies, writers like Cary Wolfe, Donna Haraway, Kelly Oliver, and Matthew Calarco, taking their cue from Derrida's later writings (i.e., The Animal That Therefore I Am), address what is for them the instrumentalizing and unethical discourses of humanism, which justifies its violence toward non-human species by its epistemological centering of the human: the "anthropological machine" (Agamben, The Open).¶ But what drives the "new industrial revolution" (Venter) is what drove the "old" one: the use of technology to appropriate surplus labor (the source of profit) at the point of production. Profit is not derived from "nature" but labor: in order for nature to become a commodifiable resource, it must become transformed by human labor, which is itself a dialectical outcome of nature. This is another way of saying that the commodification of life on such a planetary scale today is only possible on the basis of the commodification of human labor power. Biocapitalism is first and foremost a regime of wage labor.¶ Contemporary cultural theory's concern with the effects of capitalism on non-human life, however, has mystified capital's material roots, and one of the central means by which this has been accomplished is what I call machine-thinking.

#### Capitalism’s preoccupation with endless accumulation will result in total ecological destruction and extinction

Foster 11,[John Bellamy ] Dec. 2011, Capitalism and the Accumulation of Catastrophe, Monthly Review, Vol. 63 Issue 07, <http://monthlyreview.org/2011/12/01/capitalism-and-the-accumulation-of-catastrophe> (Aug 2012)

Yet, the continued pursuit of Keynes’s convenient lie over the last eight decades has led to a world far more polarized and beset with contradictions than he could have foreseen. It is a world prey to the enormous unintended consequences of accumulation without limits: namely, global economic stagnation, financial crisis, and planetary ecological destruction. Keynes, though aware of some of the negative economic aspects of capitalist production, had no real understanding of the ecological perils—of which scientists had already long been warning. Today these perils are impossible to overlook. Faced with impending ecological catastrophe, it is more necessary than ever to abandon Keynes’s convenient lie and espouse the truth: that foul is foul and fair is fair. Capitalism, the society of “après moi le déluge!” is a system that fouls its own nest—both the human-social conditions and the wider natural environment on which it depends. The accumulation of capital is at the same time accumulation of catastrophe, not only for a majority of the world’s people, but living species generally. Hence, nothing is *fairer*—more just, more beautiful, and more necessary—today than the struggle to overthrow the regime of capital and to create a system of substantive equality and sustainable human development; a socialism for the twenty-first century.

#### The alternative is to reject capitalism through revolutionary action

Herod ‘4 James Herod author of several books on capitalism and social activist since 1968 Getting Free 2004 <http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman_g/Strate/GetFre/06.htm>

It is time to try to describe, at first abstractly and later concretely, a strategy for destroying capitalism. This strategy, at its most basic, calls for pulling time, energy, and resources out of capitalist civilization and putting them into building a new civilization. The image then is one of emptying out capitalist structures, hollowing them out, by draining wealth, power, and meaning out of them until there is nothing left but shells. This is definitely an aggressive strategy. It requires great militancy, and constitutes an attack on the existing order. The strategy clearly recognizes that capitalism is the enemy and must be destroyed, but it is not a frontal attack aimed at overthrowing the system, but an inside attack aimed at gutting it, while simultaneously replacing it with something better, something we want. Thus capitalist structures (corporations, governments, banks, schools, etc.) are not seized so much as simply abandoned. Capitalist relations are not fought so much as they are simply rejected. We stop participating in activities that support (finance, condone) the capitalist world and start participating in activities that build a new world while simultaneously undermining the old. We create a new pattern of social relations alongside capitalist relations and then we continually build and strengthen our new pattern while doing every thing we can to weaken capitalist relations. In this way our new democratic, non-hierarchical, non-commodified relations can eventually overwhelm the capitalist relations and force them out of existence. This is how it has to be done. This is a plausible, realistic strategy. To think that we could create a whole new world of decent social arrangements overnight, in the midst of a crisis, during a so-called revolution, or during the collapse of capitalism, is foolhardy. Our new social world must grow within the old, and in opposition to it, until it is strong enough to dismantle and abolish capitalist relations. Such a revolution will never happen automatically, blindly, determinably, because of the inexorable, materialist laws of history. It will happen, and only happen, because we want it to, and because we know what we�re doing and know how we want to live, and know what obstacles have to be overcome before we can live that way, and know how to distinguish between our social patterns and theirs. But we must not think that the capitalist world can simply be ignored, in a live and let live attitude, while we try to build new lives elsewhere. (There is no elsewhere.) There is at least one thing, wage-slavery, that we can�t simply stop participating in (but even here there are ways we can chip away at it). Capitalism must be explicitly refused and replaced by something else. This constitutes War, but it is not a war in the traditional sense of armies and tanks, but a war fought on a daily basis, on the level of everyday life, by millions of people. It is a war nevertheless because the accumulators of capital will use coercion, brutality, and murder, as they have always done in the past, to try to block any rejection of the system. They have always had to force compliance; they will not hesitate to continue doing so. Nevertheless, there are many concrete ways that individuals, groups, and neighborhoods can gut capitalism, which I will enumerate shortly. We must always keep in mind how we became slaves; then we can see more clearly how we can cease being slaves. We were forced into wage-slavery because the ruling class slowly, systematically, and brutally destroyed our ability to live autonomously. By driving us off the land, changing the property laws, destroying community rights, destroying our tools, imposing taxes, destroying our local markets, and so forth, we were forced onto the labor market in order to survive, our only remaining option being to sell, for a wage, our ability to work. It�s quite clear then how we can overthrow slavery. We must reverse this process. We must begin to reacquire the ability to live without working for a wage or buying the products made by wage-slaves (that is, we must get free from the labor market and the way of living based on it), and embed ourselves instead in cooperative labor and cooperatively produced goods. Another clarification is needed. This strategy does not call for reforming capitalism, for changing capitalism into something else. It calls for replacing capitalism, totally, with a new civilization. This is an important distinction, because capitalism has proved impervious to reforms, as a system. We can sometimes in some places win certain concessions from it (usually only temporary ones) and win some (usually short-lived) improvements in our lives as its victims, but we cannot reform it piecemeal, as a system. Thus our strategy of gutting and eventually destroying capitalism requires at a minimum a totalizing image, an awareness that we are attacking an entire way of life and replacing it with another, and not merely reforming one way of life into something else. Many people may not be accustomed to thinking about entire systems and social orders, but everyone knows what a lifestyle is, or a way of life, and that is the way we should approach it. The thing is this: in order for capitalism to be destroyed millions and millions of people must be dissatisfied with their way of life. They must want something else and see certain existing things as obstacles to getting what they want. It is not useful to think of this as a new ideology. It is not merely a belief-system that is needed, like a religion, or like Marxism, or Anarchism. Rather it is a new prevailing vision, a dominant desire, an overriding need. What must exist is a pressing desire to live a certain way, and not to live another way. If this pressing desire were a desire to live free, to be autonomous, to live in democratically controlled communities, to participate in the self-regulating activities of a mature people, then capitalism could be destroyed. Otherwise we are doomed to perpetual slavery and possibly even to extinction. The content of this vision is actually not new at all, but quite old. The long term goal of communists, anarchists, and socialists has always been to restore community. Even the great peasant revolts of early capitalism sought to get free from external authorities and restore autonomy to villages. Marx defined communism once as a free association of producers, and at another time as a situation in which the free development of each is a condition for the free development of all. Anarchists have always called for worker and peasant self-managed cooperatives. The long term goals have always been clear: to abolish wage-slavery, to eradicate a social order organized solely around the accumulation of capital for its own sake, and to establish in its place a society of free people who democratically and cooperatively self-determine the shape of their social world.

### Off

#### Failure to manage global oil markets causes Saudi prolif, and China rise

Chris Black Major, US Army April 2009 “Post Oil America and a renewable energy policy leads to the abrogation of the Middle East to China” http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a530125.pdf

In the quest to reduce the consumption of oil, the US is failing to see the larger impact of a renewable energy policy. Reverse engineering over 60 years of policy, strategy, diplomacy, and military efforts to ensure the free flow and access to oil will inevitably cause a “vacuum” of American access, presence, and influence in a highly volatile region; raise the specter of larger militaries; cause an increasing need for nuclear weapons; shift security and cooperation guarantees; and disrupt the US economy and foreign policy. The implementation of a renewable energy policy begins to shift US prominence in the Persian Gulf to one dominated by China, resulting in US loss of strategic access and influence in an already volatile region. China presently practices a pure form of realpolitik in the region as they do not demand much of their energy suppliers nor care about the attendant politics of the region so long as they have a reliable oil stream. Saudi Arabia, as the largest producer of oil and keeper of the Islamic faith, will look to maintain their hold on power and will recognize the shift from the US to China and with it their security umbrella that has been provided by the US. Saudi Arabia will be happy to increase their relationship with China as that not only brings them large revenues for their national budget, it also brings a “no questions asked” policy of arms purchases and a lack of concern over Saudi’s domestic policies, their quest for nuclear weapons, or their stance towards Israel. As the US weans itself from oil it will accelerate the already occurring geopolitical shift in the Middle East from a region dominated by the United States to one that will be dominated by China. As a result of this shift, the US will lose access and influence in the region and realignments will occur among nation states leading the Saudis to grow their military and accelerate their quest for nuclear weapons. Unencumbered by the US, Saudi Arabian domestic policies will shift towards the more extreme versions of Wahhabism, leading towards an even harder stance towards Israel.

#### Saudi prolif causes extinction

Eric Edelman et al (Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Former Undersecretary for Defense) and Andrew Krepinevich (President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment) and Evan Montgomery (Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) February 2011 “The dangers of a nuclear Iran” http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/2010.12.27-The-Dangers-of-a-Nuclear-Iran.pdf

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also ordered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several diªerent ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer.Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the npt since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of di⁄cult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the npt. n-player competition Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other.Multipolar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarinebased nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly,would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war. Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft.

#### China rise causes escalation

Zbigniew K. Brzezinski (CSIS counselor and trustee and cochairs the CSIS Advisory Board. He is also the Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, in Washington, D.C. He is cochair of the American Committee for Peace in the Caucasus and a member of the International Advisory Board of the Atlantic Council. He is a former chairman of the American-Ukrainian Advisory Committee. He was a member of the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State from 1966 to 1968; chairman of the Humphrey Foreign Policy Task Force in the 1968 presidential campaign; director of the Trilateral Commission from 1973 to 1976; and principal foreign policy adviser to Jimmy Carter in the 1976 presidential campaign. From 1977 to 1981, Dr. Brzezinski was national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter. In 1981, he was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom for his role in the normalization of U.S.-China relations and for his contributions to the human rights and national security policies of the United States. He was also a member of the President’s Chemical Warfare Commission (1985), the National Security Council–Defense Department Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy (1987–1988), and the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (1987–1989). In 1988, he was cochairman of the Bush National Security Advisory Task Force, and in 2004, he was cochairman of a Council on Foreign Relations task force that issued the report Iran: Time for a New Approach. Dr. Brzezinski received a B.A. and M.A. from McGill University (1949, 1950) and Ph.D. from Harvard University (1953). He was a member of the faculties of Columbia University (1960–1989) and Harvard University (1953–1960). Dr. Brzezinski holds honorary degrees from Georgetown University, Williams College, Fordham University, College of the Holy Cross, Alliance College, the Catholic University of Lublin, Warsaw University, and Vilnius University. He is the recipient of numerous honors and awards) February 2012 “After America” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/after\_america?page=0,0

China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership.¶ At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty.

### Case

#### Ontology doesn’t come first or indict our scholarship

Owen 2002 (David Owen, reader of political theory at the University of Southampton, Millennium, Volume 31, Number 3, pg. 655-657)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### Calculation is good and doesn’t devalue life

Revesz 2008 Richard L. Revesz (Dean and Lawrence King Professor of Law at New York University School of Law, JD Yale Law School) and Michael A Livermore. (JD NYU School of Law, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Integrity, and Managing director of the NYU Law Review). Retaking Rationality How Cots-Benefit Analysis Can Better protect the Environment and Our Health. 2008. P. 1-4.

Governmental decisions are also fundamentally different from personal decisions in that they often affect people in the aggregate. In our individual lives, we come into contact with at least some of the consequences of our decisions. If we fail to consult a map, we pay the price: losing valuable time driving around in circles and listening to the complaints of our passengers. We are constantly confronted with the consequences of the choices that we have made. Not so for governments, however, which exercise authority by making decisions at a distance. Perhaps one of the most challenging aspects of governmental decisions is that they require a special kind of compassion—one that can seem, at first glance, cold and calculating, the antithesis of empathy. The aggregate and complex nature of governmental decisions does not address people as human beings, with concerns and interests, families and emotional relationships, secrets and sorrows. Rather, people are numbers stacked in a column or points on a graph, described not through their individual stories of triumph and despair, but by equations, functions, and dose-response curves. The language of governmental decisionmaking can seem to—and to a certain extent does—ignore what makes individuals unique and morally important. But, although the language of bureaucratic decisionmaking can be dehumanizing, it is also a prerequisite for the kind of compassion that is needed in contemporary society. Elaine Scarry has developed a comparison between individual compassion and statistical compassion.' Individual compassion is familiar—when we see a person suffering, or hear the story of some terrible tragedy, we are moved to take action. Statistical compassion seems foreign—we hear only a string of numbers but must comprehend "the concrete realities embedded there."' Individual compassion derives from our social nature, and may be hardwired directly into the human brain.' Statistical compassion calls on us to use our higher reasoning power to extend our natural compassion to the task of solving more abstract—but no less real—problems. Because compassion is not just about making us feel better—which we could do as easily by forgetting about a problem as by addressing it—we have a responsibility to make the best decisions that we can. This book argues that cost-benefit analysis, properly conducted, can improve environmental and public health policy. Cost-benefit analysis—the translation of human lives and acres of forest into the language of dollars and cents—can seem harsh and impersonal. But such an approach is also necessary to improve the quality of decisions that regulators make. Saving the most lives, and best protecting the quality of our environment and our health—in short, exercising our compassion most effectively—requires us to step back and use our best analytic tools. Sometimes, in order to save a life, we need to treat a person like a number. This is the challenge of statistical compassion. This book is about making good decisions. It focuses on the area of environmental, health and safety regulation. These regulations have been the source of numerous and hard-fought controversies over the past several decades, particularly at the federal level. Reaching the right decisions in the areas of environmental protection, increasing safety, and improving public health is clearly of high importance. Although it is admirable (and fashionable) for people to buy green or avoid products made in sweatshops, efforts taken at the individual level are not enough to address the pressing problems we face—there is a vital role for government in tackling these issues, and sound collective decisions concerning regulation are needed. There is a temptation to rely on gut-level decisionmaking in order to avoid economic analysis, which, to many, is a foreign language on top of seeming cold and unsympathetic. For government to make good decisions, however, it cannot abandon reasoned analysis. Because of the complex nature of governmental decisions, we have no choice but to deploy complex analytic tools in order to make the best choices possible. Failing to use these tools, which amounts to abandoning our duties to one another, is not a legitimate response. Rather, we must exercise statistical compassion by recognizing what numbers of lives saved represent: living and breathing human beings, unique, with rich inner lives and an interlocking web of emotional relationships. The acres of a forest can be tallied up in a chart, but that should not blind us to the beauty of a single stand of trees. We need to use complex tools to make good decisions while simultaneously remembering that we are not engaging in abstract exercises, but that we are having real effects on people and the environment. In our personal lives, it would be unwise not to shop around for the best price when making a major purchase, or to fail to think through our options when making a major life decision. It is equally foolish for government to fail to fully examine alternative policies when making regulatory decisions with life-or-death consequences. This reality has been recognized by four successive presidential administrations. Since 1981, the cost-benefit analysis of major regulations has been required by presidential order. Over the past twenty-five years, however, environmental and other progressive groups have declined to participate in the key governmental proceedings concerning the cost-benefit analysis of federal regulations, instead preferring to criticize the technique from the outside. The resulting asymmetry in political participation has had profound negative consequences, both for the state of federal regulation and for the technique of cost-benefit analysis itself. Ironically, this state of affairs has left progressives open to the charge of rejecting reason, when in fact strong environmental and public health pro-grams are often justified by cost-benefit analysis. It is time for progressive groups, as well as ordinary citizens, to retake the high ground by embracing and reforming cost-benefit analysis. The difference between being unthinking—failing to use the best tools to analyze policy—and unfeeling—making decisions without compassion—is unimportant: Both lead to bad policy. Calamities can result from the failure to use either emotion or reason. Our emotions provide us with the grounding for our principles, our innate interconnectedness, and our sense of obligation to others. We use our powers of reason to build on that emotional foundation, and act effectively to bring about a better world.

#### Technological thought inevitable

Riis 2011 (Søren Riis, Carlsberg Research Fellow and Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Science Studies at Roskilde University, February 8, 2011, “Towards the origin of modern technology: reconfiguring Martin Heidegger’s thinking,” EBSCO)

Moreover, Heidegger maintains: ‘‘Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are ‘in themselves’ are defined ontologico-categorially.’’47 According to Heidegger’s fundamental phenomenology, which he unfolds in detail in Being and Time and reaffirms a decisive part of in ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology,’’ nature is ‘‘primally’’ revealed in its ‘‘usability’’ and ‘‘serviceability-for-;’’ that is to say, ‘‘nature’’ is a resource long before the actual rise of modern and ancient technology, namely simultaneously with the very origin of human beings. That something is primordially revealed in its ‘‘usability’’ and ‘‘serviceability-for-’’ does not imply that it is actually used or serves accordingly, but that it is revealed as standing ready to be utilized in the corresponding context. As such, it is revealed as ‘‘standing-reserve.’’ This, for example, also corresponds to the empirical fact that prehistoric humans settled close to woods and rivers. In these areas they always had stockpiles of timber, power for transportation, and easy access to drinking water. Based on ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and completed through references to Being and Time, we now have an interpretation of the origin of the essence of modern technology, which traces back the characteristic revealing of das Gestell to the beginning of humankind.48 This does not imply that prehistoric technology is identical with contemporary technology; rather the third genealogy of the rule of das Gestell suggests that when ‘‘we still more primally’’ try to consider the origin of the challenging revealing characterizing the rule of das Gestell, we in fact rediscover that it is connected to being human. The rule of das Gestell has challenged humans as long as they have existed. In this sense, humans first and foremost exist under the rule of das Gestell.49 This also entails a revision and precision of Heidegger’s renowned formula characterizing the world-connectedness of human existence: being-in-the-world. Based on the comparison of ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and Being and Time, human existence is better described as being-under-the-spell-of-das-Gestell. Trying to understand the various more-or-less explicit accounts of the origin of the rule of das Gestell in ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and the resulting ambiguity is not just an exercise, nor only a way to criticize Heidegger. Rather, it is a way to better understand the nuances and layers in Heidegger’s thinking concerning technology and to warn against a short-sighted ‘‘saving’’ from an alleged danger. If the challenging revealing of nature, which characterizes the rule of das Gestell is taken seriously, then we cannot avoid it just by revolutionizing our technology, instead, we must revise our very human existence.

#### Management solves extinction

Levy 1999 (Dr Neil Levy, fellow of the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at Charles Sturt University, 1999“Discourses of the Environment” p. 215)

If the ‘technological fix’ is unlikely to be more successful than strategies of limitation of our uses of resources, we are nevertheless unable to simply leave the environment as it is. There is a real and pressing need for more, and more accurate, technical and scientific information about the non-human world. For we are faced with a situation in which the processes we have already set in train will continue to impact upon that world, and therefore us, for centuries. It is therefore necessary, not only to stop cutting down the rain forests, but to develop real, concrete proposals for action, to reverse, or at least limit, the effects of our previous interventions. Moreover, there is another reason why our behaviour towards the non-human cannot simply be a matter of leaving it as it is, at least in so far as our goals are not only environmental but also involve social justice. For if we simply preserve what remains to us of wilderness, of the countryside and of park land, we also preserve patterns of very unequal access to their resources and their consolations (Soper 1995: 207). In fact, we risk exacerbating these inequalities. It is no us, but the poor of Brazil, who will bear the brunt of the misery which would result form a strictly enforced policy of leaving the Amazonian rain forest untouched, in the absence of alternative means of providing for their livelihood. It is the development of policies to provide such ecologically sustainable alternative which we require, as well as the development of technical means for replacing our current greenhouse gas-emitting sources of energy. Such policies and proposals for concrete action must be formiulated by ecologists, environmentalist, people with expertise concerning the functioning of ecosystems and the impacts which our actions have upon them. Such proposals are, therefore, very much the province for Foucault’s specific intellectual, the one who works ‘within specific sectors, at the precise points where their won conditions of life or work situate them’ (Foucault 1980g: 126). For who could be more fittingly described as ‘the strategists of life and death’ than these environmentalists? After the end of the Cold War, it is in this sphere, more than any other, that man’s ‘politics places his existence as a living being in question’ (Foucault 1976: 143). For it is in facing the consequences of our intervention in the non-human world that the fate of our species, and of those with whone we share this planet, will be decided.

#### Even anti-managerialists would vote neg - your aff would be catastrophic

Michael **Zimmerman admits 1989** “Introducution to Deep Ecology” http://www.context.org/ICLIB/IC22/Zimmrman.htm

**A critique I hear often is that** deep ecologists want to return to a way of life that's totally tied to the rhythms of the Earth, but **at this point** we have so disturbed those rhythms that we can't even consider going back. To retreat to a pre-technological state would **in fact** be dooming the Earth to destruction**, whereas** what we need now is to be more engaged in trying to repair the damage. How would a deep ecologist respond? Michael: I think deep ecologists have mixed emotions about that, but I would agree with that critique. For example, if we stopped our development at the current level, it would be a catastrophe**, because our production methods are so dirty and inefficient and destructive that if we keep this up, we're really in trouble**. Some deep ecologists say that it would be all for the best if the industrial world were just to collapse, despite all the human suffering that would entail. If such a thing ever occurs, some people have suggested, we could never revive industrialization again because the raw materials are no longer easily accessible. I hope that doesn't happen, and yet it may happen. Now, social ecologists say that deep ecologists flirt with fascism when they talk about returning to an "organic" social system that is "attuned to nature." They note that reactionary thinkers often contrast the supposedly "natural" way of life - which to them means social Darwinism and authoritarian social systems - with "modernity," which in politial terms means progressive social movements like liberalism and Marxism. But deep ecologists recognize this danger. They call not for a regression to collective authoritarianism, but for the evolution of a mode of awareness that doesn't lend itself to authoritarianism of any kind. So I think the only thing we can do is to move forward. We need to develop our efficiency and production methods so that we'll be able to take some of the pressure off the environment. We also need to develop increasing wealth for the highly populated countries so their populations will go down. [Ed. Note: See Lappé and Schurman, "The Population Puzzle," in IC #21.] **There's a necessity for new technology.** The question is, can it be made consistent with our growing awareness that the planet is really hurting?

#### In the context of the environment the alternative fails – it results in unpredictable and unsustainable solutions

Ornulf **Seippel** (program for research and documentation for sustainable society) February **1998** “Political environmentalism” http://www.prosus.uio.no/publikasjoner/Arb\_not/298.html

In so far as environmentalism is often regarded as a collectivistic idea, the individualistic strand of postmodernism, will probably lead **individual interests** away from **this type of** political mobilisation. Implicit is an unquestioning indifference, devoid of conflicts or consensus. Nonetheless, given the complex interest coalitions present in a modern society, there are possibilities for instrumental, egoistic, xenophobic and more restricted kinds of political mobilisation which have their basis in some of these many, concrete, particularistic interests. To the extent that individualistic postmodernism is conducive to political action, it will most likely result in new **right** movements **and parties.** But individualistic postmodernism as the culture underpinning such "movements" will probably be based on fads and hunches, and consequently, its manifestations will become unpredictable and transitory.

#### The alternative necessitates ontic blindness that justifies the worst atrocities and forecloses solutions – Heideggers involvement in the Nazi party proves

Slavoj **Zizek 1999** “The Ticklish Subject” p. 13-5

As Heidegger himself put it, those who came closest to the ontological Truth are condemned to err at the ontic level…err about what? Precisely about the line of separation between ontic and ontological. The paradox not to be underestimated is that the very philosopher who focused **his interest** on **the enigma of** ontological difference- who warned again and again against the metaphysical mistake of conferring ontological dignity on some ontic content (God as the highest Entity, for example) –fell into the trap of conferring on Nazism **the ontological dignity of suiting the essence of modern man.** The standard defence of Heidegger **against the reproach of his Nazi past** consists of two points: not only was his Nazi engagement a simple error (a ‘stupidity [dummheit]’, as Heidegger himself put it) in no way **inherently** related to his philosophical project: the main counter-argument is that it is Heidegger’s own philosophy that enables us to discern the true epochal roots of modern totalitarianism. **However, what remains unthought here is the hidden complicity between the ontological indifference towards concrete social systems (capitalism, Facism, Communism), in so far as they all belong to the same horizon of modern technology, and the secred privelgin of a concret sociopolitical model** (Nazism with Heidegger, Communism with some ‘Heideggerian Marxists’) **as closer to the ontological truth of our epoch**. Here one should avoid the trap that caught Heidegger**’s defenders, who dismissed Heidegger’s Nazi engagement as a simple anomaly, a fall into the ontic level, in blatant contradiction to his thought, which teaches us not to confuse ontological horizon with ontic choices** (as we have already seen, Heidegger is at his strongest when he demonstrates how, on a deeper structural level, ecolocial, conservative, and so on, oppositions to the modern universe of technology are already embedded in the horizon of what they purport to reject: the ecological critique of the technological exploitation of nature ultimately leads to a more ‘environmentally sound’ technology, etc.). Heidegger did not engage in the Nazi political project ‘in spite of’ his ontological philosophical approach, but because of it**: this engagement was not ‘beneath’ his philosophical level – on the contrary,** if one is to understand Heidegger, the key point is to grasp the complicity (In Hegelese: ‘speculative identity’) between the elevation above ontic concerns and the passionity ‘ontic’ Nazi political engagement. One can now see the ideological trap that caught Heidegger: when he **criticizes Nazi racism on behalf of the true ‘inner greatness’ of the Nazi movement, he** repeats the elementary ideological gesture of maintaining an inner distance towards the ideological text – of claiming that there is something more beneath it, a non-ideological kernel ideology exerts its hold over us by means of this ver insistence that the cause we adhere to is not ‘merely’ ideological. So where is the trap? When the disappointed Heidegger turns away from active engagemtn in the Nazi movement, he does so because the Nazi movement did not maintain the level of it ‘inner greatness’, but legitimized itself with inadequate (racial) ideology. In other words, what he expected from it was that it should legitimize itself through direct awareness of its ‘inner greatness’. And the problem lies in this very expectation that a political movement that will directly refer to its historico-ontological foundation is possible**. This expectation, however, is in itself profoundly metaphysical, in so far as it fails to recognize that the gap separating the direct ideological legitimization of a movement form its ‘inner greatness’** (its historico-ontological essence**) is constitutive**, a positive condition of its ‘functioning’. To use the terms of the later Heidegger, ontological insight necessary entails ontic blindness and error, and vice versa – that is to say, in order to be ‘effective’ at the ontic level, one must disregard the ontological horizon of one’s activity. (In this sense, Heidegger emphasizes that ‘sicence doesn’t thing’ and that, far from being its limitation, this inability is the very motor of scientific progress.) In other words, **what Heidegger seems unable to endorse is a concrete political engagement that would accept its necessary, constitutive blindness** – as if the moment we acknowledge th gap separating the awareness of the ontological horizon from ontic engagement, any ontic engagement is depreciated, loses authentic dignity.

#### Heideggers jargon is just a cop out to avoid answering the real question of what to do in the face of real violence – it results in an ideology of power that makes true resistance impossible making violent atrocities inevitable

Ralph **Dumain** (Librarian-Archivist-Information Specialist Researcher-Scholar) **2003** “Heidegger’s Jargon” http://www.autodidactproject.org/my/jargon.html

Bourdieu's book was quite fascinating, in that he focused on Heidegger's terminology from the perspective of its covert dual functioning, within the demarcated field of "philosophy" and in the common ideological parlance of the day. Heidegger sought to insulate his work from **mere** empirical criticism or reference, always removing it to a plane of esoterism removed from **profane** everyday understanding. Yet his success with the German intelligentsia was bolstered by the resonances of his terminology with the reactionary ideological usages of his words in common parlance. **Heidegger's coded language**, despite hieratic pretensions, **is what makes his ontology political** through and through, regardless of his actual affiliation with the Nazi party. Bourdieu calls into question Heidegger's whole method, especially its way of insulating itself from any criticism or even rational evaluation, but also its pretension to greater insight (why should Heidegger's conceptions of seemingly ordinary concepts be any more profound than their ordinary senses?). Bourdieu's approach is based on his sociological concept of the "field". Adorno does not work on the same basis, though he invokes the concept of division of labor to explain the philosophical specialist's proclivities. Adorno finds similar self-protective measures in Heidegger's work as Bourdieu does**. Adorno is concerned about the debasement of language—jargon—its emptiness of real content**, **now filled by catch phrases of indefinite meaning which serve a duplicitous ideological function**, in the manner of advertising slogans. Though **Heidegger wanted to insulate his nostalgic retreat to Being** (sentimentalizing pre-industrial rural life in the process) **the vulgar everyday world of the "They", his vacuous ideas are of the very essence of capitalist exchange value**. There is a fundamental paradox in trying to maintain the ethos of the mythic in a demythologized world. Heidegger attempts to insulate himself in advance by proving that his would-be interpreters must of necessity misunderstand him, but Adorno finds him out. The most difficult aspect of reading Adorno's book is his references to German discourse of the time (presumably the early '60s). He refers to the abuse of language in everyday political and social discourse and the resonance of same in Heidegger's work, but without acquaintance of the former I get only a nebulous picture of what Adorno's allusions mean. Furthermore, I do not know the dominant intellectual or specifically philosophical trends of the time, though it appears as if German existentialism is still dominant or at least prevalent. Adorno dissects Heidegger's rural phoniness and use of keywords and concepts such as commitment, curiosity, idle chatter, dignity, and death. **Adorno intensively analyzes the relation between wholeness and death** (involving also the "they" and exchange**), finding therein the sour fascist violence at the root of Heidegger's entire philosophy.** Adorno's quotations from Heidegger reveal the fraudulent, empty claims of Heidegger's jargon. The only philosopher who comes off looking worse is Jaspers. A comparison between Adorno and Georg Lukacs is also in order. Lukacs’ The Destruction of Reason has a main theme the bogus notion of intellectual intuition, which gets its big boost historically from Schelling. My guess then is that Lukacs' critique would go right to the main ontological and epistemological issues of subjective idealism. While the argumentative basis between Lukacs and Adorno in aesthetics is well documented (I believe the most relevant documents are collected in Aesthetics and Politics), I am only aware of a couple of sentences Adorno wrote on Lukacs' Lukacs’ The Destruction of Reason. Adorno asserts that this book only amounts to evidence of the destruction of Lukacs' own reason. Also, that Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, etc. were in their own way protesting against reification. I find this extremely lame, pathetic really. Did Adorno write anything else on Lukacs' book? And, as I've asked several times, is there any secondary literature that seriously compares the critiques of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Husserl, etc., on the part of Lukacs and Adorno, respectively? (Written 21 April 2003) Adorno on Heidegger, Authenticity & Authority I think I know what Adorno is getting with respect to ‘absolute authority’, but the point should be clarified. It's important and therefore we should guard against misinterpretation. I take Adorno to contrast the new subjectivism with the old absolute idealism. **The metaphysical assertions of yore are overthrown—i.e. the authority of the absolute—but what replaces them? A philosophy claiming to represent real being and experience over abstraction, but with indefinite reference and content**. Adorno then wants to show how the Heideggerian template does not promote authentic experience at all, but rather an ideology of power against which there is no appeal because there is no determinate intellectual content to support or oppose**. Hence there is no ideal order to confirm or oppose,** but a mere subjective stance, which absolutizes authority as a power principle while destroying it as an intellectual principle**. And this is** just what Nazism did. The paradox is that Nazism was so opportunistic that, apart from its racial theory, it never established or accepted any official philosophy! Neither Heidegger nor his rivals succeeded in getting the Nazis to endorse their philosophies. If Adorno means anything like what I think he does, I would say his observation is very profound. As for Adorno's objection to the authentic self, let's hope this was not motivated by the same animus that set him against Fromm. Either way, Adorno is certainly correct to point out how the jargon of authenticity serves as an ideological mask**, first of all** for Heidegger **himself**, whose authenticity ended up as the führerprinzip. Heidegger was a scumbag through and through, and the fact that people like Marcuse or Sartre could be taken in to the extent that they were screams volumes about the bankruptcy of bourgeois European civilization and its intellectuals.

#### Alt cant solve – technological thought will never be abandoned and even if it was the alt would just get rolled back

George **Kateb** (William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics, Emeritus, at Princeton University) **1997** “Technology and Society” Social research Vol 64 Issue 3

But the question arises as to where a genuine principle of limitation on technological endeavor would come from. It is scarcely conceivable that **Western humanity – and by now** most of humanity , because of their pleasures and interests and theor won passions and desires and motives – would halt the technological project. Even if**, by some change of heart, Western** humanity could adopt an alterned relation to reality and human beings, how could it be enforced and allowed to yield its effects? The technological project can only be stopped by some global catastrophe that it had helped or cause or was powerless to avoid. Heidegger’s teasing invocation of the idea that a saving remedy grows with the worst danger is useless. In any case, no one would want the technological project halted, if the only way was a global catastrophe. Perhaps even the survivors would not want to block it reemergence.

#### Transition causes extinction

Barnhizer 2006 David, Prof of Law, Cleveland State U, ‘Waking from Sustainability's "Impossible Dream”,’ Geo Int’l Envtl L Rev, pg. l/n

The scale of social needs, including the need for expanded productive activity, has grown so large that it cannot be shut off at all, and certainly not abruptly. It cannot even be ratcheted down in any significant fashion without producing serious harms to human societies and hundreds of millions of people. Even if it were possible to shift back to systems of local self-sufficiency, the consequences of the transition process would be catastrophic for many people and even deadly to the point of continual conflict, resource wars, increased poverty, and strife. What are needed are concrete, workable, and pragmatic strategies that produce effective and intelligently designed economic activity in specific contexts and, while seeking efficiency and conservation, place economic and social justice high on a list of priorities. 60 The imperative of economic growth applies not only to the needs and expectations of people in economically developed societies but also to people living in nations that are currently economically underdeveloped. Opportunities must be created, jobs must be generated in huge numbers, and economic resources expanded to address the tragedies of poverty and inequality. Unfortunately, natural systems must be exploited to achieve this; we cannot return to Eden. The question is not how to achieve a static state but how to achieve what is needed to advance social justice while avoiding and mitigating the most destructive consequences of our behavior. Many developing country groups involved in efforts to protect the environment and resist the impacts of free trade on their communities have been concerned with the harmful effects of economic change. Part of the concern is the increased scale of economic activity. Some concerns relate to who benefits and who loses in the changing context imposed by globalization. These concerns are legitimate and understandable. So are the other deep currents running beneath their political positions, including those of resistance to change of any kind and a [\*621] rejection of the market approach to economic activities. In the system described inaccurately as free market capitalism, economic activity not only breaks down existing systems, it creates new systems and--as Joseph Schumpeter observed--continually repeats the process through cycles of "creative destruction." 61 This pattern of creative destruction unfolds as necessarily and relentlessly as does the birth-maturation-death-rebirth cycle of the natural environment. This occurs even in a self-sufficient or autarkic market system capable of managing all variables within its closed dominion. But when the system breaks out of its closed environment, the ability of a single national actor to control the system's dynamics erodes and ultimately disappears in the face of differential conditions, needs, priorities, and agendas. Globalization's ability to produce wealth for a particular group simultaneously produces harms to different people and interests and generates unfair resource redistribution within existing cultures. This is an unavoidable consequence of globalization. 62 The problem is that globalization has altered the rules of operation of political, economic, and social activities, and in doing so multiplied greatly our ability to create benefit and harm. 63 While some understandably want the unsettling and often chaotic effects of globalization to go away, it can only be dealt with, not reversed. The system in which we live and work is no longer closed. There are few contexts not connected to the dynamics of some aspect of the extended economic and social systems resulting from globalization. This means the wide ranging and incompatible variables of a global economic, human rights, and social fairness system are resulting in conflicts and unanticipated interpenetrations that no one fully understands, anticipates, or controls. 64 Local [\*622] self-sufficiency is the loser in this process. It can remain a nostalgic dream but rarely a reality. Except for isolated cultures and niche activities, there is very little chance that anyone will be unaffected by this transformational process. Change is the constant, and it will take several generations before we return to a period of relative stasis. Even then it will only be a respite before the pattern once again intensifies.

#### Value to life inevitable

Penner 2005 Melinda Penner (Director of Operations – STR, Stand To Reason) 2005 “End of Life Ethics: A Primer”, Stand to Reason, http://www.str.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5223

Intrinsic value is very different. Things with intrinsic value are valued for their own sake. They don’t have to achieve any other goal to be valuable. They are goods in themselves. Beauty, pleasure, and virtue are likely examples. Family and friendship are examples. Something that’s intrinsically valuable might also be instrumentally valuable, but even if it loses its instrumental value, its intrinsic value remains. Intrinsic value is what people mean when they use the phrase "the sanctity of life." Now when someone argues that someone doesn’t have "quality of life" they are arguing that life is only valuable as long as it obtains something else with quality, and when it can’t accomplish this, it’s not worth anything anymore. It's only instrumentally valuable. The problem with this view is that it is entirely subjective and changeable with regards to what might give value to life. Value becomes a completely personal matter, and, as we all know, our personal interests change over time. There is no grounding for objective human value and human rights if it’s not intrinsic value. Our legal system is built on the notion that humans have intrinsic value. The Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that each person is endowed by his Creator with certain unalienable rights...." If human beings only have instrumental value, then slavery can be justified because there is nothing objectively valuable that requires our respect. There is nothing other than intrinsic value that can ground the unalienable equal rights we recognize because there is nothing about all human beings that is universal and equal. Intrinsic human value is what binds our social contract of rights. So if human life is intrinsically valuable, then it remains valuable even when our capacities are limited. Human life is valuable even with tremendous limitations. Human life remains valuable because its value is not derived from being able to talk, or walk, or feed yourself, or even reason at a certain level. Human beings don’t have value only in virtue of states of being (e.g., happiness) they can experience. The "quality of life" view is a poison pill because once we swallow it, we’re led down a logical slippery slope. The exact same principle can be used to take the life of human beings in all kinds of limited conditions because I wouldn't want to live that way. Would you want to live the life of a baby with Down’s Syndrome? No? Then kill her. Would you want to live the life of an infant with cerebral palsy? No? Then kill him. Would you want to live the life of a baby born with a cleft lip? No? Then kill her. (In fact, they did.) Once we accept this principle, it justifies killing every infant born with a condition that we deem a life we don’t want to live. There’s no reason not to kill every handicapped person who can’t speak for himself — because I wouldn’t want to live that way. This, in fact, is what has happened in Holland with the Groningen Protocol. Dutch doctors euthanize severely ill newborns and their society has accepted it.

#### Ontology first is logically bankrupt

Jackson 2010 (Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Associate Professor of International Relations in the School of International Service at the American University in Washington, DC, 2010, “The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and its Implications for the Study of World Politics,” ebook)

However, I do not think that putting ontology first is the panacea that many seem to think it is. For one thing, if one puts ontology first then one is, at least provisionally, committed to a particular (if revisable) account of what the world is made up of: co-constituted agents and structures, states interacting under conditions of anarchy, global class relations, or what have you. This is a rather large leap to make on anyone’s authority, let alone that of a philosopher of science. Along these lines, it is unclear what if any warrant we could provide for most ontological claims if ontology in this sense were to always “come first.” If someone makes an ontological claim about something existing in the world, then we are faced with an intriguing epistemological problem of how possibly to know whether that claim is true, and the equally intriguing problem of selecting the proper methods to use in evaluating the claim (Chernoff 2009b, 391). But if epistemology and method are supposed to be fitted to ontology, then we are stuck with techniques and standards designed to respond to the specificity of the object under investigation. This problem is roughly akin to using state-centric measurements of cross-border transactions to determine whether globalization is eroding state borders, because the very object under investigation—“state borders”—is presupposed by the procedures of data-collection, meaning that the answer will always, and necessarily, assert the persistence of the state.

#### Ontology focus at the expense of action causes paralysis

McClean 2001 David McClean (philosopher, writer and business consultant, conducted graduate work in philosophy at NYU) 2001 “The cultural left and the limits of social hope” http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm

There is a lot of philosophical prose on the general subject of social justice. Some of this is quite good, and some of it is quite bad. What distinguishes the good from the bad is not merely the level of erudition. Displays of high erudition are gratuitously reflected in much of the writing by those, for example, still clinging to Marxian ontology and is often just a useful smokescreen which shrouds a near total disconnect from empirical reality. This kind of political writing likes to make a lot of references to other obscure, jargon-laden essays and tedious books written by other true believers - the crowd that takes the fusion of Marxian and Freudian private fantasies seriously. Nor is it the lack of scholarship that makes this prose bad. Much of it is well "supported" by footnotes referencing a lode of other works, some of which are actually quite good. Rather, what makes this prose bad is its utter lack of relevance to extant and critical policy debates, the passage of actual laws, and the amendment of existing regulations that might actually do some good for someone else. The writers of this bad prose are too interested in our arrival at some social place wherein we will finally emerge from our "inauthentic" state into something called "reality." Most of this stuff, of course, comes from those steeped in the Continental tradition (particularly post-Kant). While that tradition has much to offer and has helped shape my own philosophical sensibilities, it is anything but useful when it comes to truly relevant philosophical analysis, and no self-respecting Pragmatist can really take seriously the strong poetry of formations like "authenticity looming on the ever remote horizons of fetishization." What Pragmatists see instead is the hope that we can fix some of the social ills that face us if we treat policy and reform as more important than Spirit and Utopia.

## 2NC

#### EXTENDED CAPITALISM- CAN’T FIND THE SPEECH DOC- IF THIS INTERESTS YOU EMAIL ME AND I WILL MAKE A REDOUBLED EFFORT TO FIND THEM [oakparkdebate@gmail.com](mailto:oakparkdebate@gmail.com)

## 1NR

#### Shared rules—grammar—key to creativity, meaning, and communication. It’s also empowering.

**Leahy, 2005** (Anna Leahy, assistant professor at North Central College and award winning poet, Pedagogy; Vol. 5 Issue 2, p304-308, 5p, “Grammar Matters: A Creative Writer’s Argument” Spring, EBSCO)

Wallace Stegner (2002: 64–65), in On Teaching and Writing Fiction, notes, “Whether dismembered syntax has sprung from ignorance or from the lust after originality, I believe it should be questioned. After all, all a reader knows is the marks on the printed page. Those marks have to contribute meaning.” Like Stegner, I think commas matter, as do sentence structures that convey, support, or make ironic the meanings of the words themselves. Ursula Le Guin (1998: 33), in Steering the Craft, puts it slightly differently: our standards for writing, including for grammar and syntax, must be higher than in conversation, “because when we read, we don’t have the speaker’s voice and expression and intonation to make half-finished sentences and misused words clear. We only have the words. And, to be clear to as many readers as possible, they have to follow the agreed-upon rules, the shared rules, of grammar and usage.” When a student spells one word as another or misses a comma after an unwieldy clause, we can downplay its importance, having seen enough similar slips to surmise a larger idea. If pointed out to the student, she sometimes asserts, “But you know what I meant.” Do I? Does she want to relinquish control of meaning to me? I draw my references here from creative writers because I come to teaching as a creative writer. This position gives me a strange cachet in the grammar business. After all, if a poet supposedly exuding a spontaneous overfl ow of emotion cares about grammar and syntax, it mustn’t be all stifl ing regulations. So, I opt to quote to my students the likes of Tom Robbins and Stephen King instead of Strunk and White, whose work I appreciate more than I expect my students will. Grammar, according to Kim Addonizio and Dorianne Laux (1997: 171), “sounds stern, forbidding, and worst of all dull. It smacks of the elementary school classroom, of the meaningless dissection of sentences, of onerous burdens laid on the helpless shoulders of children. But if you are really interested in writing poetry, grammar can be something else: a door to rooms you might never otherwise discover, a way to realize and articulate your visions in language.” Knowing and talking about grammar, syntax, and style—recollecting in tranquillity, shall we say—is part of immersing oneself in language as a writer and is the student’s responsibility when using language to convey ideas. And I now see it more clearly as part of my responsibility as a teacher. The creative writer’s approach to grammar, syntax, and style allows me to bring import and enthusiasm to this teacherly responsibility, to assert its power and reward in writing. In Skinny Legs and All, novelist Robbins (1991: 172) includes a scene in which his characters discuss a word used sloppily, in this case neat. Can o’ Beans remarks, “Slang possesses an economy, an immediacy that’s attractive, all right, but it devalues experience by standardizing and fuzzing it. It hangs between humanity and the real world like a . . . a veil. Slang just makes people more stupid, that’s all, and stupidity eventually makes them crazy.” Fair or not, vague, confusing, or inaccurate sentences imply that those undesirable sentence qualities apply to the ideas and, in the world beyond the classroom, to the writer. Grammar and syntax indeed might allow people to articulate, as clearly as possible, the world and, perhaps, to see it clearly as well. As Le Guin notes (1998: 32), “Even with the best intentions, language misused, language used stupidly, carelessly, brutally, language used wrongly, breeds lies, half-truths, confusion.” To be lax with grammar and syntax might both reflect and cause confusion or ignorance.

#### C. Studies prove—depth is better than breadth.

**Arrington 09** (Rebecca, UVA Today, “Study Finds That Students Benefit From Depth, Rather Than Breadth, in High School Science Courses” March 4)

A recent study reports that high school students who study fewer science topics, but study them in greater depth, have an advantage in college science classes over their peers who study more topics and spend less time on each. Robert Tai, associate professor at the University of Virginia's Curry School of Education, worked with Marc S. Schwartz of the University of Texas at Arlington and Philip M. Sadler and Gerhard Sonnert of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics to conduct the study and produce the report. "Depth Versus Breadth: How Content Coverage in High School Courses Relates to Later Success in College Science Coursework" relates the amount of content covered on a particular topic in high school classes with students' performance in college-level science classes. The study will appear in the July 2009 print edition of Science Education and is currently available as an online pre-print from the journal. "As a former high school teacher, I always worried about whether it was better to teach less in greater depth or more with no real depth. This study offers evidence that teaching fewer topics in greater depth is a better way to prepare students for success in college science," Tai said. "These results are based on the performance of thousands of college science students from across the United States." The 8,310 students in the study were enrolled in introductory biology, chemistry or physics in randomly selected four-year colleges and universities. Those who spent one month or more studying one major topic in-depth in high school earned higher grades in college science than their peers who studied more topics in the same period of time. The study revealed that students in courses that focused on mastering a particular topic were impacted twice as much as those in courses that touched on every major topic.

# Doubles

### OFF

#### The aff should advocate increasing energy production

#### The subject: central government- the USFG.

#### The verbs:

#### increase- to make greater.

#### Reduce excludes removal

Words & Phrases: Perm Edition, 2002, vol 36A, p.80

Mass. 1905. Rev.Laws, c. 203, § 9, provides that, if two or more cases are tried together in the superior court, the presiding judge may "reduce" the witness fees and other costs, but "not less than the ordinary witness fees, and other costs recoverable in one of the cases" which are so tried together shall be allowed. Held that, in reducing the costs, the amount in all the cases together is to be considered and reduced, providing that there must be left in the aggregate an amount not less than the largest sum recoverable in any of the cases. The word "reduce," in its ordinary signification, does not mean to cancel, destroy, or bring to naught, but to diminish, lower, or bring to an inferior state.— Green v. Sklar, 74 N.E. 595, 188 Mass. 363.

#### The objects -Financial incentives means loans/grants

**UNCTAD, 4** - UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (“INCENTIVES”

http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20035\_en.pdf

There is no uniform definition of what constitutes an “investment incentive”. (Box I.1. contains a list of commonly used incentives.) The only major international instrument that contains a partial definition is the SCM Agreement (see below). Governments use three main categories of investment incentives to attract FDI and to benefit more from it:

· financial incentives, such as outright grants and loans at concessionary rates;

· fiscal incentives such as tax holidays and reduced tax rates;

· other incentives, including subsidized infrastructure or services, market preferences and regulatory concessions, including exemptions from labour or environmental standards.

#### Restrictions are regulatory prohibitions

Words & Phrases 2004 v37A p410

N.D.Okla. 1939. "Restriction," as used in the statutes concerning restriction on alienation of lands inherited from deceased Osage allottees, is synonymous with "prohibition." Act April J8, 1912. §§ 6, 7, 37 Stat. 87, 88.—U.S. v. Mullendore, 30 F.Supp. 13, appeal dismissed 111 F.2d 898.— Indians 15(1).

This is the regulatory part

Words & Phrases: Perm Edition, 2002, vol 36A, p414

N.II. 1938. As used in statute giving towns power to "regulate and restrict" buildings by zoning regulations, "regulation" is synonymous with "restrict" and "restrictions" are embraced in "regulations. Puh.Laws. 1926, c. 41. W A»-y\* r

#### The direct object is energy production

Is Cumulative Fossil Energy Demand a Useful Indicator for the Environmental Performance of Products? M A R K A . J . HUIJBREGTS , \* , † L I N D A J . A . R O M B O U T S , † S T E F A N I E H E L L W E G , ‡ R O L F F R I S C H K N E C H T , § A . J A N H E N D R I K S , † D I K V A N D E M E E N T , † , | A D M . J . R A G A S , † L U C A S R E I J N D E R S , ⊥ A N D J A A P S T R U I J S | Department of Environmental Science, Institute for Wetland and Water Research, Faculty of Science, Radboud University Nijmegen, P.O. Box 9010, NL-6500 GL Nijmegen, The Netherlands, Institute for Chemical- and Bioengineering, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zu¨rich, CH-8093 Zu¨rich, Switzerland, Ecoinvent Centre, Ueberlandstrasse 129, CH-8600 Duebendorf, Switzerland, Laboratory for Ecological Risk Assessment, National Institute of Public Health and the Environment, P.O. Box 1, NL-3720 BA, Bilthoven, The Netherlands, and Institute for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Dynamics, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 166, NL-1018 WV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands 2006 American Chemical Society VOL. 40, NO. 3, 2006 / ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 9 641 http://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/es051689g

The appropriateness of the fossil Cumulative Energy Demand (CED) as an indicator for the environmental performance of products and processes is explored with a regression analysis between the environmental life-cycle impacts and fossil CEDs of 1218 products, divided into the product categories “energy production”, “material production”, “transport”, and “waste treatment”. Our results show that, for all product groups but waste treatment, the fossil CED correlates well with most impact categories, such as global warming, resource depletion, acidification, eutrophication, tropospheric ozone formation, ozone depletion, and human toxicity (explained variance between 46% and 100%). We conclude that the use of fossil fuels is an important driver of several environmental impacts and thereby indicative for many environmental problems. It may therefore serve as a screening indicator for environmental performance. However, the usefulness of fossil CED as a stand-alone indicator for environmental impact is limited by the large uncertainty in the product-specific fossil CEDbased impact scores (larger than a factor of 10 for the majority of the impact categories; 95% confidence interval). A major reason for this high uncertainty is nonfossil energy related emissions and land use, such as landfill leachates, radionuclide emissions, and land use in agriculture and forestry.

#### Links

#### 1. The SUBJECT of the action is the AFF team, not the USFG.

#### 2. The OBJECT of the action is the judge, not energy.

#### 3. Their use of the double and/or makes the plan totally incoherent and proves it could mean any one of 12 things and negate any or all of the others.

#### Vote neg-

#### 1. Infinite regression—disregarding resolutional syntax produces an endless regression to small, trivial plans. For example, an aff only about the subject opens the door to ANY philosophy that speaks to ‘being.’

#### 2. Limits—resolutional limits encourage AFF innovation, predictive research on a designated topic, and clash—a precursor to productive education. Also, the inherent value of arguments within limits is greater, which link turns education arguments.

#### If our interpretation is net-beneficial it means there’s no reason to vote affirmative. If the case is true then it de-justifies the resolution. Teams are still signified by ‘AFF’ and ‘NEG’, so the resolution is a required measurement for ‘affirmation.’

### OFF

#### We cannot apprehend curricular questions – such as what thesis we should debate, or the role of Blackness in debate – we should start from the perspective of heteroglossia

Kyle A. Greenwalt (bio) Education and Culture > Volume 24, Number 2, 2008 assistant professor in the Department of Teacher Education at Michigan State University Discursivity, Heteroglossia, and Interest: Revisiting Herbert Kliebard's Dewey

Understanding heteroglossia is therefore key to Bakhtin's project. To do so, one must first realize that the term is used in at least two senses. On the one hand, there is a type of heteroglossia that one might call internal. Bakhtin explains this sort of heteroglossia by asking us to imagine an object—let us say, following Kliebard, that such an object is the school curriculum. On the one hand, Bakhtin will point out the "internal contradictions inside the object itself," that is, when thinking about the school curriculum, one must confront the "multitude of routes, roads and paths that have been laid down in the object by social consciousness" (p. 278). Therefore, one can think about the curriculum as the essential subject matter that the child must learn, or as the complete set of experiences society wishes the child to have, or as the complete set of experiences the child actually does have, or even as the complete set of experiences that the child is prevented from having. The word "curriculum" reveals only a specious unity if the internal heteroglossia that stratifies perception of the object is not acknowledged. This stratification is due, again, to the various world views embodied in social and professional groups. [End Page 46] In addition to this perceptional stratification, Bakhtin also describes what he variously calls the "apperceptive background" or the "social heteroglossia" of the object. These are the voices and world views that the object, so to speak, brings with itself to consciousness. As Bakhtin writes, aside from the internal stratification of the object, one "witnesses as well the unfolding of social heteroglossia surrounding the object, the Tower-of-Babel mixing of languages that goes on around any object" (p. 278). There is no "Edenic" character to the world—people were here prior to us, and their words about the world determine how it is the world is experienced. The "object is always entangled in someone else's discourse about it, it is already present with qualifications, an object of dispute that is conceptualized and evaluated variously" (p. 330). To speak of the school curriculum, then, is to engage the various social dialogues that surround the object. It is to take part in the debate about whether or not the schools are mediocre and whether or not curriculum standards might not improve them. It is to argue about whether the child's interest or the child's effort is primary in the process of coming to understanding. As Bakhtin notes, the meaning of words such as "curriculum" do not come from dictionaries—but neither can such words mean whatever it is we want them to mean. People fight over words, and that struggle means each word too has a history (a becoming), which the speaker must acknowledge.

#### Language is heteroglot at every level – it embraces the anti-thesis of their argument as means to access their benefits

Max L. Goldman (bio) Helios > Volume 35, Number 1, Spring 2008 visiting assistant professor at the University of Wisconsin, Madison Language, Satire, and Heteroglossia in the Cena Trimalchionis

A method for approaching distinct languages, as well as the intertext of satire, can be found in Bakhtin’s essay “Discourse in the Novel” (Bakhtin and Holquist 1981, 259–422), where he introduces the term and concept of heteroglossia.6 Although scholars have used several aspects of Bakhtin’s thought to study the Satyrica, none have applied heteroglossia to the languages of the Cena.7 Heteroglossia is central to Bakhtin’s view of the novel’s incorporation and juxtaposition of distinct languages and generic intertextuality. Although Bakhtin insists on connecting his analysis of languages and intertextuality to his attempt to define the generic characteristics of the novel, his generic categories are, in my view, of questionable value for understanding Petronius.8 Rather than support a generic argument, the concept of heteroglossia can help illuminate the languages of the Cena and the episode’s relationship to Roman satire. Bakhtin first discusses heteroglossia in his development of a stylistics of prose to account for the diversity of voices that he says differentiates the novel from poetry. Diversity of voices is part of a group of expressions, including diversity of languages and diversity of speech types, which are closely linked to and at times translate the central concept, [End Page 51] heteroglossia. The concept rests on Bakhtin’s view of language not as a unitary system but as a plurality of socioideological languages or idiolects: At any given moment of its historical existence, language is heteroglot from top to bottom: it represents the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions between the present and the past, between differing epochs of the past, between different socio-ideological groups in the present, between tendencies, schools, circles and so forth, all given bodily form. These ‘languages’ of heteroglossia intersect each other in a variety of ways, forming new socially typifying ‘languages.’ (1981, 291) Bakhtin developed his ideas of language in answer to the structuralism of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand Saussure, who focused on the synchronic analysis of the sign structures of language (la langue). In his critique of Saussure, Bakhtin stresses the importance of actual language, its history, and context. He thus insists on the socially typifying nature of language, and believes that the novel best represents this plurality of socioideological idiolects.

#### The role of the ballot is embodiment of heteroglossia – which means affirm both the colonization and resistance

Kyle A. Greenwalt (bio) Education and Culture > Volume 24, Number 2, 2008 assistant professor in the Department of Teacher Education at Michigan State University Discursivity, Heteroglossia, and Interest: Revisiting Herbert Kliebard's Dewey

Why is it that reform discourses can be recycled in these ways? What provides them with such continuity through time? Why aren't old discourses more easily forgotten and new discourses more easily mobilized? Furthermore, why is it that the same few Kliebardian "interests" have so consistently and insistently existed throughout the entire twentieth century, despite massive change in the society surrounding the schools? Such questions will be considered in this section by considering the work of the Russian theorist Mikhail Bakhtin (2000) in his essay, "Discourse in the Novel." I will begin by briefly sketching Bakhtin's interest in particularized, embodied languages, and then proceed to explore in detail the Bakhtinian concept of heteroglossia. Bakhtin continually reminds us that the notion of "language," especially of a national language, is in itself somewhat abstract and lifeless. Rather than focusing on language—as an abstract symbolic system—Bakhtin asks us to think about what he variously calls "languages," "discourses," or actual, living "utterances." That is, Bakhtin points out the manner in which language is itself both vivified and, more importantly, internally stratified, by the differing social classes, professions, and genres that determine it. These various social and professional discourses are not themselves segregated or unrelated to one another. They form instead what Bakhtin calls, inimitably, a "heteroglot unity." Bakhtin therefore asks us to imagine language as a field in which power is at play. Language is something alive, it has a history (a "becoming"), and a material [End Page 45] being. The concrete discourses that make up an abstract language are therefore that which give it life, in that they are fused with various ideologies, ways of looking at the world: Thus at any given moment of its historical existence, language is heteroglot from top to bottom: it represents the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions between the present and the past, between differing epochs of the past, between different socio-ideological groups in the present, between tendencies, schools, circles and so forth, all given a bodily form. (p. 291) He goes on to note that these languages "do not exclude each other, but rather intersect with each other in many different ways." All languages are therefore "specific points of view on the world, forms for conceptualizing the world in words, specific world views, each characterized by its own objects, meanings and values." Language diversity is therefore an embodied reality: languages "encounter one another and co-exist in the consciousness of real people" (pp. 291-292). Bakhtin asks us to imagine language as the product of centripetal and centrifugal forces: nationalizing, unifying forces that attempt to colonize and assimilate through the construct of a "proper" and "correct" language, working against the forces of dialect, patois, argot, slang—all of which, as embodiments of particular world views, resist. This background of centrifugality Bakhtin terms heteroglossia. As he notes, every "utterance participates in the 'unitary language' (in its centripetal forces and tendencies) and at the same time partakes of social and historical heteroglossia (the centrifugal, stratifying forces)" (p. 272). As such, utterances can carry no "consistent and recognizable ideological" interests; for utterances exist on the horizon between myself and the other (p. 293). The word is always half someone else's. The task before the speaking subject is therefore to recognize this heteroglossia, to formulate one's own intentionality, and to thereby orchestrate an embodied language encounter.

#### No solvency – their demand to open the curriculum to the exterior just reproduces stratifications – their error was to center their criticism on the curriculum instead of the institution

Kyle A. Greenwalt (bio) Education and Culture > Volume 24, Number 2, 2008 assistant professor in the Department of Teacher Education at Michigan State University Discursivity, Heteroglossia, and Interest: Revisiting Herbert Kliebard's Dewey

Institutions are themselves, therefore, stratified in a Bakhtinian sense. Yet such stratification is rarely renewed or enriched by contact with their exteriors. Discursive patterns begin to demonstrate a remarkable continuity across time—indeed, as Kliebard has shown us, four discourses about the American curriculum have been in almost continuous mobilization for a century—both within the research community and in the schools themselves. Debates have begun to reenact themselves as the discourses available to us calcify. Social heteroglossia is not so much overcome as it is reduced to the same few notes, against which our own voices have difficulty sounding. Likewise, as social heteroglossia becomes something taken for granted, internal heteroglossia seems to become more important for the social actors within institutions. One forgets, as Bakhtin would forbid us to, that the curriculum is no one, unitary thing, and that the question of what values the curriculum should really contain and reflect reveals only a desperate attempt to eliminate even internal heteroglossia. Institutions promote an overinvestment in their "sacred" objects, an imaginary politics. Indeed, the price of institutional enclosure seems to be just such an overinvestment in an imaginary, monolithic curriculum. Clearly, what needs attention is not so much the curriculum, the canon, or the syllabus, but the institution itself. Otherwise, the school's trajectory risks becoming merely memorial, a faithful reproduction of the same social dialogues, time and again. In the previous section of this paper, I showed how the institutionalization of discursive practices produces a stratification that is rarely renewed or enriched by contact with the institution's exterior. My question for this section, then, is as follows: How can the institution of schooling be opened up to new social languages, especially given the current context of high-stakes testing and learning standards—standards that no doubt have the effect of "standardizing" teaching and learning?

### OFF

#### Identity, culture, and our orientation towards the material world around us are not fixed by our socio-historical location – they are permeable and porous – treating identity as monolithic experience to be confronted boxes us into our own relativistic world – closes off any possibility of true transformation

Devicka Chawla (Associate Professor of Communication Studies at Ohio University) and Amardo Rodriguez (Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor Communication and Rhetorical Studies at Syracuse University) 2007 Teaching in Higher Education Vol. 12, Nos. 56, OctoberDecember” EBSCO

The moments I revisit do not belong to one particular job interview. Even though I present them in one scenario, they belong to series of experiences which occurred during various campus visits when I was interviewing for an academic job. I show them here as a collection of scenes, episodes, conversations, and incidents. In all of these interviews, I came to experience myself, in greater degrees, as a person of color, and a woman who was being interrogated about how she would teach courses, such as intercultural and cross-cultural communication. Being of South Asian origin and being engaged in research which was contextually situated in my country of origin made me ‘separate’ from other candidates who were interviewing for these jobs. Even though I was qualified\*/intellectually and professionally\*/to get these jobs, it was my obvious multiculturalism that was often center stage at these interviews. My ‘color’, my ‘ethnicity’, and my obvious ‘diversity’ (one rooted in shape, space, and color) were unfortunately, my selling points. Having lived in the US for over eight years, I am aware that my brownness entails ‘Otherness’. On the other hand, I have concerns about being professionally boxed in as a person of color who is casually cast as an expert on all matters intercultural. In this case, the job description required me to teach a core undergraduate class in intercultural communication, placing me in the category of an intercultural expert owing to my physical otherness from those around me (who are primarily of Caucasian descent). I resist this (then and now) because I am also aware of the dangers of being professionally and theoretically bound to my color, of perpetuating diversity as a noun, rather than a verb, of promoting stable categories of difference, and boxing the study of intercultural experiences into one course space where one can presumably acquire intercultural skills. Acknowledging these dangers, I have begun to reposition and re-body my physical ‘brownness’ in a different way. I choose to see Brown as a metaphor for the increasing number of peoples who ideologically, epistemologically, racially, sexually, and spiritually chose to reside in borderlands and other conceptual spaces that locate 698 D. Chawla and A. Rodriguez us at the center of the world. Yet some may say that I use brown as yet another category to address notions of difference. However, my goal is to view it as a symbolic metaphor that exemplifies ambiguity and complexity by showing that difference is inherently elastic and that all categories\*/to rephrase Trinh T. Minh-Ha’ swords\*/leak, change, and evolve (see Minh-ha, 1989). This is one story of brown. Living in color: stories from academic job interviews Over here, I am feeling more brown than I am. What does that really mean? Can one be browner, blacker, or whiter than one is? And then, how can this be happening in a conference room with faculty that holds a reputation of full commitment to diversity. A silly observation. Perhaps the snow outside is accentuating my tan colored skin to myself. I could be over-reacting. I have had many such moments as I go through the drill of campus interviews. Some are particularly memorable. For this one, I flew into the town in a twenty-seater plane that landed in the middle of snow-covered corn fields at ten in the evening. The runway was less than a mile long and the airport badly lit. I am in the rural heartland of America. I suppose I have felt browner since I stepped off the plane knowing that in this place my physical dissimilarity to those around me will be magnified to others and myself. I shed my own skin and become the ‘other’ that I am expected to be\*/I feel that I should feel enough of an ‘outsider’ to fit the job description. I should be used to such maneuvers, but as always I want to resist becoming used to such matters. The irony of my own diversity resounds loudly. I will always be the center of attention because I look different, and this very difference that centers me pushes me aside. It is an irony that will never be reconciled for people like me who reside both in the center and the periphery. Because I long to be in the center intellectually, not merely in terms of my category. Almost all departments that have invited me are in search of someone who straddles this duality\*/a ‘diversity’ expert. Why do such thoughts come to me when I am trying to find my first academic job? I should be more concerned with making an impression. But, I am after all, anthropologically trained\*/a culture-watcher. I am watching them, I am watching myself being watched, and I am conducting multiple analyses as I drown in these observations. I look across the table and for a second my eyes meet Jared,3 the only black member on this faculty. I wonder if he, like me, feels more his blackness in this room. I am trying to guess, but it is hard to read faces when I am the one under scrutiny. I wonder how they see me. South Asian. Woman. Brown. Subaltern. Multicultural. Diverse. Exotic. A scholar. A person committed to an intellectual life. Not the latter, I am sure. The other labels are more comfortable, less threatening, disconnected with the work that most faculty are involved in. I would be a comfortable colleague\*/non-interfering, assigned to the diversity curriculum, contributing to the multicultural commitment. New imaginations of difference 699 ‘How would you design an intercultural communication course for undergraduate seniors?’ The question has been thrown out by someone on my left. All eyes are trained on me. I did a quick count when I walked in, about 25 of the 27 faculty members, two are on sabbatical. I’ve done my homework. I work my way through my notes, look up, and seek her eyes. ‘I would design a course that critically questions the idea of studying social life based upon how we are socially organized into categories. I would emphasize the ethical and moral implications that come with looking at culture as a collection of different categorical groups. My overall approach would encourage students to think of difference beyond and before categories, to examine difference that is mindblowing, that is beyond our/their imagination, that is **rooted in the complexity of relationships rather than in the socially constructed categories of gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation’**. ‘How would you do this?’ I briefly glance at the person who has asked me this question. This time it is someone across from me. I look first into her eyes and then encompass the room. ‘By exploring culture as a naturally occurring process in all ecologies, societies, communities, and systems. By looking at culture as a constant and continuous natural process that is occurring around us all the time. That differences are to be understood in more complex fashions by understanding patterns, not by focusing upon ethnic identity markers. I agree with an anthropological performance studies understanding of cultural identity about which Phelan writes, ‘‘Identity cannot reside in the name you can say or the body you can see identity is perceptible only through a relation to an other’’ (Phelan, 1993, p. 13). In other words, black, brown, golden, olive, yellow do not constitute relational difference. I too want to disconnect identity from space, shape, and place’. ‘What books would you choose?’ All eyes are focused upon me. I am talking about difference in ways that seem to have no loyalty to race, class, gender, nationality, sexuality, caste, religion, or geography. I know that some people are bemused by my response. Why am I under selling my Orientalist currency? I could make it easy for myself\*/after all, I am one of those who are always strongly encouraged to apply for such jobs. But then, when have I made it easy for myself? I have never bought into categorical difference. To do so now, would be intellectually dishonest. I name books such as: Ethnicity beyond groups by Brubaker (2004), Postethnic America: beyond multiculturalism by Hollinger (1995), Peripheral visions: learning along the way, and Willing to learn both by Mary Catherine Bateson (1994, 2004), among others. Each of these intellectuals explore difference outside of categories. They forward the idea of cultural identity as being a 700 D. Chawla and A. Rodriguez ‘choice’, rather than merely being ‘ascribed’ on the lines of shape and color (Hollinger, 1995). I tell my soon to be colleagues that my approach to ‘multiculturalism’ is ‘postethnic’. I take my understanding of this word from Hollinger who very succinctly explains the values of a postethnic perspective when he states: A postethnic perspective favors voluntary over involuntary affiliations, balances an appreciation for communities of descent to make room for new communities, and promotes solidarities of wide-scope that incorporate people with different ethnic and racial backgrounds. A postethnic perspective resists the grounding of knowledge and moral values in blood and history, but works within the last generation’s recognition that many of the ideas and values taken to be universal are specific to certain cultures. (Hollinger, 1995, p. 3) My goal is to push for newer ways of imagining identity and culture. In fact, I would even challenge my students to imagine a new vocabulary and language of difference so as to recognize the persons who are increasingly sexual rather than heterosexual or homosexual, ecological rather than geographical, spiritual rather than denominational, and so forth. That is, those persons that David Rudder nicely describes as ‘the children of the frontline’. Indeed, in a recent essay entitled, ‘The endangered university’ published in The New York Review of Books, Andrew Delbanco, Professor of Humanities at Columbia University, writes critically about the diversity curricula adopted by universities and colleges across the country: The new diversity has exerted a necessary and salutary pressure to open the curriculum to non-Western and other nontraditional subjects. But there has been almost no parallel effort to establish courses that bring students of ‘‘differing outlooks’’ together into productive discussion The new diversity has tended to exert pressure on the curriculum to be more various at precisely the time when some measure of commonality is needed. (Delbanco, 2005, p. 90) I am making a point here. If I am to teach such classes there will be no overt celebration of difference and therefore of tolerance. There will be an examination and investigation of how interactional, communicational, and rhetorical practices can create difference\*/the evolution of new and different ways of experiencing and understanding the world that are fundamentally different to our own. There will also be an investigation of difference as a demystified ‘given’, that can be dangerous if held on too tightly. I tell them I want students to look difference and commonality in the eye and move beyond political correctness to address conflict, dissent, and intolerance. ‘I also want my students to distinguish plurality from diversity. Plurality is about accommodation, inclusion, and toleration. It constitutes the bleaching of diversity. Diversity is ontological, epistemological, and ecological. It is a process that belongs naturally to the world. In this case, the diversity that I speak of is rooted in cosmopolitanism\*/‘‘a movement that is more wary of traditional enclosures and favors voluntary affiliations. It is a movement that promotes multiple identities, emphasizes the dynamic and changing character of many groups, and is responsive to the potential for creating new cultural combinations’’ (Hollinger, 1995, p. 3). New imaginations of difference 701 Even though cosmopolitanism would not be a focus in the class, I would take my understanding of diversity from this perspective. This diversity is about open ecologies, not closed systems that remain separated from each other’. I am mindful of how easy it is to misinterpret and oversimplify my position, to believe that I am naı¨vely aligning myself with those who call for a color-blind society and thereby oblivious of the profound ideological, institutional, and structural forces that make race, ethnicity, and sexuality still matter and worthy of struggle. I am also mindful of being seen as the privileged Third World e´migre´ who is unable or unwilling to acknowledge the ugly and stubborn legacy of over 350 years of slavery and Jim Crow in the US. Indeed, I am very conscious of being seen as dismissive of the struggles that demand solidarity with historically marginalized and disenfranchised peoples. So I warn against making these false characterizations and generalizations.My theoretical commitment is to possibility and how we can begin to re-imagine identity in ways that enlarge possibility (Rodriguez, 2002). Inside the classroom: intercultural moments in movements The class is mapped out, but is merely a sketch. It unfolds like a story whose plots, dialogues, events, episodes are created inside the class with my students as characters yet unknown to each other. A mysterious intellectual journey more like. I have planned the class to have experiential, theoretical, and empirical dimensions. In it, I will try to demystify the idea of cross-cultural communication. After all, what is ever acultural? When I begin to teach it, the class emerges in three movements that follow from each other. The first movement probes the students’ own understandings of culture. I try to have the students reckon with the underlying forces such as their beliefs, values, and assumptions. But, more importantly I urge them to identify what anxieties and insecurities are most shaping their own description of culture. After this, we interrogate the implications and consequences of their different definitions. This is the experiential aspect of the class. In the second movement, I introduce the theoretical framework proposed by Rodriguez that lends for a different understanding of culture. They look at the consequences and implications of this emergent framework which is centered on looking at cultures as naturally occurring ecologies. The whole idea is to use this emerging framework as an exemplar of a different way of framing our view of culture. The final movement is empirical. In it we use the emergent framework to analyze recent local, national, international/intercultural conflict that many deem intractable and even hopeless. It is the first day and I know my students are trying to place me somewhere, in some place, among some people, and in some category. I see questions in their eyes about how I got here, what I speak, whether I speak English, how strong is my accent, and finally the most important e´migre´ question of all\*/what do you think of America? They are imagining exotic worlds that we will journey into. It is a comictragic expectation that resonates with the contemporary national and international desire to be multicultural. Such musings never insult me. There is humanity in them. 702 D. Chawla and A. Rodriguez The syllabus is read. And then an assignment\*/‘On a sheet of paper describe the following with regards yourself\*/of culture, cultural identity, and one intercultural experience’. It is not an unreasonable request. These were made to me very often during the course of my own higher education. Describe something, generate discussion, and then search for resonances with the assigned readings. Except, in this class we are bereft of readings for what I have mentioned as the ‘First Movement’. This movement is defined by how each person in the class describes culture. All 28 of us are taking stock of what we bring into the equation. After that we will examine various worlds of difference. I am getting all the responses that I expect. The chalkboard has been divided into two parts. Every student has a copy of each other’s descriptions of the four terms. I closely examined them for similarities and differences. They are all quite similar. . Culture is the attributes that are shared between people of the same region/ location/country including people of different races, religion and economic status. . Culture is your values, beliefs, experiences that you have been taught and learned, which can include language, religion, education and race. . Culture is the set of ideas, beliefs, and values that shape a society or group of individuals. The culture establishes a set of norms that identifies what is acceptable and what is not acceptable. Culture also allows individuals to identify with one another and there is a comfort level established between people of the same culture. The crux of all the descriptions can be visually seen on the board. There are three embedded assumptions in them. (1) Culture is a process of injection or implantation into us; (2) human beings are passively receiving culture; (3) and culture is rooted in difference, as something fixed. ‘Is this how you experience culture?’ I constantly refer to myself as ‘brown’. Mostly the response to this is a widening of the eyes. I never claim to be only an Indian, only a Third World e´migre´, or only a person of color. I want to complicate my origins. By doing so within this class, I hope to open doors, encourage my students to do the same. I want to destroy categories. I find strength in wearing brown\*/a color between solids. In fact, I explore with my students how I first felt the weight of my brownness when I landed in the United States eight years ago. I tell them about experiencing myself as an ‘other’ when people would refer to my ‘tan’\*/a tan that I was born with. I tell them about experiencing my ‘tan’ in language when people would speak to me loudly thinking that my color determined my language and my accent, and how these people would be astonished when I replied in moderate and clear English, albeit with an Indian accent. In these everyday stories I want to show them how color, shape, size, and language are boundaries that can mislead, even lie. New imaginations of difference 703 Those boundaries we spin As the class progresses, we have established that we are all rooting culture in difference and in closely held boundaries. My interrogations in the class are now aimed at questioning the construction of boundaries through which we define our cultural identity/s. I want to them to think of a category/boundary/place as ‘a heavily trafficked intersection, a port of call and exchange, instead of a circumscribed territory’ (Conquergood, 2002, p. 145). I hope we can begin to envision a boundary as ‘more like a membrane than a wall’ (Conquergood, 2002, p. 145). Most importantly, I would like us to interrogate why these boundaries exist. What keeps them alive? What harm or good do they do? Why this deep-seated loyalty to them? What anxieties, insecurities, and paranoia hold us to these categories? Popular discourses on cultures speak only, but a little to these forces. This type of multiculturalism puts pressure on us to align with an ethnic community, identify as brown, black, white, claim a language or religion and so on. If one resists such bracketing then one is considered an escapist, an idealist, color-blind, optimistic, and so on. Moreover, this kind of multiculturalism pushes us to align with the causes and grievances of our supposed groups. Failure to comply exposes us to charges of complicity and forsaking the struggles of our peoples. In other words, this multiculturalism uses ethnicity, race, and other such markers to limit diversity. The heart of the matter is that such limited understandings of our cultural selves encourage separation and decrease our obligations to the world by making believe that we only belong to one corner of the world. Instead of defining ourselves in relational connection with the people around us, we place ourselves in sealed boxes. Cultural identity becomes an airtight container which limits our wholehearted mingling with those around us. The social and political implications of such a stance are tremendous because by anchoring my identity within specific categories, I am excusing myself from my human obligations to multiple peoples. So what exactly am I suggesting? We have multiple orientations and all these orientations have inherently unstable and porous. For example, what of sexual orientation? I tell my students: ‘In defining our cultural identity, I was not surprised that none of us wrote, ‘‘I am a sexual being’’. We all wrote about being straight, gay, or bisexual. Again, the point I am trying to make is that whatever the orientation, we are unused to simply acknowledging that we are ‘‘sexual beings’’. Instead, we feel compelled to align with one kind of orientation, doing what we do with race, religion, and other areas\*/ bracket ourselves into definable categories. Of course, it makes for a less complex life-neat, tidy, and simple, and so less uncertain. The point of all three examples is the same\*/each is showing us that we understand our ‘‘selves’’ as ‘‘separate’’, ‘‘apart’’, and therefore disconnected from the world around us’. All I have wanted to achieve is an awareness that categories may tell more lies than truths. That they are arbitrary, and indeed socially constructed. I have wanted us to flesh out the idea that as long as categories are nurtured, difference will abound, and we will need more boxes to fit people in. On the other hand, I am in no way trying to deny or even discount the harsh reality of boxes, or, as many are demanding, calling for the end of boxes. Boxes still play an important role in revealing to us who is still being left behind and left out. The claim that we will only achieve a color-blind society by ending boxes is disingenuous as it masks the many difficulties that persons of different races, ethnicities, and sexualities still face in attaining equality and justice. It also masks the tragic and unfortunate histories and ideologies that still privilege some races, ethnicities, and sexualities over that of others. A color conscious society is therefore much more heuristic and humane than one that makes believe it can eventually be color-blind by simply removing boxes. So for now I want the end of ideologies that aim to limit me to merely a person of color, for in doing so, such ideologies limit possibility and thereby our capacity to imagine and realize new worlds. Learning in teaching The final reflections for this movement require us to write about our ‘selves’ outside of categories. For a week there is a battle of wills. What I want is to at least open their eyes to the possibility of ‘other’ ways of envisioning identity. I cannot fathom this intense loyalty to categories. Of course, since I grew up in South Asia, in a country colonized by the English, I grew up with a colonial complex about fairness because being fair was considered more beautiful. It took many years for me to physically and intellectually revel in being brown. But I did not grow up thinking of myself as a part of one race or another. It was not a part of my reality. The end of the First Movement is pedagogically and, more importantly, personally revealing to me. In the course of the exercises, I am realizing and understanding my own experiences with categories\*/how and why they have shaped me, why I do not consider them important, and how I define my selves. I realize that my interest in identity and my previous writing about it are deeply connected to what is emerging here. I have an essay that is autoethnographic\*/an identity journey that I decide to share with the class. This essay entitled ‘Two Journeys’ is an inventory of my cultural selves (Chawla, 2003). It is a story that attempts to sculpt a semblance of my selves between memories of myself as a child who was sent away to a boarding school at the age of ten, and memories of myself as an adult who chose to move away from home in India to America at the age of 23. I wrote it as a performance narrative making an argument that we can re-create selves in writing, narrative, memories, and performance. I was rooting myself in post-colonial theoretical frames. But, as an essay it was more about methodology than about identity. In this class, one interpretation of it is continually reinforced. We keep returning to it as an autobiographical narrative which roots my identity in displacement, uprootedness, in-betweeness, and has very little to do with my being Asian, Oriental, female, or woman. More importantly, it lends to my arguments that our ‘selves’ are created in relation, not categories. This story has no roots in categories of race, class, gender, or age. Its only roots are in uprootedness. It does not really fit into an New imaginations of difference 705 immigrant narrative, because there is no nostalgia (I believe) about exile or immigration. It is not an ethnic narrative as I do not claim inside it any desire to be American/South Asian/British, and so on. For me, one of the most revealing moments of the class occurs when Zara and Celia visit me during my office hours to tell me that they associated very well with this story. ‘What made you associate with it?’ Celia replies , ‘Well, I have not had similar experiences of being in a catholic boarding school, yet I cried when I read of those moments when you talk about saying goodbye to your family. I moved away from home a few years ago and I could feel that same sorrow. I’m not South Asian, I didn’t grow up where you did, I don’t even know the meanings of some of those words you use in the essay. But, I felt it’. I suppose as a teacher, one waits for moments such as these\*/revelations. My goal here is to assert that cultures, and therefore cultural identities, are naturallyoccurring ecologies, and all such ecologies flourish by constantly changing and evolving (Rodriguez, 2002). I am asserting that all cultures, peoples, and societies are and must be permeable, unstable, and diverse to survive and thrive. My point is that all healthy cultures/peoples are open to influence and change. After this task is completed, I begin to reinforce the prescriptive nature of the framework by navigating examples and case studies that include the Taliban in Afghanistan, controversy between the Islamists and Secularists over the veil ban in France and Turkey, unused languages such as Latin and Sanskrit, and other linguistic attempts to maintain the purity of English. In each ‘intercultural conflict’, we find that it is not the ‘different’ values that are causing the conflict, but the rigidity with which the values are imposed or held onto. The moral is a simple one\*/the more we stay loyal to stable categories of color, class, religion, and ethnicity, the more separate we make ourselves. In the third and final movement, each of us identifies our own supposedly intractable intercultural conflict that is currently in the news, and these become the case studies for the class. Disruptions and possibilities Ultimately, my pedagogical goals for this class turn out to be very simple\*/to release ourselves from the primal forces that keep us beholden to the need to impose static and simplistic categories on ourselves and others. But it is not merely a question of releasing ourselves of categories. I am aware that this de-fragmentation is a continuous process. The idea is to understand that categories are merely constructs and we can unshackle these from ourselves. We have the choice to do so. One might say that this is too simple an endeavor\*/almost non-intellectual. Yet, my students’ struggle to maintain boundaries and categories and their resistance to being disarmed off their boxes drives home the necessity of my stance. Is one academic 706 D. Chawla and A. Rodriguez term enough to let go off the comfortable boxes that Census Bureaus have created for us? Of course, these are boxes that history\*/both social and political\*/has given us. These are burdens of history as well as bureaucracies. But, I am suggesting that there are choices\*/to question, reshape, remake. To resist. My theoretical, political, and personal resistance lies in my hope to provide us with a peep hole into the possibilities of other worlds unencumbered by races, spaces, or locations. I have always wanted to be larger than who I was meant to be\*/an Asian, an Indian, a woman, a postcolonial theorist, a diversity expert, a person of color. All my thinking, reading, writing\*/even as a relative newcomer into academe\*/is driven by this need to sculpt newer selves in the experiences I encounter, and not imprison myself in the categories that define me. I find it hard, and indeed I resist informing people of my geographic origins because I know that I will be attributed admirable or not so admirable qualities that I may never possess. Since, I look like I could be from any land of brown people, I often allow the question to hang. Academically, I stay informed about all matters of cultural theory that fit my category. These often include lenses such as postcolonial theory, Third World feminism, cosmopolitanism, and so on. Yet, I question their application and am wary of using these as a way of marketing my intellectual self. My intellectual project (inside and outside of this class) is aimed at studying human identity/s in all their anxieties, vulnerabilities, and im/possibility/s\*/wherever they may be when I encounter them. To refer to myself as a scholar who studies Third World identity would make me more attractive as an academic. But, ultimately from an intellectual standpoint, it limits the undiscovered worlds into which I might venture. This class, therefore, is no different from my larger intellectual project. It is an arena that allows us to forge new spaces for our ‘selves’, and thereby free ourselves to newer possibilities. I am trying to free ourselves to be in situations which allow us to imagine newer, richer, more complex realities, pregnant with possibility. For me, this class is finally an opportunity to resist the forces that stop us from re-imagining more worlds..

#### The affirmatives explicit call for the ballot as a methodology to validate personal experience and inclusion replicates and re-intrenches current power structures

Wendy Brown (professor of political science at UC Berkeley) 2005 “Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics” p. 91

Though this kind of regulatory function is familiar enough to stu¬dents of legal and bureaucratic discourse, it is less frequently recog¬nized and perhaps more disquieting in putatively countercultural discourse, when confessing injury can become that which attaches us to the injury, paralyzes us within it, and prevents us from seeking or even desiring a status other than that of injured. In an age of social identification through attributes marked as culturally significant.— gender, race, sexuality- and so forth—confessional discourse, with its truth-bearing status in a postepistemological universe, not only regulates the confessor in the name of freeing her, as Foucault described that logic, but extends beyond the confessing individual to constitute a regulatory truth about the identity group: confessed truths are assembled and deployed as “knowledge” about the group. This phe¬nomenon would seem to undergird a range of recurring troubles in feminism, from the “real woman” rejoinder to poststructuralist decon¬structions of her to totalizing descriptions of women’s experience that are the inadvertent effects of various kinds of survivor stories. Thus, for example, the porn star who feels miserably exploited, violated, and humiliated in her work invariably monopolizes the feminist truth about sex work, as the girl with math anxieties constitutes the feminist truth about women and math; eating disorders have become the femi¬nist truth about women and food, as sexual abuse and violation oc¬cupy the feminist knowledge terrain of women and sexuality In other words, even as feminism aims to affirm diversity among women and women’s experiences, confession as the site of production of truth, converging with feminist suspicion and de-authorization of truth from other sources, tends to reinstate a unified discourse in which the story of greatest suffering becomes the true story of woman. (This may con¬stitute part of the rhetorical purchase of confessional discourse in a postfoundational epistemological era: confession substitutes for the largely discredited charge of false consciousness, on the one hand, and for generalized truth claims rooted in science, God, or nature on the other.) Thus, the adult who does not manifestly suffer from her or his childhood sexual experience, the lesbian who does not feel shame, the woman of color who does not primarily or “correctly” identify with her marking as such—these figures are excluded as bona fide members of the identity categories that also claim them. Their status within these discourses is that of being “in denial,” of suffering from “false consciousness,” or of being a “race traitor.” This is the norm-making process in traditions of “breaking silence,” which, ironically silence and exclude the very persons these traditions mean to empower. While these practices tacitly silence those who do not share the experiences of those whose suffering is most marked (or whom the dis¬course produces as suffering markedly), they also condemn those whose sufferings they record to a permanent identification with that suffering. Here, there is a temporal ensnaring in “the folds of our own discourses” insofar as our manner of identifying ourselves in speech condemns us to live in a present dominated by the past. But what if speech and silence aren’t really opposites? Indeed, what if to speak in-cessantly of one’s suffering is to silence the possibilities of overcoming it, of living beyond it, of identifying as something other than it? What if this incessant speech overwhelms not only the experiences of others but also alternative (unutterable, traumatized, fragmentary, or unas¬similable) zones of one’s own experience? Conversely, what if a certain modality of silence about one’s suffering—and we might consider modalities of silence to be as varied as modalities of speech—articulates a variety of possibilities not otherwise available to the sufferer?

#### This form of identity politics is the root cause of war and violence

Barry Posen (Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT) November/December 2007 “The Case for Restrain” http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=331

Identity Politics. Aside from Saddam Hussein’s attempted smash-and-grab robbery of Kuwait, the most troublesome conflicts of the post-Cold War world have been internal and have centered on identity politics. For the U.S. military this included Desert Storm’s unhappy postscript in the Kurdish and Shi‘a rebellions in northern and southern Iraq, respectively, and civil wars in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo. The United States eschewed military intervention to stop the Rwanda genocide, but those in the Clinton Administration who made this decision all regret it deeply, and most critics of this policy believe with unwarranted certainty that such an intervention would have been easy and successful. The U.S. approach to all of these conflicts bore certain similarities rooted in U.S. liberalism, which exalts in the rational calculating individual and thus underestimates the power of group loyalty. The United States was usually surprised by one or more of the following: the outbreak of conflict itself, the extent of group ambitions, the ferocity of the violence, the intensity of group loyalties, and the cost and duration of any U.S. military intervention. This myopia crossed party lines: Most Republican security strategists have been as confounded by the bloody, stubborn and resilient identity politics of Iraq as the Clinton Administration was in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo. But why? Academic disputes aside, there is enough of an historical pattern of association between identity politics and violence that U.S. policymakers should know to take nationalism and religion seriously, both as immediate causes of violence and as key ingredients sustaining military capability and armed resistance—particularly in periods of political and economic insecurity.

#### Explicit calls for inclusion and accusations of exclusion serve to re-entrench hegemonic ideologies by reinforcing the social power of individuals over the regulation of our identity and experience in this debate space. In the case of debate, we should want to be in the community, but we should not base our inclusion/exclusion in that community on whether or not we win a round on our argument.

Karen Shimakawa (Associate Professor, Performance Studies at the University of California, Davis) 2004 “The Things We Share: Ethnic Performativity and "Whatever Being" The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 18.2 (2004) 149-160

Giorgio Agamben's "whatever being" offers a[n] possible alternative way to conceive of (communal) subjectivity that does not depend on stable political identity categories for its integrity, without requiring one to dispense with categories altogether. Unlike the common English parsing of whatever, Agamben's use of the term is differently nuanced: "[whatever being] is not 'being, it does not matter which,' but rather 'being such that it always matters'" (Agamben 1993, 1).3 The impulse to include/be included is retained, though not assigned to a particular or stable grounds of inclusion: "such-and-such being is reclaimed from its having this or that property, which identifies it as belonging to this or that set, to this or that class (the reds, the French, the Muslims)—and it is reclaimed not for another class nor for the simple generic absence of any belonging, but for its being-such, for belonging itself" (1-2, emphasis in original). Belonging itself, according to Agamben, is a state of being that acknowledges the (social and affective efficacy of the) desire for inclusion while, at the same time, resisting the concretization of static categories (defined racially, nationally, sexually, religiously, or otherwise) that would afford not only inclusion, but also exclusion. What would it mean, Agamben asks, to acknowledge the [End Page 151] desire to belong to identity categories as that which binds us across the boundaries of such categories? To define subjectivity as "being as such," that is, at the level of the impulse to belong (belonging itself), rather than at the point of inclusion in an established social category/community?4 It is important to emphasize that Agamben does not advocate a dissipation of belonging per se—his is not a dismantled universalist/humanist leveling program. "It is the Most Common that cuts off any real community," he writes; "[whatever being] is neither apathy nor promiscuity nor resignation" (10), Instead, whatever being constitutes a mode of (prospective) subject formation that achieves some of Kristeva's deject's ends (that is, the rough articulation of a subject position) without producing a concretized, jettisoned abject; and for those who might otherwise find themselves on the "wrong" side of that (nationalizing/racializing) abjection equation, perhaps Agamben's conception of "being as such" describes a strategic response to abjection that does not simultaneously reaffirm its logic; that is, it offers an alternative to abjection that does not result in simply "claiming a place" at the dejects' table. Indeed, Agamben articulates "whatever being" in terms that are provocatively complementary to Kristeva's: whereas Kristeva's abject is "simply a frontier," Agamben situates whatever being precisely at the border or "threshold" between inside and outside, "a point of contact with an external space that must remain empty" since, in order to locate a recognized "outside" one must claim (even if only implicitly) a particular "inside," the zone/community in/to which one belongs (and from which an "outside" is distinguishable). Rather, he argues, "the outside is not another space that resides beyond a determinate space ... it is, so to speak, the experience of the limit itself" (68). By locating subject's formation in whatever being, that is, in the impulse to belong, he creates a concomitantly concretization-resistant zone of not-belonging. That is, just as Kristeva's abject is less a particular object/concept than a function (i.e., explusion/differentiation), so Agamben's "outside" is simply that which is implied by whatever being/belonging itself: the impulse to not-belong otherwise/elsewhere (always resisting the temptation to locate that otherwise/elsewhere in concrete terms). "Whatever, in this sense," Agamben writes,"is the event of an outside" (67, emphasis in original).

#### The alternative is to vote negative to reject the affirmatives act of submitting their personal discourse to the regulation of the ballot

#### This act of rejection is key to reveal and embrace Whatever Being - an appreciation of forms of life without referent to an ends

#### The aff serves as an active site for the expansion of the power to determine who counts as ‘dead’ and who doesn’t in the first place. The alternative is the only way to truly breakdown the structures of power

Anne Caldwell (Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Louisville) 2004 “Bio-Sovereignty and the Emergence of Humanity” Theory & Event, Project Muse

Can we imagine another form of humanity, and another form of power? The bio-sovereignty described by Agamben is so fluid as to appear irresistible. Yet Agamben never suggests this order is necessary. Bio-sovereignty results from a particular and contingent history, and it requires certain conditions. Sovereign power, as Agamben describes it, finds its grounds in specific coordinates of life, which it then places in a relation of indeterminacy. What defies sovereign power is a life that cannot be reduced to those determinations: a life "that can never be separated from its form, a life in which it is never possible to isolate something such as naked life. " (2.3). In his earlier Coming Community, Agamben describes this alternative life as "whatever being." More recently he has used the term "forms-of-life." These concepts come from the figure Benjamin proposed as a counter to homo sacer: the "total condition that is 'man'." For Benjamin and Agamben, mere life is the life which unites law and life. That tie permits law, in its endless cycle of violence, to reduce life an instrument of its own power. The total condition that is man refers to an alternative life incapable of serving as the ground of law. Such a life would exist outside sovereignty. Agamben's own concept of whatever being is extraordinarily dense. It is made up of varied concepts, including language and potentiality; it is also shaped by several particular dense thinkers, including Benjamin and Heidegger. What follows is only a brief consideration of whatever being, in its relation to sovereign power. "Whatever being," as described by Agamben, lacks the features permitting the sovereign capture and regulation of life in our tradition. Sovereignty's capture of life has been conditional upon the separation of natural and political life. That separation has permitted the emergence of a sovereign power grounded in this distinction, and empowered to decide on the value, and non-value of life (1998: 142). Since then, every further politicization of life, in turn, calls for "a new decision concerning the threshold beyond which life ceases to be politically relevant, becomes only 'sacred life,' and can as such be eliminated without punishment" (p. 139). This expansion of the range of life meriting protection does not limit sovereignty, but provides sites for its expansion. In recent decades, factors that once might have been indifferent to sovereignty become a field for its exercise. Attributes such as national status, economic status, color, race, sex, religion, geo-political position have become the subjects of rights declarations. From a liberal or cosmopolitan perspective, such enumerations expand the range of life protected from and serving as a limit upon sovereignty. Agamben's analysis suggests the contrary. If indeed sovereignty is bio-political before it is juridical, then juridical rights come into being only where life is incorporated within the field of bio-sovereignty. The language of rights, in other words, calls up and depends upon the life caught within sovereignty: homo sacer. Agamben's alternative is therefore radical. He does not contest particular aspects of the tradition. He does not suggest we expand the range of rights available to life. He does not call us to deconstruct a tradition whose power lies in its indeterminate status.21 Instead, he suggests we take leave of the tradition and all its terms. Whatever being is a life that defies the classifications of the tradition, and its reduction of all forms of life to homo sacer. Whatever being therefore has no common ground, no presuppositions, and no particular attributes. It cannot be broken into discrete parts; it has no essence to be separated from its attributes; and it has no common substrate of existence defining its relation to others. Whatever being cannot then be broken down into some common element of life to which additive series of rights would then be attached. Whatever being retains all its properties, without any of them constituting a different valuation of life (1993: 18.9). As a result, whatever being is "reclaimed from its having this or that property, which identifies it as belonging to this or that set, to this or that class (the reds, the French, the Muslims) -- and it is reclaimed not for another class nor for the simple generic absence of any belonging, but for its being-such, for belonging itself." (0.1-1.2). Indifferent to any distinction between a ground and added determinations of its essence, whatever being cannot be grasped by a power built upon the separation of a common natural life, and its political specification. Whatever being dissolves the material ground of the sovereign exception and cancels its terms. This form of life is less post-metaphysical or anti-sovereign, than a-metaphysical and a-sovereign. Whatever is indifferent not because its status does not matter, but because it has no particular attribute which gives it more value than another whatever being. As Agamben suggests, whatever being is akin to Heidegger's Dasein. Dasein, as Heidegger describes it, is that life which always has its own being as its concern -- regardless of the way any other power might determine its status. Whatever being, in the manner of Dasein, takes the form of an "indissoluble cohesion in which it is impossible to isolate something like a bare life. In the state of exception become the rule, the life of homo sacer, which was the correlate of sovereign power, turns into existence over which power no longer seems to have any hold" (Agamben 1998: 153). We should pay attention to this comparison. For what Agamben suggests is that whatever being is not any abstract, inaccessible life, perhaps promised to us in the future. Whatever being, should we care to see it, is all around us, wherever we reject the criteria sovereign power would use to classify and value life. "In the final instance the State can recognize any claim for identity -- even that of a State identity within the State . . . What the State cannot tolerate in any way, however, is that the singularities form a community without affirming an identity, that humans co-belong without a representable condition of belonging" (Agamben 1993:85.6). At every point where we refuse the distinctions sovereignty and the state would demand of us, the possibility of a non-state world, made up of whatever life, appears.

## 2NC

#### Heteroglossia is empirically critical to anti-genocidal language strategies

Susan Gubar Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies 25.4 (2007) 182-184 Department of English Indiana University Sounds of Defiance: The Holocaust, Multilingualism and the Problem of English, by Alan Rosen. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2005. 241 pp. $45.00.

Each close reading enables Rosen to elaborate upon the different meanings of the English language's marginality and neutrality in relation to the Shoah. Despite a miserably unreliable Index, teachers will find useful insights into works often assigned in Holocaust studies courses. Rosen's discussion of Cynthia Ozick's allusions to Celan and Shakespeare, for instance, enriches understanding of maternal loss in The Shawl. Similarly, Rosen explains how Art Spiegelman's survivor-father gains a measure of control and the means to endure persecution through his acquisition of English and yet how his fractured narrative voice manages "to torture English into being a foreign language" (p. 170). Particularly illuminating is Rosen's discussion of Hannah Arendt. Indeed, she is a pivotal figure here, one whose allegiance to her mother tongue of German alienated her from the accented English she spoke and then the scholarly English in which she decided to write. Exploring Arendt's analysis of Eichmann's bungling linguistic ineptitude in German officialese and also Arendt's misgivings about the official language of the trial (Hebrew), as well as the moral weight she imputed to the judges' knowledge of German, Rosen demonstrates that Arendt's alienation from English paradoxically turned English into "a universal language of the Holocaust" (p. 94), "the perfect vehicle by which to reinforce law's propensity to place distance between trauma and its aftermath" (p. 111). The virtues of Sounds of Defiance match its limitations. For while Rosen exhibits clarity and tact as he negotiates subtle gradations of meaning within a particular text, he has not yet formulated the generalizations governing his close interpretive readings or their implications in terms of North American literary history from the nineteen fifties through the nineties. How does heteroglossia differ in North American Holocaust literature from the bi- or [End Page 183] multi-lingualisms generated under other diasporic conditions? Given what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari have called "deterritorialized" languages, many immigrant or exiled groups have had to confront the puzzle of writing in a national tongue that has denied the writer personhood or the bewilderment of writing in an adopted tongue that has been derogated or marginalized as inconsequential. Rosen does not raise this comparative issue, nor does he generalize sufficiently about the impact of the increasing prestige of English as a global language on the trajectory he traces. Although the English language has recently been accused of linguistic genocide as it corners both academic and commercial marketplaces around the world, the history Rosen traces seems antithetically to pose a North American English able to evoke, heal, or revive (if not restore) those language communities so severely wounded, when not massacred. Still, within the complex rhythms of North American Jews' dual attraction to separatism and assimilation, the subject Rosen has chosen allows him to trace various attitudes of anger at, nostalgia for, and acceptance of the destruction of living Yiddish, during a time period when Yiddish became either a dead language or an academic subject or, in ever smaller pockets here and there, what is now called Yinglish.

#### Debaters are to judges and policy experts as patients are to doctors – our methodology is uniquely liberating because it is not simply oppositional and reciprocal – our approach better displaces the dangers of dominant discourses

John Wiltshire Literature and Medicine, Volume 13, Number 2, Fall 1994, pp. 211-228 (Article) Beyond the Ouija Board: Dialogue and Heteroglossia in the Medical Narrative

The dual or contradictory nature of the experience of being a patient might seem then to require a different, a heteroglossic, narrative form. But one might claim that pathology's heteroglossia is making a more fundamental point, which is a political one. Some patient testimonials or reminiscences directly confront or challenge medical understanding, criticizing, often sharply, the limitations of medical and other health-care personnel. But the very diversity of the pathography's materials is more telling. By including a range of voices, and by allowing the viability of divergent forms of knowledge, the pathography is resisting not medical or biological knowledge in themselves—it is, in fact, as I have argued, allowing them greater power—but the assumption that these are exclusively authoritative or privileged modes of understanding. It establishes a resistance to the domination of any one discourse. This cannot be reduced to a simple matter of conflict between the patient's and the doctor's voice, for the patient's voice is not necessarily reciprocal, in answer to the doctor, but obeys its own narratological and formal imperatives.45 In those pathographies compiled by caregivers and nurses, there are multiple sources, not just medical records and clinical opinions. Abrasion between the diary of the patient and the memoir of the caregiver is not uncommon. The pathography sets up the conditions in which truth may have diverse versions and emanate from diverse centers; it thus destabilizes and throws into question the pervasive monologic assumptions upon which medical thinking is founded. The pathography's heteroglossia is not merely a reaction to, or even a critique of, the medical narrative. It is the instantiation of a world in which medical discourse is only one among other languages for representing and dealing with the experience of the body.

#### Heteroglossia is more useful – it accounts for dialogism

John Wiltshire Literature and Medicine, Volume 13, Number 2, Fall 1994, pp. 211-228 (Article) Beyond the Ouija Board: Dialogue and Heteroglossia in the Medical Narrative

While King and Stanford find the concept of dialogism opens up important questions in literature and medicine, I see Bakhtin's notion of heteroglossia as a more powerful, more useful tool. In part this is because the specific phenomenon of heteroglossia subsumes, or assumes, the more general notion of dialogism. Heteroglossia, literally, "differing voices," refers to the copresence of diverse idiolects, or language styles, within a text. These, because they emanate from various social, historical, and political contexts, are necessarily dialogized, which is to say that they are conditioned by, and in interactions with, other utterances. Dialogism in fact may be understood as the general condition of all human utterances. The advantage of heteroglossia as a working term is that it points to specific features of texts.

### Heteroglossia: A2 Perms

#### Their focus on code switching is mutually exclusive with our methodology of heteroglossia – the role of the ballot is to determine which methodology is more productive in theorizing the social nature of language

Susan E. Frekko Goucher College Anthropological Quarterly > Volume 84, Number 1, Winter 2011 “Containing Castilian in Catalan Talk Radio: Heteroglossia and the Projection of Monoglot Identities”

Scholars have called into question the notion of distinct codes existing separate from and prior to situated discourse (Gal and Irvine 1995; Makoni and Pennycook 2007). Bailey (2007) has built on these insights to argue that analytical constructs such as "bilingualism," "hybridity," " syncretism" or even "code-switching" do us a disservice because they presuppose the existence of distinct codes. He [Bailey] argues instead for adopting [End Page 66] Bakhtin's term "heteroglossia" (Bakhtin 1981) which Bailey applies to "a) the simultaneous use of different kinds of forms or signs, and b) the tensions and conflicts among those signs, based on the sociohistorical associations they carry with them" (Bailey 2007:257). In addition to avoiding the presupposition of distinct codes, the term covers both variation within and between named languages, thus permitting "a level of theorizing about the social nature of language that is not possible within the confines of a focus on code-switching" (Bailey 2007:258). [Brackets added to clarify original]

## 1NR

#### C. Studies prove—depth is better than breadth.

**Arrington 09** (Rebecca, UVA Today, “Study Finds That Students Benefit From Depth, Rather Than Breadth, in High School Science Courses” March 4)

A recent study reports that high school students who study fewer science topics, but study them in greater depth, have an advantage in college science classes over their peers who study more topics and spend less time on each. Robert Tai, associate professor at the University of Virginia's Curry School of Education, worked with Marc S. Schwartz of the University of Texas at Arlington and Philip M. Sadler and Gerhard Sonnert of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics to conduct the study and produce the report. "Depth Versus Breadth: How Content Coverage in High School Courses Relates to Later Success in College Science Coursework" relates the amount of content covered on a particular topic in high school classes with students' performance in college-level science classes. The study will appear in the July 2009 print edition of Science Education and is currently available as an online pre-print from the journal. "As a former high school teacher, I always worried about whether it was better to teach less in greater depth or more with no real depth. This study offers evidence that teaching fewer topics in greater depth is a better way to prepare students for success in college science," Tai said. "These results are based on the performance of thousands of college science students from across the United States." The 8,310 students in the study were enrolled in introductory biology, chemistry or physics in randomly selected four-year colleges and universities. Those who spent one month or more studying one major topic in-depth in high school earned higher grades in college science than their peers who studied more topics in the same period of time. The study revealed that students in courses that focused on mastering a particular topic were impacted twice as much as those in courses that touched on every major topic.

#### In the specific instance of their AFFIRMATIVE- the assumption that our ‘interpretation must be an attempt to exclude their argument’ means the AFF is too arbitrary to generate real sociological discussion.

**Niemonen, 2010** (Jack Niemonen, American Sociologist, 41(1), 48-81, “Public Sociology or Partisan Sociology? The Curious Case of Whiteness Studies” EBSCOhost)

Although distinctive insights are possible—for example, as demonstrated in the work of Patricia Hill Collins—the claim that nonwhites have privileged access to the world whereas whites do not is implausible at best (Hammersley 1993; Srivastava 1996). Such an argument begs the question of how a correct perception of the world is achieved. In other words, the argument that personal experience occupies the same epistemological ground as social science is rife with logical and empirical problems. By grounding their framework on the epistemology of provenance (that only the oppressed can claim epistemic authority by virtue of their experiences), proponents of whiteness studies have blurred the distinction between scientific justification and folk beliefs. Personal experiences may be atypical or distorted by self-interest. Yet, to suggest so devolves into debates about the speaker’s authenticity and his or her right to speak. If an objective understanding of the world is impossible, then sociological concepts such as “concentration effects” may be more sophisticated, but no more valid, than the accounts offered by anybody else. If so-called higher values are little more than the hegemonic tactics of whites, and if the epistemology of provenance decides truth and falsehood, or right and wrong, then knowledge is local convention, and any outsider who disputes that claim is a racist (Aya 2004). Sociological research may not escape from normative concerns. However, this body of work is much more sophisticated than the proponents of witnesses studies claim (cf. Alba 1999; Bash 1979; Lee 1999; Lubienski 2003; Mckee 1993; Niemonen 2002). Even if the worth of this work should be evaluated by its public relevance, the claim on the part of whiteness studies proponents that its validity should be evaluated in the same way is questionable. Proponents of whiteness studies imply that true understanding is impossible across bounded groups because the latter construct discourses that—by virtue of the postulates of standpoint epistemology—cannot be communicated across boundaries without violating their authenticity (Sidorkin 1999). This premise creates a dilemma: How is it possible to appeal to social justice, while at the same time disavowing the possibility of authentic communication (Sidorkin 1999)? In fact, the boundaries between discourses are drawn too rigidly as a result of a conception of the social that is fixed, static, and homogenous (Merton 1972). In this context, whiteness is an arbitrary designation that underpins a political project that could not succeed in the absence of reification.